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# AFRICA

## SOUTH AFRICA

### Agreement on transitional executive council

Parliament passed on Sept. 23 a bill marking a further step towards democratic rule, providing for the establishment of a transitional executive council (TEC), a multiracial body to work with the government of State President F. W. de Klerk in the run-up to democratic elections scheduled for April 27, 1994. The disenfranchised African majority would thereby have a legal role in central government for the first time. This development led to the African National Congress (ANC) calling for the lifting of all remaining economic sanctions against South Africa.

The widespread optimism generated by these developments, however, was tempered by fresh outbreaks of violence.

#### Structure of proposed TEC

Details of the bill had been agreed on Sept. 8 by delegates to the multiparty negotiating forum [see pp. 39584-85]. The TEC and seven subcouncils would have extensive powers to "oversee the levelling of the political playing field" in the period leading to multiracial elections.

Among the TEC's objectives were the creation and promotion of a climate for free political participation. The Council was expected to work in conjunction with all levels of legislative and executive government.

Membership of the TEC was opened to any of the 26 groups which had been involved in the negotiations process, with each group entitled to one member. However, it was envisaged that the Council would comprise just 20 members, since six of those entitled to membership—namely the *Inkatha* Freedom Party, the Conservative Party (CP), the Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Kwazulu bantustans ("homelands"), and also the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)—had decided against participation. Negotiators at the multiparty forum did not expect the TEC to convene before mid-October.

The seven TEC subcouncils would be responsible for law and order, stability and security; defence; the status of women; intelligence; foreign affairs; regional and local government and traditional authorities; and finance. The most powerful subcouncils would be that on law and order, stability and security, and that on defence. The former was given the authority to establish a national inspectorate to investigate and monitor all policing agencies, formulate a code of conduct for policing agencies and effectively veto the decision of the State President to impose a state of emergency. The powers of the defence subcommittee included overseeing any planning, preparation and training for a future national defence force as well as substantial budgetary authority.

All decisions of the TEC would require the support of a minimum of 75 per cent of its members. The same level of support would be required for the subcouncils on defence, on intelligence and on law and order, stability and security, each of which would have eight members. A two-thirds majority would be needed to carry decisions in the other subcouncils, which would have six members. Government officials believed that the government and its allies could if necessary assemble sufficient votes to block TEC decisions. Similar beliefs were expressed by ANC sources.

### Lifting of sanctions

The day after the adoption of the TEC bill, ANC president Nelson Mandela declared that the "countdown to democracy" in South Africa had begun, and called for the lifting of all existing economic sanctions against South Africa.

In his Sept. 24 speech, at an extraordinary meeting of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid which had spearheaded the sanctions campaign in the UN from the early 1960s, Mandela asked governments to take "all necessary measures to end economic sanctions you imposed and which have brought us to the point where the transition to democracy has now been enshrined in law". He called on the international investment community to "help regenerate" the South African economy.

However, Mandela also called for the retention of the arms embargo until the formation of a government of national unity after the April elections. He left the decision to the UN on the question of the lifting of the oil embargo.

#### International reaction

USA. Within hours of Mandela's speech the US Senate had approved legislation lifting remaining US sanctions, and US President Bill Clinton called on state and local governments to end their boycotts. Clinton also said that the USA would launch "initiatives to help restore economic growth" including supporting South African access to the IMF and World Bank. It was later announced that Ronald H. Brown, the US Secretary of Commerce, would lead a trade and investment mission to South Africa to explore business opportunities, particularly with the black private sector.

Commonwealth. On Sept. 24 the Commonwealth Secretary-General Emeka Anyaoku announced that the Commonwealth would begin lifting remaining restrictions, and expressed the hope that South Africa would one day rejoin the organization [see pp. 17987-90 for South Africa's announcement in March 1961 of withdrawal from the Commonwealth]. Canadian and Australian ministers announced that their countries would lift trade investment and financial sanctions.

OAU. On Sept. 29 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) announced the immediate lifting of economic sanctions.

EC. The European Communities Council of (Foreign) Ministers outlined on Sept. 29 a "rolling

### Chronology of sanctions against South Africa

- 1960. Breaking of trade relations by China.
- 1963. Institution by UN Security Council of voluntary arms embargo.
- 1964. Breaking of trade relations by India; Japanese ban on direct investment.
- 1973. Imposition of oil embargo by 16 Arab countries in response to call from OAU.
- 1977. Imposition of mandatory arms embargo by UN Security Council, including a ban on co-operation in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons.
- 1979. Swedish ban on new investment; UK ban on export of North Sea oil.
- 1981. Adoption of comprehensive sanctions by OAU.
- 1984. Reaffirmation of arms embargo by UN Security Council and its extension to the import of South African arms, ammunition and military vehicles.
- 1985. UN Security Council request for UN member states to suspend new investments and export guarantees, re-examine maritime and aerial relations, prohibit sales of krugerrands and computer equipment for use by the security services and impose restrictions on sport and cultural relations; EC ban on sales of arms, oil and nuclear co-operation; US ban on computer exports to security services, nuclear technology exports, new loans (except those which benefited all racial groups) and import of krugerrands; Commonwealth ban on sale of oil, nuclear fuels, material and technology and computer equipment to security services; Japanese ban on computer sales to security services; French ban on coal imports.
- 1986. Ban by various countries on agricultural imports; Ban on imports of iron and steel imposed by EC and Japan; adoption of Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) by US federal government, prohibiting import of Krugerrands, military equipment, coal, iron, steel, textiles, uranium and agricultural products as well as exports to South African government of computers, crude oil and petroleum.
- 1987. US ban on new investment and bank loans.
- 1990. Lifting of UK ban on new investment.
- 1991. Lifting of CAAA, although sanctions retained by 27 US states and 89 cities [see p. 38318]; readmission of South Africa to International Olympic Committee [see p. 38318]; lifting of Japanese sanctions [see p. 38516]; vote by UN General Assembly to restore sporting, cultural, scientific and academic exchanges [see p. 38663].
- 1992. Lifting of EC oil embargo as well as removal of all remaining restrictions on sporting, scientific and cultural links [see p. 38851].

programme" for full normalization of relations, but warned that a new trade accord would not be signed until after democratic elections.

China decided on Sept. 30 to resume economic and trade relations. The ANC's call had been pre-empted by India which on Sept. 12 had announced that after consultation with the ANC it would lift sanctions and establish diplomatic relations at the beginning of October. On Sept. 13 Sweden had announced that it would lift trade sanctions.

#### Debt arrangement

A further step in the normalization of South Africa's relations with the international com-



munity was taken on Sept. 27 when Derek Keys, Minister of Finance, Trade and Industry, unveiled arrangements for the repayment of foreign borrowings which had been frozen since 1985.

Addressing an investors' conference in New York, Keys said that under the terms of the deal concluded with creditor banks South Africa would repay its debts of US\$5,000 million over an eight-year period starting in January 1994, with 10 per cent of the debt to be repaid by February 1994 and the remainder to be paid in 15 six-monthly instalments. It was hoped that the arrangement, which was endorsed by the ANC, would assist the negotiation of new loans and improve the country's credit rating in international capital markets which had plummeted after its declaration in 1985 of a unilateral moratorium on the repayment of debt [see pp. 33892-93].

■ Last article pp. 39584-85; reference article pp. R21-22.

## NAMIBIA

### Date for transfer of Walvis Bay

Following the August decision of the South African government to relinquish its claim to sovereignty over Walvis Bay [see p. 39584], Namibia's Foreign Minister Theo-Ben Gurirab met his South African counterpart Roelof "Pik" Botha on Sept. 8 to discuss a date for the "incorporation-reintegration" of the enclave into Namibia.

March 1, 1994 was set as a target for the transfer of the port and the Penguin Islands, the dozen offshore islands to the south Walvis Bay. Legislation to facilitate the process would be introduced in the South African parliament before the end of 1993. It was also agreed to establish two technical committees to resolve a number of outstanding issues including citizenship, the future of South African civil servants in Walvis Bay, ownership of the harbour, and the future of the South African Defence Force's Rooikop air force base.

### New currency

On Sept. 13 the Namibian dollar was launched. A simultaneous bilateral monetary agreement was signed with South Africa to link the new currency to the rand on a one-to-one basis. Since independence the South African rand had continued to be the legal tender.

■ Last article p. 39584; reference article p. R17.

## ANGOLA

### Implementation of UN sanctions

On Sept. 26 mandatory oil and arms embargo against the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), imposed by the UN, came into effect. The sanctions were not widely expected to weaken the rebels' military capacity; military observers estimated that, with its existing arms stockpiles,

UNITA could continue the war for a further two years. However, they did represent an unequivocal international condemnation of UNITA.

The UN Security Council had warned UNITA in July that such action would be taken unless it had implemented an effective ceasefire, accepted the results of the 1992 election [see pp. 39082; 39128-29] and agreed to implement, by Sept. 15 [see p. 39543], the May 1991 Bicesse Peace Accord and subsequent Security Council resolutions [see pp. 38180; 39350; 39497].

The UN action was taken under the terms of Resolution 864, adopted unanimously on Sept. 15, which also extended the mandate of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) until Dec. 15, and provided for further sanctions, including trade and travel restrictions, if a ceasefire had not been implemented by Nov. 1. Resolution 864 had delayed the implementation of the sanctions, giving UNITA a further 10 days to comply with its demands, in response to an unexpected request from UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

During the debate, Security Council members heard accounts of the devastating effects of the war, including a report from Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio da Silva Moura that inhabitants of Kuito, besieged by UNITA forces for seven months [see pp. 39543; 39584], had been forced to eat human flesh to survive.

The Security Council's Sept. 26 decision to go ahead with the implementation of the embargo was taken despite the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi from Sept. 20, since diplomatic sources had reported an intensification of UNITA activity, particularly around Kuito, from that date. The Security Council was equally unimpressed by UNITA's plan for negotiations as put forward on Sept. 24 in talks with Chris Garuba, military commander of UNAVEM II. Essentially, this proposal called for both sides to disavow the Bicesse Peace Accord and the UN-monitored elections, and to establish a power-sharing government based on military occupation.

### Possible dos Santos-Savimbi meeting

On Sept. 29 at the end of a three-day visit to Angola President Miguel Trovoada of São Tomé and Príncipe announced that Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos had agreed to meet with Savimbi, although a date and venue had yet to be finalized. Trovoada, the purpose of whose visit had been to arrange such a meeting, also said that he had received assurances from UNITA that it would recognize the 1992 election results.

As the month ended there were reports that UNITA had started new fighting in the southern province of Benguela and that rebel forces were advancing towards Caxito, about 120 km north of Luanda [for map see p. 39257].

■ Last article p. 39584; reference article p. R3.

## MOZAMBIQUE

### Chissano-Dhlakama talks

Talks between President Joaquim Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama, leader of the rebel

Mozambique National Resistance (MNR or Renamo), ended in Maputo on Sept. 3 with consensus on two of the three main points under discussion [see p. 39585 for start of talks]. As a result of significant compromises from both sides, agreements were reached on territorial administration before national elections and on control of the police. The outstanding issue was that of press freedom.

Dhlakama agreed to withdraw the demand that the post of governor in five of the 10 provinces should be assigned to a Renamo member. He accepted instead the government proposal that three Renamo advisers would be appointed to advise each of the provincial governors on all issues relating to the reintegration of areas hitherto under Renamo control, including economic and social issues. For his part Chissano, yielding to Renamo complaints that the national police force was not neutral, agreed to ask the UN to send in a team to monitor police activities.

The final document signed by the two leaders made no mention of the delays in the programme to disarm and demobilize troops from both sides, as set out in the October 1992 General Peace Accord [see p. 39129], which Dhlakama had thus far resisted implementing.

### UN resolution on implementation of peace

The agreement reached by the two leaders was welcomed by the UN. On Sept. 13 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 863 which urged the two sides to ensure that the momentum towards implementing the Peace Accord was maintained. It directed the government and rebels to continue their direct talks, and urged them to agree on an electoral law as soon as possible in order that multiparty elections could be held no later than October 1994.

Prompted by the UN resolution, representatives of the two sides met with Aldo Ajello, the UN Secretary-General's special representative, on Sept. 23 to discuss a revised timetable for the implementation of the Peace Accord. No agreement was reached, and a further meeting scheduled for Sept. 28 did not take place because the Renamo delegation failed to attend. On Sept. 26 senior rebel leaders had stated that Renamo was prepared to contest elections in October 1994 even if the demobilization programme remained incomplete. This idea was rejected by the government, which warned of a repetition of events in Angola since September 1992 [see pp. 39082; 39128; this page].

■ Last article p. 39585; reference article pp. R16-17.

## ZAIRE

### Agreement on transitional government

Negotiators representing President Mobutu Sese Seko and opposition parties agreed on Sept. 30 to adopt a single interim constitution for the transitional period, subject to a popular referendum. This would end the current situation in which parallel institutions of govern-



ment were operating as rival claimants to authority.

The talks had begun on Sept. 10, and aimed at resolving the political stalemate, which included the existence of rival governments—the Mobutu-backed government of Prime Minister Faustin Birindwa appointed in March [see p. 39352] and that of Etienne Tshisekedi, appointed in August 1992 [see p. 39039] and supported by the opposition-dominated transitional legislature, the High Council of the Republic (HCR—see p. 39227).

The principal transitional institutions as approved under the new agreement would be the president of the republic (with agreed presidential prerogatives); the HCR, henceforth designated as the (unicameral) Parliament of the Transition; the government of the transition; and the courts and tribunals. The agreement also covered procedures for the composition of the Parliament.

Earlier, negotiators had reached agreement on January 1995 as the date for the beginning of the Third Republic, following a constitutional referendum and presidential and legislative elections.

#### **Amnesty report**

A report by the human rights group Amnesty International on Sept. 16, claiming that Zaïre was facing its worst human rights crisis since the 1960s, was described by Mobutu as “tendentious”. The report accused security forces of “ruthless brutality” in the murder and torture of thousands of civilians and opposition members.

#### **New opposition coalition**

Tshisekedi was elected on Sept. 5 as head of a new opposition movement, the Democratic Forces of Congo-Kinshasa, which replaced the comparatively smaller opposition coalition, the Sacred Union.

#### **Confusion over UN recognition**

A Belgian report on Sept. 23 to the effect that Lambert Mende, Information Minister in the Tshisekedi government, had been chosen to represent Zaïre at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly, was contested by the Mobutu-backed government of Prime Minister Faustin Birindwa.

■ Last article p. 39543; reference article pp. R25-26.

## **CONGO**

### **Senate obstacle to implementation of accord**

On Sept. 5 the Senate, the upper house of the bicameral legislature, unanimously rejected a government bill to establish an international college of magistrates to arbitrate in electoral disputes, as provided for by the “Libreville accord” agreed by supporters of President Pascal Lissouba and the opposition coalition (the Union for Democratic Renewal—Congo-lesse Workers’ Party, URD-PCT) in August [see p. 39584].

At an extraordinary meeting of the Senate, members agreed that the accord was “a private deal

among political parties” and could not be endorsed automatically. The government agreed to withdraw the bill and provide further information to parliament. It was not clear whether the seven-member college, which was deliberating on 56 petitions arising from the first round of legislative elections in June [see pp. 39495-96], would continue its work in the interim. The Senate did agree to the re-run of elections in 11 constituencies, to be organized by an international committee as stipulated in the Libreville accord. On Sept. 17 it was confirmed that polling day would be Oct. 3.

Also on Sept. 17 the curfew imposed on July 7 [see p. 39543] was lifted.

■ Last article p. 39584; reference article p. R8.

## **CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

### **New President**

Ange-Felix Patasse of the Central African People’s Liberation Party was declared President on Sept. 27 following a second round run-off election on Sept. 19 [see pp. 39583-84 for first round]. Patasse won 52.47 per cent of the vote; his opponent Abel Goumba, candidate of the Consultative Group of Democratic Forces, won 45.62 per cent.

A veteran politician, Patasse had become Prime Minister in September 1976, three months before the then President Jean-Bedel Bokassa proclaimed himself Emperor, and continued in this post until his dismissal in July 1978 [see pp. 28172; 29451]. He returned from exile in France in 1979 only to spend a year in prison, being released in November 1980 [see pp. 29934; 30646]. He was then a candidate in the March 1981 presidential elections [see p. 30928].

Voting in the elections was reported to have been free and fair. The threat of the possible disruption of the second round was averted on Sept. 14 when former President (in 1960-66 and in 1979-81) David Dacko, who had been eliminated in the first round of voting [see p. 39583], withdrew his appeal to the Supreme Court against the first round results.

Results of the simultaneous legislative elections were not available as of Oct. 1.

#### **Release of Bokassa**

On Sept. 1, the outgoing President André Kolingba, who had been beaten into fourth place in the first round of the presidential race [see p. 39583], granted the release of convicted criminals to mark the 12th anniversary of his accession to power. Among the hundreds to be freed was the self-styled Emperor Bokassa.

Bokassa, who had been toppled by Dacko (his cousin) in a French-backed armed coup in September 1979 [see pp. 29933-34], had returned from exile in 1986 to face charges including multiple murder and embezzlement (charges of cannibalism being later dropped) [see p. 34983]. Condemned to death in June 1987, his sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment, then further reduced to 20 years’ and in December 1992 to 10 years’ imprisonment [see pp. 35428; 36266; 38424; 39227]. His release was condemned by Goumba who de-

scribed it as “an act of vengeance against all those who want to install democracy in this country”.

On his release Bokassa was escorted to quarters within the grounds of the presidential palace normally used by visiting heads of state. He made his first public appearance on Sept. 26 when he spoke at an outdoor church service in Bangui attended by 4,000 supporters. Clad in full dress uniform, he likened himself to Jesus Christ in having been “condemned in the name of the people”. There was no indication as to whether he would remain in the country.

■ Last article pp. 39583-84; reference article p. R7.

## **EQUATORIAL GUINEA**

### **Public execution of opposition activist**

Romualdo Rafael Nsogo, a young opposition activist who had been found guilty of murder and sentenced to death by a military court on Sept. 17, was executed in public on Sept. 19 on the beach at Bata airport, according to a Spanish radio report on Sept. 21.

The opposition Convergence for Social Democracy, of which Nsogo had been a member, said that his execution was part of a government strategy to intimidate the opposition and demonstrated that the government was not prepared to respect agreements aimed at bringing democracy to the country.

■ Last article p. 39583; reference article pp. R9-10.

## **NIGERIA**

### **Proposals for fresh elections**

The newly installed Interim National Government headed by Chief Ernest Adegunle Shonekan, while making repeated commitments to democracy, continued to rebuff opposition demands that power should be handed over to Moshood Kashimawo Olawale “MKO” Abiola, the presumed winner of the aborted June presidential elections [see p. 39494], who returned to Nigeria on Sept. 24. Instead the interim government made plans for the holding of fresh elections. At the same time, however, it made efforts to assert its independence from the regime of former President Ibrahim Babangida [see p. 39582].

#### **Military appointments**

A series of military appointments made during September effectively demoted allies of Babangida and strengthened the position of Gen. Sanni Abacha as Minister of Defence. As a result of the changes, widely thought to have been initiated by Abacha, several appointments made by Babangida just before he stepped down from office were reversed, and vocal opponents of the extension of military rule were promoted.

Babangida supporters moved to less powerful positions included Brig.-Gen. Halilu Akilu, a close associate of the former President, who was transferred from head of the Directorate of Military



Intelligence to head the recruiting and reservist service; and Brig.-Gen. John Shagaya, a former Interior Minister and potential rival of Abacha, who was given command of the ECOMOG multinational peacekeeping force operating in Liberia under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) [see this page]. Other sidelined senior military personnel were Lt.-Gen. Salihu Ibrahim, Lt.-Gen. Joshua Dogonyaro and Lt.-Gen. Gariba Guba, and Vice-Adml. Babatunde Elegbede, whose "voluntary" retirements were announced during September.

On Sept. 3 Lt.-Gen. Oladipo Diya, who had reportedly opposed the annulment of the presidential elections, was appointed Chief of Defence Staff. A champion of the army's professionalism, Diya criticized the military's recent involvement in politics. He promised that the military would abide by the Constitution and that the armed forces would be confined to military duties. Brig.-Gen. A. Abdullahi, hitherto defence attaché at the Nigerian high commission in London, became the new head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence.

#### Election date

On Sept. 19 the National Electoral Commission (NEC) announced that presidential elections would be held on Feb. 19, 1994.

It had been announced that the leadership of both officially recognized parties, the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic party (SDP), had reached agreement with the NEC on the holding of fresh elections in February (although the SDP leadership in doing so placed itself in contradiction to Abiola's demand that his June election victory be recognized).

The NEC released a detailed timetable on Sept. 28 according to which the process of the selection of party candidates would end with national party conventions on Jan. 7-9. Polling on Feb. 19 would be held simultaneously for the presidency and for local governments (postponed from December). Final results of the presidential elections would be released by Feb. 23, and March 5 was fixed as the date of any possible run-off. The new president would be sworn in on March 31.

On Sept. 23 Shonekan announced that in keeping with the spirit of national reconciliation every eligible citizen was free to run in the forthcoming polls and appealed to all citizens, "including those outside the country, to return to join in the national dialogue".

#### Return of Abiola

After a seven-week absence [see p. 39582] Abiola returned to Lagos on Sept. 24 and received a hero's welcome from over 100,000 of his supporters who gathered at the airport chanting "MKO for president".

On arrival Abiola announced that he would "talk to anyone" provided that such discussions took place "on the basis of justice, fair play and the people's will as expressed on June 12". Shonekan later indicated that he was prepared to negotiate with Abiola.

#### Suspension of pro-Abiola strikes

Strike action in support of Abiola, called at the end of August by the main unions [see p. 39582], was suspended in early September to give the government time to assess the unions' demands and the effect of their action. The

Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) called a temporary halt to its general strike on Sept. 2 and the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (Nupeng) ended its action on Sept. 6. The combined effect of the industrial action had been to cripple the economy, bringing major towns to a halt, paralysing the transport system and causing a serious fuel shortage.

#### Calling for renewed protests by Campaign for Democracy

Following the announcement of a date for fresh elections, the Campaign for Democracy (CD) called for renewed protests beginning on Sept. 29 and ending on Oct. 1, which it set as the target date for the resignation of the National Interim Government and the installation of Abiola as President.

There were contradictory reports on the success of the protests. Nigerian radio reported that the strike call had gone largely unheeded. However, according to the Pan-African News Agency (PANA) in Dakar (Senegal), the streets of Lagos were virtually empty, most businesses and banks were closed, and government offices were staffed by only a handful of employees, despite warnings from the police that they would deal "ruthlessly" with those participating in "illegal rallies, processions or demonstrations". Other international news agencies reported the violent break-up of a demonstration on Sept. 29 when the police used tear gas to disperse protesters.

■ Last article p. 39582; reference article p. R18.

## LIBERIA

### UN report on Harbel massacre

A UN report into the massacre of hundreds of refugees at a camp near Harbel in early June [see p. 39494], found that those responsible belonged to the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL—previously loyal to the late President Samuel Doe but now under the control of the interim government), and not to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) as had been widely assumed. The report, submitted to the UN Security Council on Sept. 17, also implicated the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), saying that although it could have identified the attackers shortly after the massacre, it had chosen to remain silent.

On Sept. 21 the interim government ordered the arrest of three AFL members named in the report for their alleged participation in the massacre. In a communiqué issued simultaneously the government stressed, however, that "the facts and circumstances surrounding the Carter Camp massacre [at Harbel] have not been fully established by the UN commission of inquiry". Earlier a Ministry of Defence spokesman had claimed that the report had been "biased" against the AFL.

On Sept. 20 the NPFL accused the interim government and ECOMOG of covering up the massacre in an attempt to discredit the organization.

Sierra Leone on Sept. 24 apologized for an inadvertent air attack the day before on a food distribu-

tion centre in the border town of Vahun, about 190 km north-west of Monrovia, which killed five people and injured 48.

#### Withdrawal of Nigerians from ECOMOG

The interim government on Sept. 1 expressed disquiet over Nigeria's decision to withdraw its contingent from ECOMOG before March 31, 1994. Nigeria, which currently provided almost three-quarters of ECOMOG's personnel, had also been a crucial source of finance for the running of peacekeeping operations since the creation of the force in August 1990 [see p. 37644].

The UN Security Council on Sept. 22 unanimously adopted Resolution 866 to establish the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) for a period of seven months to oversee the peace agreement signed in July [see p. 39545].

■ Last article pp. 39582-83; reference article p. R14.

## BENIN

### Cabinet changes

President Nicéphore Soglo announced extensive changes to the Cabinet on Sept. 8.

#### Benin Cabinet

- \*Desiré Vieyra Minister of State in charge of National Defence
- \*Robert Dossou Foreign Affairs and Co-operation
- \*Antoine Alabi Gbegan Interior, Security and Territorial Administration
- Paul Dossou Finance
- Yves Yehouessi Justice and Legislation; Keeper of the Seals
- Karim Dramane National Education
- Robert Tagnon Planning and Economic Restructuring
- Adamou Ndiaye Rural Development
- \*Theodore Holo Minister in charge of Relations with the Parliament and Spokesman of the Government
- \*Kapuoe Koumourade Osseni Labour, Employment and Social Welfare
- \*Marius Francisco Culture and Communications
- \*Lazare Kpatokpa Public Works and Transport
- \*Timothee Adahui Civil Service and Administrative Reform
- Rigobert Ladikpo Industry and the Promotion of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
- \*Roger J. Ahoyo Environment, Housing and Town Planning
- Veronique Lawson (f) Health
- Aurelien Houessou Energy, Mines and Hydraulic Resources
- \*Yacoumo Kpatashi Commerce and Tourism
- \*Alaassane Idriss Youth and Sports
- \*New appointment.
- \*Altered portfolio.

Women are indicated by (f).



The most senior minister to be dismissed was Richard Adjaho, hitherto Minister of the Interior, who was replaced by Antoine Alabi Gbegan, hitherto Minister of Civil Service and Administrative Reform. Other ministers whose responsibilities were altered were Theodore Holo, hitherto Minister of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, who took over from Marius Francisco as Minister in charge of Relations with Parliament and Spokesman of the Government. Francisco in turn became Minister of Culture and Communications. The reshuffled Cabinet included several new appointments.

■ Last article pp. 39354; 39404; 39548; reference article pp. R3-4.

## GUINEA

### Announcement of elections - Violent demonstration

President Lansana Conte announced on Sept. 3 that the country's first multiparty presidential elections would be held on Dec. 5.

While welcoming the announcement, a number of opposition leaders expressed concern that legislative elections would not be held simultaneously, President Conte having decided that they would take place 60 days after the presidential poll. They also repeated demands that a transitional government of national unity be established to supervise the run-up to the elections, and that the organization of the polls be assigned to an independent national electoral commission.

On Sept. 28 police opened fire on demonstrators who were marching through Conakry in one of a series of actions to support opposition demands. Protesters took to the streets again the following day and were again dispersed by police using live ammunition and tear gas. According to official figures, two died. However, the Guinean Organization for the Defence of Human Rights said that at least eight people had been killed and dozens seriously injured. It also reported violent clashes in other parts of the country, including Boke, 200 km north-west of the capital, where the homes of the prefect and mayor had been attacked.

■ Last article pp. 38753; 38903; 39134; reference article p. R12.

## SENEGAL

### Opposition to austerity measures

The hostile reception given to the economic recovery programme unveiled in August [see p. 39588] forced the government to suspend its implementation, to allow for further negotiations with trade unions. The austerity measures, which provided for a 15 per cent reduction in the salaries of 66,000 civil servants, provoked considerable industrial unrest including a 24-hour general strike on Sept. 2.

By Sept. 26 the government and unions appeared to have reached a consensus. It was agreed that only civil servants on monthly salaries above 50,000

francs CFA (about US\$175) would be subject to a reduction, ranging from 11 to 18 per cent according to the level of income. The deal was rejected, however, by the National Union of Independent Labour Unions of Senegal, which said that salaries of only 6 per cent of civil servants would be protected under the new scheme.

■ Last article pp. 39545; 39588; reference article pp. R19-20.

## BURKINA

### Cabinet changes

Prime Minister Youssouf Ouedraogo announced a Cabinet reshuffle on Sept. 3.

There were changes of portfolio for two of the three existing Ministers of State, Roch Christian Kabore moving from Finance and Planning to head the newly styled Ministry in charge of Relations with Institutions (i.e. the legislature), and Kanidoua Naboho taking on Territorial Administration. Hermann Yameogo's position as Minister of State remained unchanged, while Ousmane Ouedraogo became a fourth Minister of State, taking charge of Finance and Planning.

Other changes included the appointment of Idrissa Zampaligre, hitherto in charge of Relations with Parliament, to the Ministry of Transport. New appointments were Joseph Ouedraogo and Alice Tiendrebeogo as Minister of Water (replacing Seyni Macaire Nare) and of Primary Education and Mass Literacy respectively.

■ Last article p. 38951; reference article p. R5.

## NIGER

### Renewal of truce

The government on Sept. 11 renewed a truce for a further three months with one of the country's three main rebel factions, the Front for the Liberation of Tamoust (FLT). Formed in July following a split in the Front for the Liberation of Air and Azawad (FLAA) [see p. 39545], the FLT, led by Mano Dayak, had threatened to resume fighting in the north unless the government moved towards a negotiated settlement. The initial signing of the truce in March and its extension in June [see p. 39495] had been with the FLAA.

The FLAA and the Revolutionary Army of the Liberation of Northern Niger [see p. 39495], which did not participate in the latest truce, were urged to do so in a joint statement issued by the government and the FLT.

#### Public-sector strike

A three-day strike by public-sector workers, the second in 1993 [see p. 39355], ended on Sept. 13 after the government agreed to re-open talks on its austerity programme which had been opposed by labour unions. Reports in late September said that the government had suspended its austerity measures pending the outcome of negotiations with public-sector unions which resumed on Sept. 27.

■ Last article p. 39545; reference article pp. R17-18.

## CHAD

### Controversy over appointment of Finance Minister

A quarrel between President Idriss Déby and Prime Minister Fidèle Moungar over the dismissal of Finance and Computer Sciences Minister Robert Roingam appeared to have been resolved on Sept. 25, after both sides agreed on Amos Reoulengar as his replacement. The appointment came after days of mounting tension between Déby and Moungar precipitated by Déby's dismissal of Roingam on Sept. 14.

Déby's action, denounced by Moungar as inconsistent with "the smooth running of the institutions set up by the National Conference [see pp. 39402-03]", came amid reports of growing differences between the two over economic policy. On Sept. 14 Déby justified Roingam's dismissal as a necessary corrective to the "amateurism" shown by Moungar in the "management of public funds". On Sept. 16 Déby named Abderahmane Miskine Izo, the Commerce and Industry Minister, to replace Roingam as Finance Minister amid accusations from Moungar's supporters that Déby had "hampered" the democratic process by acting unilaterally.

The stalemate prompted 24 political parties to issue a joint declaration on Sept. 25 calling on both sides to resolve their differences on grounds that "no one has the right to act in violation of the charter of transition [ibid.]".

On Sept. 26 Moungar said in a radio interview that relations between Déby and himself had returned to normal, and that he was "determined to work in close collaboration with Déby to save the transition [to democracy]".

■ Last article p. 39587; reference article pp. R7-8.

## SUDAN

### IGADD peace initiative

A fresh initiative launched at a recent heads of state summit of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) [see p. 39628], to resolve the war between the government and southern rebel forces was welcomed by President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir on Sept. 7.

Speaking at a news conference in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, Bashir said that Sudan was "totally convinced" that the states of the region were "more capable of solving the region's problems", and that it was on that basis that Sudan had accepted the mediation of the quadripartite IGADD committee comprising Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya and Uganda. Bashir stressed, however, that Sudan would not repudiate other peace initiatives currently being pursued by Nigeria [see pp. 39403; 39450]. An official statement on Sept. 9 said that consultations were under way to resume negotiations between the government and the rebel movement under the auspices of the IGADD committee.



### Resignation of ambassador

Lawrence Mode Tombe, a former minister and senior southern official, resigned on Sept. 8 as Sudan's ambassador to Bulgaria and Romania after accusing the regime of "horrendous violations of human rights" in its campaign to crush the southern revolt led by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).

On Sept. 28 the human rights organization Amnesty International alleged in a report that attacks on civilians, forced resettlements and other human rights violations had substantially aggravated famine conditions in the country [see also p. 39307].

### Condemnation of US decision on terrorism

The government continued to express outrage at a recent US decision to declare Sudan a terrorist state [see pp. 39587; 39590]. On Sept. 19 Foreign Minister Hussain Abu Salih reiterated the government's denial of US charges of Sudanese involvement in terrorism, adding that fresh US accusations implicating Sudanese diplomats in terrorist activity were "groundless".

On Sept. 4 there had been further US press allegations of Sudanese involvement in the bombing in February of the World Trade Center in New York City [see p. 39311].

A statement by former US President Jimmy Carter in Washington on Sept. 16 claiming that the decision to declare Sudan a terrorist state had been motivated by hostility to Islam, was praised by President Bashir.

■ Last article pp. 39586-87; reference article p. R23.

## SOMALIA

### UN attacks on civilians

Some 200 people, mostly women and children, were reported killed on Sept. 9 after a US helicopter fired on a crowd in Mogadishu which had allegedly turned on UN troops engaged in a gun battle with Somali militiamen. One UN soldier was also killed. Justifying the decision to fire, a UN military spokesman said that the women and children were combatants who posed "an imminent threat to our soldiers". On Sept. 11 UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said that responsibility for civilian casualties lay with Somali militia who used women and children as human shields.

A further attack on civilian targets by UN forces was confirmed on Sept. 19 following a mortar strike on the Digfer hospital in Mogadishu which killed one person. UN forces claimed that it was used as a launch site by militiamen.

The total UN military death toll in the fighting since May rose to 56 with the deaths on Sept. 26 of three US military personnel whose helicopter was shot down by militiamen in Mogadishu.

### Delay in Italian troop withdrawal

Italy announced on Sept. 6 that it would delay "for an indefinite time" the withdrawal of its troops from Mogadishu, ordered in August following the death of Italian paratroopers the previous month [see pp. 39546; 39586]. The announcement came in response to a personal appeal from Boutros-Ghali following the deaths of seven Nigerian UN troops who were ambushed by Somali gunmen in Mogadishu that day. Two more Italian soldiers died in sniper fire in Mogadishu on Sept. 15.

### Setting of date for UN withdrawal - Re-opening of courts

On Sept. 22 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 865 stressing the importance of ending the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) peacekeeping operations in Somalia by March 1995 and handing over responsibility to an elected government.

Resolution 865 also requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to re-establish the Somali police, judicial and penal systems, and on Sept. 27 a UN official announced that UNOSOM II had certified the re-opening of Somali courts in Mogadishu. As part of the UN mandate to re-establish the court system UNOSOM II had set up a judiciary re-establishment council (JRC), composed entirely of Somalis, to select judges and monitor developments.

### Capture of Aydid aide

The US Quick Reaction Force, a company of elite US Ranger special forces which arrived in late August [see p. 39586], captured four Somalis in Mogadishu on Sept. 21, one of whom was identified as Osman Ato, senior adviser and financier to Gen. Mohammed Farah Aydid, the fugitive leader of the Somali National Alliance. The arrests were made under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 837 which called for the punishment of those responsible for the deaths in June of 24 Pakistani UN soldiers [see p. 39499].

■ Last article p. 39586; reference article pp. R20-21.

## KENYA

### Renewed ethnic violence

The government in September mounted a vigorous operation to quell renewed ethnic violence in western Kenya. Parts of the Rift Valley, the scene of fierce fighting in March and April 1992 [see pp. 38800; 38854], witnessed fresh clashes in Nakuru, Kericho and Uasin-Gishu districts. One of the worst affected areas was Molo in Nakuru district, which along with other areas in the Rift Valley Province was placed under strict security.

Responsibility for the clashes was attributed by the government to opposition parties which it said had deliberately fuelled ethnic conflict. On Sept. 4, 13 opposition MPs were arrested while attempting to enter Molo in defiance of

a government order banning outsiders from entering the area. A team of Netherlands parliamentarians seeking to enter western Kenya on Sept. 7 were also barred from doing so.

Estimates of the exact number of people killed in the clashes were uncertain. On Aug. 29 the government denied allegations said to have been made by Kerry Kennedy, executive director of the Robert F. Kennedy Foundation for Human Rights, who claimed after visiting Molo that close to 1,000 people had died in the recent clashes. On Sept. 3 Kennedy issued a clarification saying that her assessment of the death toll as between 365 and 1,000 had referred to estimates since 1991.

Official figures of deaths resulting from ethnic clashes, released on Sept. 1, put the number at 365 in 1992, and 29 between January and May 1993.

### Demonstrations by religious parties

Two people were killed and several more injured when riot police intervened in demonstrations involving the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) and its rival grouping, the United Muslims of Africa (UMA), on Sept. 9 and 10. The disturbances occurred mainly in the coastal towns of Mombasa and Malindi.

### FORD-Kenya crisis

The threat of an imminent split in the main opposition party, FORD-Kenya, increased with the resignation on Sept. 19 of Paul Muite, its first vice-chairman and deputy leader of the parliamentary opposition. Explaining his decision Muite said that a faction within the party had attempted to "take advantage of Oginga-Odinga's age to pursue personal ambitions".

### New party

A new political party, the Kenya Voice of Young People, which declared its loyalty to President Daniel arap Moi, was launched on Sept. 24.

■ Last article p. 39586; reference article p. R13.

## TANZANIA

### Possibility of Tanganyika government

On Sept. 13 the Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly, Pius Msekwa, clarified a parliamentary resolution relating to the establishment of a separate government for Tanganyika (mainland Tanzania). He confirmed that the resolution adopted on Aug. 23 provided for the possibility of setting up a third government, in addition to the Union government and the government of Zanzibar, and that the opinion of the people would be sought on the structure of the Union.

While the Assembly resolution was unanimously supported, members were divided on whether a separate government should actually be established. At least 50 signed a petition calling for mainland Tanzanians to enjoy the same control over their own affairs as islanders. However, several prominent figures, including former President



Julius Nyerere, called for the establishment of a single administration to govern the entire Union.

#### Ministerial changes

The resignation of Charles S. Kabeho as Minister of Education and Culture on health grounds was reported on Sept. 5. On Sept. 26 it was announced that Stephen Kibona, Minister of State in charge of Planning, had died in hospital in Washington, USA. No replacements had been named by Oct. 1.

■ Last article p. 39404; reference article p. R24.

## MALAWI

### Cabinet changes

President Hastings Kamuzu Banda announced a Cabinet re-shuffle on Sept. 11.

#### Civil service strike

A week-long wave of public-sector strikes involving some 6,000 civil servants ended on Sept. 7 with the acceptance of a government offer of a 35 per cent pay rise. Under the agreement pay rises, backdated to July 1, would be weighted according to salary grades, with lower echelons entitled to the largest increases. The strikes, which paralysed state institutions and closed the country's main airports at Blantyre and Lilongwe, had been in support of wage increases of more than 100 per cent.

#### Resumption of UK aid

The government on Sept. 22 appealed to the UK to increase its financial and technical assistance to Malawi, saying that the denial of aid had caused "great suffering to ordinary Malawians".

The UK had formally resumed aid to Malawi on Sept. 17 with the allocation of grants worth MK 67,000,000 (about US\$16,000,000) to help with the country's balance of payments. In May 1992 Western aid donors had suspended non-humanitarian aid to Malawi after expressing dissatisfaction with the government's human rights record [see p. 38898]. On Sept. 21 a two-member parliamentary delegation from the UK commended the government for its progress towards democratization.

The European Communities (EC) indicated on Sept. 17 that they would resume aid to Malawi by

#### Principal members of Malawi Cabinet

- Louis Chimango Finance
  - \*Love Munlo Justice
  - \*Hetherwick Mtaba External Affairs
  - \*Edson Sambo Health
  - \*Jodder Kanjere Works
  - \*William Binali Energy and Mining
  - \*Michael Mlambala Labour
  - \*Nyemba Mbekeani Trade and Industry
  - \*Queen Gondwe (f) Community Services; Women and Children's Affairs
  - \*New appointment.
  - \*Changed portfolio.
- Women are denoted by (f).

the end of 1993 in recognition of its progress made towards democratization.

■ Last article p. 39586; reference article pp. R14-15.

## COMOROS

### Postponement of elections

On Sept. 11 President Said Mohammed Djohar announced the postponement of the legislative elections scheduled for Oct. 10 and 24 until Nov. 14 and 28.

The official reason given for the delay was the "lack of sufficient material and financial means" to hold the elections on schedule. However, observers noted that the government had received several promises of funding including F 660,000 from the European Communities (EC), F 400,000 from France and F 120,000 from the UN (a total equivalent to about US\$210 million). This prompted speculation that Djohar wanted more time to press parties which claimed to support him to put up joint candidates, and thus to strengthen the chances of a presidential majority in Federal Assembly. Djohar was thought to be particularly anxious to minimize the potential threat from the *Union pour la république et le progrès* (URP), formed on Sept. 10 by the merger of Udzima and the *Union nationale pour la démocratie aux Comores* (UNDC). Udzima had until November 1991 supported Djohar [see p. 38565], while the UNDC was the party of leading opposition figure Mohammed Taki Abdoukarim.

■ Last article p. 39499-500; 39548; reference article p. R8.

## FRANC ZONE

### BEAC suspension of currency repurchasing

Following its Aug. 1 decision to suspend the physical export of the franc of the *Co-opération financière en Afrique centrale* (CFA franc) [see p. 39588], the Banque des états de l'Afrique centrale (BEAC) decided on Sept. 16 to suspend the repurchasing of CFA francs exchanged outside the franc zone. The measure took effect immediately.

Describing the action as a simple technical measure, the BEAC emphasized that it did not affect the franc zone's basic principles of the unrestricted convertibility of the CFA franc in relation to the French franc and the free transfer of capital within the franc zone.

■ Last article p. 39588; reference article p. R27.

## INTER-GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DROUGHT AND DEVELOPMENT

### Fourth summit

The fourth summit of the heads of state and government of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was held on Sept. 6-7 in Addis

Ababa, Ethiopia, under the chairmanship of Ethiopian President Meles Zenawai and attended by the heads of state of four other member countries: President Hassan Gouled Aptidon of Djibouti, President Daniel arap Moi of Kenya, Lt.-Gen. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, head of state of Sudan, and President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. Somalia, one of IGADD's founding members, was not represented owing to the civil war currently prevailing on its territory.

Eritrea, which became IGADD's seventh member on Sept. 6, was represented by President Issaias Afewerki.

A joint statement issued after the summit said that IGADD leaders had adopted a five-year development programme related to food security, environmental protection and desertification control. Leaders also endorsed current peace efforts to resolve the conflict in Somalia, and agreed to establish a committee under the chairmanship of Kenya, including Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, with the aim of ending the civil war in Sudan [see also p. 39626].

Several leaders emphasised the need to strengthen and expand IGADD's activities. While acknowledging that IGADD had originally been established to address Africa's environmental problems, some members, notably Sudan, called for greater involvement in regional peace-making and the formal creation of a "conflict resolving body financed by the continental organization [presumably the Organization for African Unity—OAU] to avoid interference in the internal affairs of African countries".

On Sept. 3 IGADD was officially reported to be operating under difficult budgetary conditions, owing creditors some US\$1,300,000.

■ Reference article p. R27.

## SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

### Summit meeting

The annual meeting of the heads of state and government of the 10 member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was held on Sept. 5-6 in Mbabane, Swaziland [see p. R27 for membership; pp. 39042-43 for 1992 summit]. Meeting for the 13th time (on the 12 previous occasions as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference—SADCC), members focused their attention on regional economic integration.

On Sept. 5 the leaders ratified a key treaty which committed the 10 southern African states to deeper and more formal arrangements for co-operation in trade and investment. The treaty was heralded as an important step in the establishment of a regional economic community which would be strengthened by the membership of a democratic South



Africa. Several leaders expected South Africa to have fulfilled membership conditions once democratic elections, scheduled for April 1994, had taken place, and they looked forward to South Africa attending the 1994 summit.

Another area of discussion was food security, including a proposal to establish a regional food reserve. Leaders heard that 1992 had seen the worst drought recorded in the region for generations [see pp. 38755; 38855], and that wide-scale famine had only been averted thanks to the efficient operation of the regional transport system.

Sir Ketumile Masire, President of Botswana, was asked to continue as SADC chair for a further year and King Mswati III of Swaziland was elected as vice-chair. In his closing address, President Masire paid tribute to the organization's outgoing Executive Secretary, Simba Makoni, who had held the position for nine years. He confirmed that Makoni would be replaced at the end of the year by Kaire Mbuende, a Namibian former Deputy Agriculture Minister.

■ Last article p. 39042-43; reference article p. R27.

## IN BRIEF

**BURUNDI:** The National Assembly on Sept. 8 endorsed a general amnesty, releasing some 5,000 prisoners; those excluded from the amnesty were recidivists, and those convicted of murder, organized crimes, arson or drug-related offences.

**ETHIOPIA:** Dismissing press reports to the contrary, Zimbabwean Minister of Foreign Affairs Nathan Shamuyarira stated on Sept. 16 that his government had not received a request from the Addis Ababa authorities for the extradition of former President Mengistu Haile Mariam who had been granted political asylum in Zimbabwe following his overthrow in May 1991 [see pp. 38174-75].

**GABON:** As a result of austerity measures adopted by the government, the allowances of all government workers, including senior politicians, were reduced by 50 per cent from Sept. 1 until the end of 1995; other measures included an increase in fuel prices and customs duties on alcoholic beverages and tobacco products.

**GUINEA-BISSAU:** Joseph Turpin, a former Secretary of State for Fisheries, was sentenced to three years' imprisonment with hard labour on Aug. 31 after a regional court found him guilty of corruption involving US\$9,000,000 from the European Communities (EC) relating to the disposal of four government-owned fishing trawlers; he was also found to have sold the country's fishing company, Semapesca, without authorization.

**MAURITANIA:** The government on Sept. 29 endorsed a bill to permit the country to accede to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

**SWAZILAND:** On Sept. 27 King Mswati III repealed the order allowing for detention without trial for up to 60 days; the order had been introduced in 1973 in the wake of the suspension of the Constitution [see p. 25908].

**TOGO:** The government announced on Aug. 9 that the electoral roll would be revised, thus fulfilling one of the conditions set by the opposition for participation in legislative elections expected before the end of the year [for presidential elections see p. 39583].

**UGANDA:** Nine army officers arrested on treason charges between 1988 and 1990 and subsequently held without trial were released on Sept. 1; Minister of State for Defence Amama Mbabazi said that their human rights had been "grossly abused", and also announced a review of the cases of those sentenced to death by army tribunals which he described as "illegal and incompetent".

# AMERICAS

## UNITED STATES

### Formal presentation of health care reforms

In a 53-minute televised speech to Congress on Sept. 22, President Bill Clinton formally unveiled a plan to reform the US health care system. The long-awaited blueprint, which represented the most sweeping US social welfare reform to have been attempted for half a century, aimed to provide every US citizen with permanent health cover.

In a speech which was repeatedly punctuated with rapturous applause, Clinton emphasized the importance of "giving every American health security, health care that can never be taken away, health care that is always there". Describing the current US health system—under which some 37,000,000 were uninsured and, therefore, were not entitled to medical care—as "the costliest and most wasteful system on the face of the Earth", Clinton characterized its reform as the "most urgent priority" facing the country.

The new scheme, which had been widely leaked in advance and had been sent to Congress in a draft form earlier in the month, involved maintaining many aspects of the current system of health insurance, but expanding and rationalizing the scope of its operation through a combination of market forces and federal regulation. At the heart of the plan lay the proposal to create vast consumer groups, known as regional health alliances, which would have sufficient bargaining power to purchase high-quality care at low cost from among competing doctors and hospitals. Each alliance would provide information about the price and benefits offered by competing health plans within its area, each of which would have to provide a federally certified minimum level of care. Individuals would choose between the competing health plans. Employers would meet 80 per cent of the premiums, and employees the remaining 20 per cent, although government subsidies would ensure that health costs would amount to no more than 8 per cent of a company's total payroll spending (no more than 3.5 per cent in the case of smaller companies). The self-employed, unemployed and those on low incomes would be given direct government subsidies to allow them to purchase a health plan, and every citizen would be provided with a health security card, a prototype of which was displayed by Clinton during his speech, which would be used to guarantee access to medical care.

While the scheme was founded on the concept of managed competition, an unprecedented degree of federal control was to be introduced, through the

**ZIMBABWE:** Six white farmers in mid-September launched a legal challenge to the controversial 1992 Land Acquisition Act [see p. 38804] by asking the High Court to declare the state's "designation" of their farms for resettlement as "null and void, unlawful and unconstitutional"; President Robert Mugabe described the action as futile.

creation of a National Health Board which would have powers to regulate all areas of the health sector. This Board would be empowered to limit the rate of increase in the premiums charged for health plans, and would be able to regulate the level of spending on public health schemes such as Medicare (the scheme which currently provided medical care for the elderly, which would remain in operation under the new system for those who wished to use it). Clinton suggested that the cost of the \$700,000 million reforms would be met by the introduction of new "sin taxes"—on tobacco and, perhaps, alcohol—and that no other new taxes would be required to finance the plan.

Following the formal unveiling of the plan, Clinton and leading members of the administration began a series of nationwide campaigns to secure public approval for the measure.

Hillary Rodham Clinton, the head of the task force which had worked for eight months to devise the blueprint, appeared before a number of House and Senate committees to explain the details of the proposals. She thereby became only the third First Lady in US history—joining Eleanor Roosevelt and Rosalynn Carter—to have testified before Congress. The combination of her renowned intellect, together with her bipartisan approach which had included wide consultations with leading Democrats and Republicans in preparing the proposals, meant that the plan received a sympathetic hearing, and the House ways and means committee chairman Dan Rostenkowski described her performance before his committee as "marvellous". Despite her formidable grasp of the details of the 1,500-page proposal, however, there remained doubts over how the scheme could be funded without greater sacrifices that the administration had thus far suggested.

### Housing Initiative - National service legislation

In a Labour Day address in Miami on Sept. 6, President Clinton outlined a \$600,000,000 housing initiative, involving private- and public-sector co-operation, to address the current shortage in "affordable" housing; the initiative was particularly directed towards regions such as Florida and the Midwest which had suffered from the effects of recent natural disasters.

The legislation to create a national service programme [see pp. 39588-9] cleared its final hurdle when it was passed by the Senate on Sept. 8.



## Publication of plan to streamline government

President Clinton and Vice-President Al Gore on Sept. 7 presented the administration's plans to improve the performance and cut the cost of the federal government. The plan, which contained around 800 individual recommendations, sought to save \$108,000 million over five years, much of it by reducing the number of federal employees.

The plan took the form of a report entitled *From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less*, which had been drawn up by the National Performance Review, a task force operating under the leadership of Gore. Its four broad goals were to reduce government "red tape", improve service to consumers, provide federal employees with greater control over their jobs in order to improve their productivity, and improve overall efficiency through a greater scrutiny of government programmes and the introduction of improved technology.

In unveiling the plan Clinton acknowledged that it would involve the loss of an estimated 252,000 federal jobs—12 per cent of the current federal workforce—but suggested that most of these job cuts could be achieved through voluntary redundancy and natural wastage. The leaders of the National Treasury Employees' Union and the National Federation of Federal Employees, two of the largest unions of federal employees, derided the plan, however, suggesting that the administration was being too optimistic in its belief that such a radical reduction of the workforce could be effected without having an adverse impact of the provision of services to the public.

It was estimated that between 40 and 70 per cent of the recommendations included in the plan could be adopted by executive action, while the remainder would require legislative approval. Both Clinton and Gore began campaigns around the country on Sept. 8 in an effort to win public support for the plan.

## Further military cuts and revised defence strategy

The Clinton administration's plans for the USA's post-Cold War military structure and strategy were unveiled by Defence Secretary Les Aspin on Sept. 2.

The proposals involved deeper cuts in military forces than those planned by Dick Cheney, the Defence Secretary in the Bush administration. Aspin retained his predecessor's belief, however, that, despite the cuts, the military forces would be of sufficient size and technological superiority to be able if necessary to fight two "major regional conflicts" (MRCs) simultaneously.

The Aspin plan was the product of a five-month, "bottom-up review" which had been ordered by the Defence Secretary to assess the country's future military needs. The "lean and mobile force for the new era" involved a reduction in total strength from the current level of 1,700,000 personnel to around 1,400,000 by 1999. Cheney's Base Force plan, drawn up in 1990, had envisaged a 1999 total of 1,600,000. Aspin planned deeper cuts than Cheney

## Planned strength of armed forces in 1999

	1993 level	Cheney Plan	Aspin Plan
Total personnel (approx.)	1.7m.	1.6m.	1.4m.
Active army divisions	14	12	10
Aircraft carrier groups	13	12	12
Navy ships	443	450	346
Air force fighter wings	16	15.25	13

in all branches of the armed forces except the Marine Corps which, under Aspin's plan would total 174,000, a level similar to that of 1990 and 15,000 higher than the 1999 total planned by Cheney. It was also planned that the country's National Guard reservists should be integrated more fully into the military structure in order that they could be deployed within 90 days of being called up. The two main weapons systems scrapped under the Aspin plan were the Navy's planned A/FX radar-evading bomber and the Air Force's multi-role fighter aircraft.

The review did not deal in detail with the country's strategic nuclear forces. However, a separate review was reported likely to recommend a 1999 level of 18 Trident submarines and 500 Minuteman-3 intercontinental ballistic missiles, each of which contained a single warhead. These weapons would be supported by 94 B-52 bombers and 20 B-2 Stealth bombers, all of which could carry conventional or nuclear weapons.

The central strategic consideration of the plan was the belief that, with the ending of the Cold War, the most serious military conflict in which the USA might be engaged would be regional rather than global. By pre-positioning weapons, fuel and ammunition in areas of potential conflict, enhancing air and sea transportation capacity, and developing more effective weapons to combat enemy armour, the Aspin strategy planned that the USA should have the capacity to fight and win two regional conflicts simultaneously. This "win-win" concept replaced the "win-hold-win" strategy formulated by the Bush administration wherein, in the event of two simultaneous conflicts, one would have been dealt with by a holding action until the other had been resolved. The win-hold-win strategy had been criticized by some of the USA's allies, notably South Korea, which saw it as a recipe for allowing allies to sustain massive damage before sufficient US forces arrived to turn the tide of the war. However, the win-win strategy was qualified by the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Colin Powell, who suggested that two regional conflicts would have to be fought "nearly simultaneously" rather than concurrently.

In announcing the plan, Aspin gave no indication of its budgetary implications. Defence Department officials suggested, however, that they were consistent with the Clinton administration's stated aim of saving \$127,000 million in defence spending by 1999.

## Admission of deception in Star Wars tests

Defence Secretary Aspin admitted on Sept. 9 that the Reagan administration had attempted to deceive the Soviet Union over the progress and viability of the "Star Wars" missile defence programme by secretly manipulating three space tests in 1983.

The admission followed a two-week Defence Department inquiry into a report in the *New York Times* of Aug. 18 which claimed that the so-called Homing Overlay experiments—designed to prove that an interceptor launched from Earth could destroy an incoming nuclear warhead before it struck US territory—had been manipulated to make them appear successful even if they had failed.

The Homing Overlay experiments involved a missile launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California attempting to intercept and destroy a simulated warhead launched from a US army base on Kwajalein (in the Marshall Islands) in the Pacific Ocean. To ensure the success of the tests, explosives had been secretly attached to the target warheads and primed to detonate automatically when the interceptor passed within a certain distance of them. The deception had failed, however, because the interceptors had not proved accurate enough even to detonate the charges.

Aspin stressed that the inquiry had found no evidence that the fourth test, held in 1984, was similarly manipulated. The success of the fourth test, the first time that one missile had deliberately intercepted another [see p. 33131], had been crucial in persuading Congress to finance the Star Wars programme.

## Cancellation of Florida tourist campaign after murder

The Florida state tourist office on Sept 14 cancelled its domestic and international advertising campaign following the murder on Sept. 14 of Garry Colley, a British tourist, in an attempted robbery. Colley was the second tourist to be murdered in the state within a week, and the ninth during the previous year.

Colley and his companion were attacked as they slept in their car at a rest area on Interstate 10, near Tallahassee in northern Florida. The incident followed the killing on Sept. 9 of Uwe-Wilhelm Rakebrand, a German tourist, in a highway shooting in Miami.

In addition to cancelling tourist advertising, Florida Governor Lawton Chiles deployed 540 auxiliary officers from the Florida Highway Patrol, Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, and Marine Patrol, to help patrol the state's 48 interstate highway rest areas. Chiles also offered a \$10,000 reward for information leading to the conviction of the killers, and announced that he was seeking to protect the state's \$31,000 million per year tourist industry by asking for emergency federal assistance to provide a greater level of police surveillance. In the days following Colley's death, however, representatives of the state's black community complained that police were indiscrimi-



nately apprehending and questioning black youths in an attempt to find those responsible for the crime.

## Arraignment of Jack Kevorkian

Jack Kevorkian, a retired physician colloquially known as "Dr Death", was ordered on Sept. 9 to stand trial on criminal charges relating to the most recent of the 17 assisted suicides in which he had participated.

The ruling, by Detroit District Judge Willie G. Lipscomb Jr., followed Kevorkian's indictment in August on a charge of having violated Michigan's law banning assisted suicide—enacted to curtail Kevorkian's activities—which carried a maximum prison sentence of four years and a \$2,000 fine. The move represented a landmark in Kevorkian's crusade to legalize assisted suicide by providing him with the opportunity to present his case before a jury.

On the day of the ruling Kevorkian attended his 18th suicide, that of a 73-year-old bone cancer victim, Donald O'Keefe. Kevorkian was arraigned on a second charge of assisted suicide on Sept. 14, and was released on \$10,000 bail with the condition that he refrain from assisting in any further suicides.

## In brief

Louis J. Freeh, whose appointment as Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had been announced in July [see p. 39549], was sworn into office on Sept. 1.

New York Mayor David Dinkins on Sept. 15 launched his campaign for re-election in November 1993 after securing the nomination of the Democratic Party; Dinkins was due to face Republican rival Rudolph Giuliani whom he had narrowly defeated in the election of November 1989.

Katherine Ann Power, a former student radical who until 1984 had been on the FBI's list of most wanted criminals, pleaded guilty in Boston on Sept. 15 to charges of manslaughter and armed robbery dating from 1970, after choosing to surrender to the authorities.

At least 44 people were killed when a Miami to Los Angeles passenger train plunged off a bridge and into an alligator-infested swamp near Mobile, Alabama, on Sept. 22; this was the worst US rail accident since the death of 45 people in 1972 in a collision between two trains near Chicago.

■ Last article pp. 39588-91; reference article pp. R54-56.

## CANADA

### Calling of general election

Kim Campbell, the recently appointed federal Prime Minister of Canada [see p. 39502], on Sept. 8 instructed the Governor General to call a general election for Oct. 25.

The Progressive Conservative Party (PCP), in office since 1984 [see pp. 33202-03] and re-elected in 1988 [see p. 36425], held 153 seats in the outgoing 295-member House of Commons. The PCP had in recent years recorded very low opinion poll ratings, but Campbell's election to the leadership in June 1993 [see p. 39502] had produced a fresh surge in the party's popularity.

The opposition Liberal Party, which held 79 seats, remained favourites to win the election. The outcome was unusually difficult to predict, however, in view of a collapse in support for the left-of-centre New Democratic Party (NDP)—which controlled 43 federal seats but had suffered declining support because of its perceived poor record as the governing party in the province of Ontario—and the unknown effect of the Reform Party and of the *Bloc Québécois* (BQ). The former, a populist right-wing grouping formed in 1987, controlled only a single parliamentary seat but had made a major impact in the country's English-speaking Western provinces. The BQ, which had been formed in mid-1990 by a group of separatist federal PCP and Liberal MPs from Quebec [see p. 37648], held eight seats, and many commentators predicted that it would make significant gains in view of the growth in popular support for greater autonomy for the province.

### Retirement of Robert Bourassa

Robert Bourassa, the Liberal Premier of Quebec who had been a staunch advocate of the mainly French-speaking province remaining within the Canadian federation, announced on Sept. 14 that he would retire from politics prior to the 1994 provincial elections. Although suffering from cancer, Bourassa, 60, was expected to remain as Premier of Quebec until his successor was chosen by the party.

### Closure of Atlantic fishing grounds

The federal government on Aug. 31 closed large sections of Canada's coastal waters in the Gulf of St Lawrence and south of Newfoundland to cod fishing, effective from Sept. 1. As many as 12,000 fishermen and fish-processing workers were expected to lose their livelihoods as a result of the action, which also reduced the permitted catch in other sectors of Canadian waters.

Only a small proportion of Canadian waters now remained open to cod fishing, since in mid-1992 a moratorium had been imposed on cod fishing in north-eastern waters, near the Grand Banks, off Newfoundland.

■ Last article p. 39550; reference article pp. R33-34.

Erratum. Canada was wrongly described on p. 39502 as "a predominantly Catholic country". According to official estimates for 1991, 42.25 per cent of the population are Roman Catholics, who thus form Canada's largest religious grouping.

## MEXICO

### Approval of electoral reforms

The electoral reforms introduced in July [see p. 39550] and approved by Congress on Aug. 24, were completed in mid-September with final agreement on the issue of qualification to run for the presidency.

At one stage in the debate the conservative National Action Party (PAN), which had largely supported the package, staged a walk-out when elements within the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) opposed a proposal which had been introduced to conciliate the PAN, and which would allow anyone born in Mexico of foreign parents to become a presidential candidate.

■ Last article p. 39591; reference article pp. R45-46.

## CUBA

### Legalization of self-employment

In a major departure from its traditional economic policy, the Cuban government issued State Decree Law 141 on Sept. 9 legalizing self-employment for certain people, who would be allowed to sell their products or services directly. The measure aimed to alleviate the very severe pressures on the economy [see also p. 39551] and also to curb the activities of the black market.

The law legalized private enterprise for more than 100 categories of worker, including taxi drivers, hairdressers, mechanics, farm produce salespeople and computer programmers. Those specifically barred from self-employment were people working in education and health, graduates, company directors and managers. The universal ban on hiring employees was retained. Although workers could apply to leave state-sector employment, the government intended that the new opportunity would be taken up particularly by the unemployed, the retired and housewives.

The state would monitor the establishment of this private sector, and, while products could be sold directly to the public, the state would take measures to prevent the "excessive proliferation of vendors, especially in particular areas". Initially the state would levy a monthly charge, on a fixed scale ranging from 20 to 60 pesos (80 pesos for taxi drivers) (US\$1.00=0.759 pesos as at Sept. 6, 1993); there would be no progressive earnings tax for the present, but this measure was not ruled out for the future.

### Efforts by Cuban citizens to gain exit from island via foreign embassies

On Sept. 10 a group of 11 Cuban citizens entered the Mexican embassy in Havana, asking to travel to Mexico, and refused to leave. Five Cubans tried unsuccessfully to seek asylum at the Argentinian and Brazilian embassies on the same day.

On Sept. 12 the Cuban authorities announced that steps would be taken to guarantee security at foreign embassies. They did, however, grant "exceptional" permission for the 11 in the Mexican embassy to leave the country, stressing that they should have temporary visas and not be seen as political refugees, and adding that the decision had been taken "in the light of the Mexican authorities' decision not to allow the use of its diplomatic facilities as a pretext for immigration from the island".

The issue was sensitive for both countries. At the end of August Mexico had been forced to reconsider its planned deportation of eight Cubans who came ashore from a capsized raft off the Yucatan coast, after violent protest among the Cuban community in Miami, USA. Another eight Cubans arrived in eastern Mexico on Sept. 26 when their boat was allowed



to dock as one occupant needed medical treatment.

A group of 72 Cubans occupied the Mexican embassy in the Dominican Republic on Sept. 16, demanding to be allowed to travel to the USA. Both the Dominican and Mexican authorities refused them positive assistance, however, and a week later it was reported that they were ready to leave the building.

#### Return of 120 exiles from Miami

A first group of 120 exiles from Miami flew back to Cuba on Sept. 21, following an announcement by President Fidel Castro on July 26 that the government was to increase the number of visas for exiles, as part of its economic reforms. Most had left Cuba in 1980 via the Peruvian embassy in Havana [see pp. 30610; 30474].

#### Deportation of alleged drug traffickers

In a major improvement in Cuban-US relations, two US residents suspected of cocaine trafficking who had fled to Cuba were flown back to Miami on Sept. 18. This was the first occasion on which Cuban authorities had returned a boat and crew to the USA for prosecution on drugs-related charges.

According to an unnamed official in the US State Department, Cuba had made similar offers previously, but these had been rejected under the Bush administration (1989-93) to avoid lending legitimacy to the Castro government. US President Bill Clinton said that he did not yet envisage lifting the blockade on Cuba, although the European Parliament had on Sept. 16 approved a resolution calling on the USA to do so.

#### Defection of air force officers to USA

Capt. Enio Ravelo Rodríguez flew to the US naval air station at Key West in Florida on Sept. 17, and on Sept. 24 the Cuban authorities confirmed that Capt. Leónidas Basulto Serrano had flown to the US base at Guantanamo on Cuba, requesting political asylum.

#### Successful eradication of eye disease

The WHO announced on Sept. 29 that Cuba had responded successfully to an epidemic of eye disease, which had been eliminated thanks to a nationwide distribution of vitamin supplements.

The condition, optic neuritis, had affected more than 50,000 people since the beginning of the year, with over 1,500 severe cases and up to a 70 per cent loss of eyesight in the worst cases; it was believed to have been set off by a household toxin.

■ Last article pp. 39591-92; reference article p. R37.

## HAITI

### Upsurge of violence

Hopes for a period of greater stability with the inauguration of a new Prime Minister and the lifting of international sanctions [see p. 39591] receded sharply in the second week of September with a sudden upsurge of political violence, including the assassination of a

close friend of exiled President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the prospect of Aristide's return to the island on Oct. 30 was thus jeopardized. It was reported on Sept. 9 that a group of 40-60 Haitians were being trained in the USA to act as Aristide's bodyguards on his return.

On the evening of Sept. 11 Prime Minister Robert Malval and other Cabinet ministers met with armed forces C-in-C. Gen. Raoul Cédras and military police chief Col. Michel François to demand the disbanding of gangs of armed "attachés" or police auxiliaries. No action was taken, however, and on Sept. 12 the special UN and Organization of American States (OAS) envoy to Haiti, Dante Caputo, publicly accused Col. François of being "very closely related to these killers".

#### Killings and intimidation

Five people were killed and around 30 wounded in Port-au-Prince on Sept. 8 when supporters of Aristide were attacked by "attachés" outside the City Hall, where former mayor Evans Paul was being reinstated (having been ousted in the 1991 coup).

On Sept. 11-12 a dozen people were killed, including Antoine Izmyery, the businessman who had financed Aristide's 1990 election campaign. A group of "attachés" forced Izmyery to leave a church where he was attending a memorial mass, and then shot him in the head in public. (A prosecutor appointed to investigate this murder subsequently resigned after receiving death threats.)

A group of attachés entered the Finance Ministry building on Sept. 14-15, threatening officials and demanding to see the Minister, Marie-Michele Rey, who was reportedly rescued by US embassy officials. The induction of Claudette Werleigh as Foreign Minister on Sept. 21 was subjected to continuous disruption. A number of television and radio stations were also besieged and staff threatened. An extraordinary session of the legislature was finally convened on Sept. 22, deputies having been deterred from entering the building the previous week by the presence of a group of armed attachés outside.

#### Emergence of new right-wing pro-Duvalier groups

A new organization calling itself the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH or *Le Frap*) announced on Sept. 16 that it considered Caputo to be persona non grata, giving him 72 hours to leave the country (a threat which he dismissed). The FRAPH called on Malval to widen his Cabinet to incorporate supporters of the Duvalier family, ousted in 1986 [see pp. 34158-60]; it also demanded Malval's resignation.

On Sept. 22 the FRAPH organized the largest demonstration since the ousting of Aristide to celebrate the 36th anniversary of François "Papa Doc" Duvalier's taking office. The participants were protected by the police, who had attacked participants in previous pro-Aristide demonstrations.

The formation of a new party, the Assembly of Democrats for the Republic (RDR), was announced on Sept. 22; its principal demand was for the resumption of power by the Duvaliers.

#### Decision to deploy UN mission

The UN Security Council on Sept. 23 unanimously approved in Resolution 867 the immediate deployment of a lightly armed 1,300-strong mission to Haiti, under the leadership of Caputo, with an advisory role in the creation of a new police force and the modernization of the army, but with no power to intervene in the activities of the security forces.

■ Last article p. 39591; reference article pp. R43-44.

## DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

### Cabinet changes

President Joaquín Balaguer announced changes to his Cabinet on Sept. 8.

Rafael Bello Andino was appointed Secretary of State to the Presidency, replacing Domingo Gutiérrez who was named Minister without Portfolio. Arturo Martínez Moya took over from Bello Andino as Minister for Industry and Commerce. Florencio Lorenzo Silva was named Minister of Finance, replacing Licelotte Marte de Barrios, who became head of the Dominican oil refining company. Victor Hernández took over from Nicolás Concepción García as Minister for Agriculture.

■ Last articles pp. 38430; 38573; reference article pp. R38-39.

## ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

### New ruling party leader

Foreign Affairs, Planning and Trade Minister Lester Bird was elected next leader—to take office in early 1994—of the ruling Antigua Labour Party (ALP) at its annual convention held on Sept. 5-6. Bird won 169 votes against 131 for Information Minister John St Luce. An ALP special convention in May 1992 had failed to choose a successor to Prime Minister Vere Bird Sr (who intended to remain Prime Minister until elections due in 1994), the votes for Bird and St Luce being evenly split on that occasion [see p. R28].

■ Last article p. 39312; reference article p. R28.

## BARBADOS

### Cabinet reshuffle

Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford relinquished the Finance portfolio in a Cabinet reshuffle announced in late August.

David Thompson, 31, became the country's youngest Finance Minister and was widely tipped as a future leader of the ruling Democratic Labour Party (DLP). Sandiford dismissed as "ridiculous" the suggestion that Thompson's appointment was "an open admission of Sandiford's own failure as Minister of Finance".

The Foreign Affairs portfolio went to Branford Tait, who had faced opposition calls for his resig-



nation as Health Minister over the management of the state-owned St Joseph hospital. Taitt succeeded Maurice King, who remained Attorney General and Minister of Justice and became Minister of CARICOM Affairs.

#### Incomes and prices accord

A protocol on wages and prices signed by the government, trade unions and private-sector representatives on Aug. 29 called for a pay freeze in public and private sectors from April 1, 1993, to March 31, 1995, except in areas where pay was agreed to be "substandard". Addressing union concerns that the value of frozen wages would be eroded by price increases, the accord provided also for price monitoring "so that [price] increases may be limited to legitimate cost increases".

■ Last articles pp. 38720; 39189; reference article pp. R29-30.

## BAHAMAS

### Cabinet reshuffle

Prime Minister Hubert Ingraham named Orville Alton Turnquest as Deputy Prime Minister in a Cabinet reshuffle announced in late August.

Turnquest, who remained Attorney-General and Minister for Foreign Affairs, relinquished the Justice portfolio to Janet Gwennett Bostwick, hitherto National Insurance and Housing Minister, who also took on the Immigration portfolio. Other changes included the elevation of William Allen, hitherto Minister of State for Finance and Planning, to full Cabinet rank with responsibility for Public Service and Broadcasting.

■ Last article pp. 39090; 39460; reference article p. R29.

## GUATEMALA

### Constitutional crisis

In September normal government was effectively halted by a constitutional crisis arising from an attempt by President Ramiro de León Carpio to rid the Congress of corruption. At the end of the month President de León called for a plebiscite to end the deadlock.

In the face of a decline in his personal popularity and criticism of his government's perceived slowness in addressing the problem of corruption in political life, the President had in August called for a purge of the Congress. As there was no positive response, he issued a demand on Aug. 26 for the immediate and voluntary resignations of all 116 deputies and also of all nine Supreme Court judges. Particular claims had been made against 16 deputies, who were alleged to sell their votes on a regular basis, and there had been expressions of disquiet that no moves had been made to expel two deputies, one of whom had been accused of drug trafficking and the other allegedly involved in a stolen car racket. A total of 76 deputies did offer their resignations to

the National Instance of Consensus—(INC—see p. 39503), but this group did not contain any of the 16 on the list drawn up by the INC.

A congressional session, convened on Sept. 5 to debate the matter, ended in a brawl in the chamber. The President of the Congress, Fernando Lobo Dubón, himself on the list of 16 names, then suspended the session, but 65 deputies defied this suspension to elect a new Congress President, Arturo Soto.

Lobo was reinstated temporarily by the Constitutional Court on Sept. 7, pending a clarification of the situation in the Congress. However, he proved unable to convene a quorate congressional session, with a majority of deputies, calling themselves the "Group of 70", saying that they would boycott any session convened by him until the final ruling had been given.

It was reported on Sept. 27 that de León had tried again to force all 116 deputies and nine judges to resign by calling for a national plebiscite to resolve the matter.

■ Last article pp. 39552-53; reference article p. R42.

## EL SALVADOR

### FMLN party convention

In the course of its first national political convention the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) on Sept. 6 selected Francisco Lima as its vice-presidential candidate to run with Rubén Zamora on the Democratic Convergence (CD) slate in the 1994 elections.

The FMLN had completed its transition from guerrilla group to political party with the conclusion of the process of verification and destruction of its weapons on Aug. 18. The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), a member organization of the FMLN, announced on Sept. 28 that it had decided to abandon Marxism-Leninism and now defined its line as centre-left. ERP leader Joaquín Villalobos declared that "the framework of the election struggle . . . places the FMLN near several very concrete ideological positions which are social democratic in nature".

#### Strike

Union leaders on Sept. 21 claimed the participation of some 60,000 of the country's 110,000 public-sector workers in a mass 48-hour strike in support of Health Ministry workers, who had been on strike since the end of August.

■ Last article p. 39553; reference article pp. R39-40.

## NICARAGUA

### Suspension of government-opposition talks

Talks between the government and the right-wing National Opposition Union-Political Opposition Alliance (UNO-APO), aimed at resuming the "national dialogue initiated in May [see p. 39456], were suspended on Sept. 28, reportedly because the UNO-APO had

refused to continue the negotiations when three government ministers announced their withdrawal from the talks. Government officials claimed that the ministers had been recalled to settle a strike by transport workers [see below].

The bilateral discussions, which began on Sept. 13 under pressure from the Organization of American States (OAS), had been interrupted once before on Sept. 7 when the UNO-APO demanded the resignation of Presidency Minister Antonio Lacayo Oyanguren and nine former UNO-APO deputies as a precondition for further talks. The UNO-APO had accused Lacayo and the deputies of leading President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro to deviate from her government's original manifesto. Chamorro rejected these allegations, however, and insisted that the tenure of the deputies was a matter for the National Assembly to resolve.

#### Transport strike

An agreement between the government, transport co-operatives and vehicle owners, signed on Sept. 24, ended a violent four-day strike in which two people, one of them a senior police officer, were killed. The nationwide strike had been called by some 30,000 bus, truck and taxi drivers to protest against a new vehicle ownership tax. An offer by the government made on Sept. 22 to suspend the tax for the rest of the year was rejected by the strikers.

Under the new accord the government agreed to abolish the tax, to freeze petrol prices for the remainder of 1993, and to refrain from taking punitive action against those arrested for participating in the strike.

On Sept. 25 Chamorro warned that the economic aspects of the settlement would have "negative consequences on the government's fiscal deficit".

#### Decision to replace army chief

An announcement by Chamorro on Sept. 2, stating her intention to replace army C.-in-C. Gen. Humberto Ortega Saavedra in 1994, threatened further to strain relations with the army, which declared that it would not accept the decision.

Addressing a military ceremony to mark the 14th anniversary of the establishment of the Sandinista People's Army, Chamorro said that she planned a five-year tenure for army chiefs in future. Afterwards, however, Gen. Ortega told reporters that the date of his retirement could only be decided by the National Assembly. On Sept. 5 Chamorro rejected charges that she had acted unlawfully by seeking to dismiss him.

It was understood that sections of the US administration and of Chamorro's own supporters had urged her to remove Gen. Ortega, brother of former President Daniel Ortega and army leader since the triumph of the left-wing Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in July 1979, on the grounds that his dismissal was necessary to reduce the FSLN's political influence. Gen. Ortega's removal had also been a condition for the release of several government officials taken hostage by right-wing contras in August [see pp. 39592-93].

■ Last article pp. 39592-53; reference article p. R47.



## PANAMA

### Acquittal of defendants in Spadafora murder trial

Demonstrations erupted in a number of towns on Sept. 6 at the conclusion of the trial of seven former soldiers for the murder in 1985 of Hugo Spadafora, when the jury acquitted all the defendants. A protest in the capital was led by the President's wife, Ana Mae Diaz.

Spadafora's tortured and decapitated body had been discovered in September 1985 [see p. 33976], shortly after he had apparently disclosed his intention to expose the involvement of the former dictator Gen. Manuel Noriega and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a scandal involving drugs and arms for the Nicaraguan contras.

The trial had opened in the city of David on July 6 and had been expected to end in at least some convictions, especially as one of the defendants, Francisco González, had admitted detaining Spadafora (although denying his murder). The conspiracy aspect of the case was not raised during the trial.

The cases against three other former members of the Panamanian Defence Force still lay with a grand jury. They included Noriega, allegedly the intellectual author of the crime, who was currently serving a prison sentence for drugs offences in the USA.

■ Last article p. 39593; reference article pp. R47-48.

## BRAZIL

### Splits in governing coalition

The government of President Itamar Franco, weakened by the withdrawal of the Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB) from the ruling coalition in August, also faced growing dissension from a more significant coalition member, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB). The PMDB convention on Sept. 12 was marked by inconclusive debate on an anti-government motion, but later in the month the party narrowly rejected a proposal from the influential PMDB São Paulo Governor Luiz Antônio Fleury Filho that it should leave the coalition, to distance the party from the government in the run-up to the 1994 elections.

#### Ministerial resignations

The departure of the PSB from the coalition in August entailed the resignation of Health Minister Jamil Haddad, who was replaced by Henrique Santillo, a former governor of the state of Goiás, and a member of the Progressive Party (PP). In the same month Culture Minister Antônio Houaiss resigned to head the Brazilian delegation to UNESCO, and was eventually replaced by Jeronimo Moscardo de Souza.

Reportedly at the request of Filho, Jose Antônio de Barrios Munhoz (PMDB) resigned in late August after only two months as Agriculture Minister (his

portfolio being assumed on an interim basis by Commerce and Tourism Minister José Israel Vieira). Also in August Filho unsuccessfully pressed President Franco to dismiss Planning Minister Alexis Stepanenko (appointed in May—see p. 39460) after Stepanenko had demanded the removal of Luis Carlos Deben Leite, President of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES). Deben Leite had been nominated to his post by Filho, and had apparently overlooked his duty to report to Stepanenko.

Four PMDB government members tendered their resignations on Sept. 13. Two of them, Social Security Minister Antônio Brito and Transport and Communications Minister Alberto Goldman, were both persuaded to remain in the Cabinet. Those who did resign were government Senate leader Pedro Simon and Environment Minister Fernando Coutinho Jorge, whose portfolio went on an interim basis to Rubens Ricúpero, the Minister with Special Responsibility for the Brazilian Amazon since August [see p. 39595]. (Pedro Simon announced on Sept. 28 after a meeting with Franco that he had resigned because he disagreed with government policy, and that he would leave his post as soon as a successor had been named.)

#### PMDB renewal of support for government

On Sept. 21 the PMDB national council voted by 25 to 22 votes not to accept a proposal sponsored by Filho and the governors of Para and Goiás to end the party's co-operation with the government. After the vote Filho said that he would respect the party's decision.

The party convention on Sept. 12, at which Luiz Henrique was elected party president, had debated the question of its continuing support for the government (precipitating the Sept. 13 ministerial resignations), but had opted to postpone a decision.

#### Resignation of FUNAI president

In the wake of the August massacre of Yanomami Indians [see p. 39595] President Franco on Sept. 2 dismissed Claudio Romero from the post of head of FUNAI, the government's Indian Agency [for dismissal of previous head of FUNAI in May see p. 39460].

■ Last article p. 39595; reference article pp. R32-33.

## VENEZUELA

### Permanent suspension of Pérez

At a special session held on Aug. 31 the Congress voted that the suspension of President Carlos Andrés Pérez (carried out in May—see pp. 39457; 39504-05; 39595) should be made permanent, to prevent him from holding office again, even if he were acquitted on the charges pending against him. All the opposition parties voted for the motion, while all deputies and senators of Pérez's Democratic Action (AD) party who were present abstained. The vote also ratified the appointment of Ramón Velásquez as interim

President until the presidential election due in December.

The vote was sponsored by the Social Christian Party (COPEI), whose leader, Oswaldo Alvarez Paz, conceded that it was a "political measure", based on the article in the Constitution requiring the Congress to replace the president after a three-month absence. The AD criticized the vote, since another constitutional article banned the removal of a president until the case against him had been resolved.

Velásquez called on Sept. 12 for the conclusion of a national pact between political parties, the unions and business interests to address the country's political and economic situation before the new president took office. He also proposed a number of reforms to the 1961 Constitution, effectively limiting presidential power by creating the post of prime minister, introducing a double round of voting in the presidential elections and giving greater autonomy to the state and municipal governments.

#### Introduction of VAT

The government announced in mid-September that value added tax (VAT) would be introduced on almost all goods and services with the exception of basic foodstuffs, transport, medicines and financial transactions.

VAT would be levied at a rate of 10 per cent on wholesale and imported goods from Oct. 1, and at retail level from Jan. 1, 1994. The government expected that the tax would raise the equivalent of about US\$300 million in its first three months, and that it would help to offset the country's rising public-sector deficit (standing at an estimated \$3,000 million).

The Central Bank announced in September that after three years of economic growth averaging 8 per cent per annum, the economy had contracted by 2.3 per cent in the first half of 1993. It cited as reasons the political uncertainty, a fall in oil revenues, public spending cuts, high interest rates and high inflation. Foreign investment in Venezuela fell by over 40 per cent in the first eight months of 1993, and more than 1,000 small and medium-sized companies ceased operations, involving the loss of 59,000 jobs.

#### University unrest

In protest against budgetary cuts and the introduction of VAT, a number of universities staged a demonstration on Sept. 23, which was broken up by the authorities. One student was killed and around 20 students and reporters were wounded, sparking off further student protests the following day. Interior Minister Carlos Delgado Chapellin and Defence Minister Radamés Muñoz León justified the government's action by accusing the universities of becoming centres of political activity and of deliberately fomenting public disorder.

■ Last article pp. 39595-96; reference article p. R58.



## PERU

### Approval by Congress of draft constitution

President Alberto Keinya Fujimori announced on Sept. 5 that the new draft constitution approved by the Democratic Constituent Congress on Aug. 31 would be submitted to a national referendum to be held on Oct. 31. In a speech on Sept. 18 he said that the referendum would be a vote of confidence in the government's national reconstruction programme and the peace process, and he staked his own political credibility on the outcome.

The draft constitution included several controversial provisions: (i) introduction of the death penalty for terrorist offences [see p. 39593]; (ii) an end to the bar on presidential re-election [ibid.]; and (iii) a measure approved on Aug. 9 allowing the President to make promotions within the armed forces, and ending the congressional right of veto.

The draft was criticized by opposition parties for concentrating too much power in the hands of the President. On the day of Fujimori's Sept. 18 speech, students at the San Marcos University in Lima staged a demonstration in protest against the draft constitution; according to the government broadcasting station, the national police intervened when the demonstration turned violent, and used tear gas and fired shots into the air to disperse the students.

The General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP) organized a demonstration on Sept. 29 to call for a "no" vote in the referendum. The police broke up the rally, which they said was illegal under the current state of emergency in Lima, and arrested 15 people, including CGTP secretary-general Teodilo Hernández. The CGTP accused the authorities of "trying to silence the opposition's right publicly to reject the Fujimori government's policy".

Former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar confirmed in August that he had been asked by the Popular Christian Party (PPC) to stand as its presidential candidate in the 1995 elections.

#### Sendero Luminoso activity

A sabotage attack attributed to *Sendero Luminoso* guerrillas caused a power cut in Lima while the government's programme was being presented in Congress on Sept. 24. The attack also coincided with publication by the Armed Forces Joint Command of statistics on the war against *Sendero*, whose actions it described as "subversive genocide"; in all, the report said, 25,352 people had been killed (including 2,232 members of the security forces) and 11,084 "terrorist criminals" had been captured.

■ Last article pp. 39593-94; reference article pp. R49-50.

## CHILE

### Demonstrations to mark 20th anniversary of 1973 coup

Marches and demonstrations were held all over Chile on Sept. 11 to mark the 20th anniversary of the 1973 coup by Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte which overthrew the government of President Salvador Allende. Most of the marches commemorated those who died in the coup and the 3,500 people who "disappeared" under the Pinochet dictatorship, although there were also a few pro-Pinochet demonstrations. (Pinochet himself was still Army C-in-C.)

In Santiago the marches were organized by the Communist Party (PCCh), human rights organizations, and relatives of the disappeared. They focused on the Moneda Palace, where Allende died, and the cemetery where he had been buried. A memorial mass at La Moneda arranged by the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) was attended by Allende's widow, Hortensia Bussia de Allende, who declared that reconciliation in Chile was impossible "as long as there is no repentance" by the military. Also present at the mass were the Interior Minister, Enrique Krauss Rusque, and several members of the Congress. Some 5,000 people progressed towards La Moneda and violence broke out when they tried to breach a security cordon. The police responded with tear gas, water cannon and aluminium pellets; according to one Chilean television station the police had been provoked by demonstrators throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. An elderly man died near the palace when he was run over by a police water cannon, and at the cemetery a young man was killed by a bullet fired from a police pistol. In total the number of injured was variously reported at between 20 and over 50, and the number arrested at between 75 and 160.

There had been a number of injuries and arrests in demonstrations held on Sept. 10 in Santiago, Concepción and Valparaíso. A faction of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) claimed responsibility for bomb explosions on Sept. 9 at two shops in the capital owned by US chains (one of them a branch of the fast-food chain MacDonalds).

#### Abandonment of bill to accelerate human rights trials

The withdrawal of support by two member parties of the ruling coalition, the Socialists (PS) and the Party for Democracy (PPD), following a campaign by human rights activists, compelled President Patricio Aylwin Azócar to withdraw on Sept. 1, before the scheduled parliamentary vote, his highly controversial proposals contained in the so-called "Aylwin Law", designed to accelerate the completion of the process of trying members of the military for human rights abuses [see p. 39594].

The abandoned legislation would have legalized Pinochet's 1978 amnesty decree for human rights violators (a decree which also provided protection from prosecution to all military personnel accused of political crimes between 1973 and 1978) and guaranteed the protection of secrecy for defendants

and witnesses, without which, Aylwin had claimed, the trials would be unworkable and the whereabouts might never be discovered of the remains of some 1,100 disappeared detainees who were still unaccounted for.

In an interview with the conservative paper *El Mercurio* of Sept. 12 Gen. Pinochet called for a total amnesty for human rights abuses, admitting for the first time in public that what he described as "excesses" had been committed. He claimed that the disappeared had been bandits and that those responsible had shown "justifiable . . . loss of mental control" under fire.

■ Last article p. 39594; reference article pp. R34-35.

## ARGENTINA

### Budget

The government announced details of the 1994 national budget on Sept. 15, envisaging expenditure totalling 39,980 million pesos, slightly below the 1993 total of 39,985.4 million (US\$1.00=1,002 pesos as at Sept. 20, 1993). The allocation for social services was increased from 69.8 per cent to 73.2 per cent (including a 20.1 per cent increase for education), and there was also a rise in security and defence spending.

The budget was based on a forecast of a 6.5 per cent rise in gross domestic product (GDP), a 4 per cent rise in combined prices, and a 1,815 million peso trade deficit, and did not include any salary increase for public employees.

#### Attacks on journalists

A staff member of the daily *Pagina 12*, Hernán López Achagüe, was on Sept. 9 forced into a car at knife point, and beaten up and his life was threatened by men believed to be off-duty members of the security forces. López had earlier, on Aug. 25, been assaulted outside his house after writing a report into alleged links between the Justicialist Party (Peronists) and extortion rackets in a Buenos Aires market.

The number of reports of journalists being harassed, threatened or attacked had increased sharply, with 23 such incidents reported in the five months to September 1993 (out of a total of 130 recorded since mid-1989). The rise was believed to be an attempt by hardline sections of the Peronists to curb the press in the run-up to the October elections.

President Carlos Saúl Menem ordered an inquiry into the attacks and publicly denounced them, but had also been highly critical of journalists, suggesting that a number of them were "ex-subversives" with former terrorist connections.

■ Last article p. 39594; reference article pp. R28-29.



# ASIA - PACIFIC

## JAPAN

### Announcement of economic stimulus package

The new Japanese government headed by Morihiro Hosokawa unveiled on Sept. 16 its first major economic initiative in the form of a 6,150,000 million yen package designed to boost the country's ailing economy (US\$1.00=104.275 yen as at Sept. 20, 1993). The package, which was the third such effort in the past 13 months, contained a series of traditional pump-priming measures which were designed to raise Japan's gross national product (GNP) by at least 1.3 per cent.

The spending allocated almost 2,000,000 million yen to public works, comprising 1,000,000 million yen on social infrastructure, 500,000 million yen to be spent by local governments and 450,000 million yen to be used by central government to assist the recovery from recent earthquake and typhoon damage. A further 2,900,000 million yen was designated for low-interest loans for the housing market. The remainder of the package was geared towards incentives for businesses, including loans to assist small and medium-sized organizations, which had been badly hit by the rising yen and the poor summer weather, to promote imports and maintain employment.

Unlike its predecessors, the package also included the loosening or removal of state controls in 94 areas of economic activity, simplifying the standards and certification procedures for imports, granting recognition for international standards for building materials, and allowing greater flexibility in the rules governing the types of bonds which Japanese companies could issue. There were also plans to pass on the benefits of the strong yen to consumers through reductions in gas and electricity prices, domestic air fares, and telephone charges.

Despite its deregulatory elements, the package was widely criticized as being too limited in scale and scope. Overall, it was only half the size of its two predecessors—in August 1992 and April 1993 [see pp. 39049; 39419], neither of which had had as great an impact upon the economy as had been predicted. In both cases only a proportion of the money earmarked for public spending had been used, and whereas the April package had been designed to increase GNP by at least 2.6 per cent, figures issued in September showed GNP falling in the April-June quarter by an annualized rate of 2 per cent. The plan was also deemed to be over-reliant on government spending, and was particularly criticized for not containing income tax cuts. Although several business groups had urged tax cuts, the coalition government was believed to be seriously divided over this issue.

### Cut in interest rates

In a further effort to spur the economy, on Sept. 21 the Bank of Japan announced an unexpectedly large—0.75 percentage points—cut in its discount rate—applied to loans to other banks—to a record low of 1.75 per cent. The rate had been falling for the past two years [for most recent in February 1993 see p. 39319].

### Agreement on political reform bills

In pursuit of its stated goal of achieving comprehensive electoral reform by the end of 1993, the government unveiled four bills on Sept. 17, the opening day of an extraordinary 90-day session of the Diet (the bicameral legislature).

The bills were based upon an agreement announced on Aug. 28 after two weeks of intense negotiation within the coalition government. At the core of the plan was a scheme to replace the country's corruption-prone system of multi-member constituencies with a combination of 250 single-seat constituencies and 250 representatives elected separately through proportional representation. The draft legislation also provided for the imposition of restrictions on donations by companies to individual politicians or their support groups, and for the establishment of a central election fund to subsidise parties and thereby break their dependence on corporate donations.

The opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), whose inability to enact political reform had been a key factor in its ejection from office after 30 years in government, vowed to oppose Hosokawa's reforms. However, the party announced on Sept. 2 its own reform proposals, which were markedly similar to those of the government. The key differences were that the LDP proposed 471 rather than 500 members in the lower house (300 chosen from constituencies and 171 elected through proportional representation), and that each voter should have a single vote rather than the two votes (one for the constituency and one to determine the level of proportional representation) suggested by the government. Under the LDP's plan the level of proportional representation would be determined by the total of votes cast for a party in the constituency contests, a device seen to favour larger parties which could field a full slate of candidates.

### Election of Socialist leader - Change of party stance on Korea

The Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), the largest single grouping within Hosokawa's seven-party coalition government, on Sept. 18-19 elected Tomiichi Murayama as its new chair.

The outgoing chair, Sadao Yamahana, in post only since January [see p. 39275], had been widely expected to step down following the poor showing of the party in the July general election [see pp. 39555-56]. He had also faced strong criticism, par-

ticularly from the left of the party, for sacrificing too many traditional policies in the interests of coalition harmony. The latest example of this was Yamahana's arrival in South Korea on Sept. 4 for a three-day visit during which he had talks with President Kim Young Sam and apologised for Japan's colonial rule of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945. The visit, the first by a leader of Japan's socialist party, marked a key shift by the party which had hitherto recognized North Korea as the legitimate government of the whole Korean peninsula.

In the September poll Murayama defeated Masatoshi Ito, supported by the left wing of the party, who opposed Hosokawa's political reform plans. The contest between Murayama and Ito was seen as crucial to the long-term stability of Hosokawa's government. Although 33 per cent of members chose not to vote, and Ito took 22 per cent of the vote itself, Murayama's margin of victory was sufficiently convincing to provide an important boost to the new government. Following the election the new leader pledged his loyalty to Hosokawa.

### Temporary easing of rice import ban

It was reported on Sept. 26 that the government had agreed to lift temporarily its prohibition on rice imports. The move was prompted by the worst rice harvest for 40 years due to an exceptionally cool and wet summer.

Traditionally the ban, which was a long-standing source of irritation among Japan's trading partners, had been justified on the grounds that Japan needed to be self-sufficient in rice production for reasons of national security. In reality, however, the ban had been maintained by successive LDP government as a means of bolstering its popularity in rural constituencies, where the party traditionally enjoyed a disproportionately high level of support.

### Trade relations with USA

Hosokawa made his first visit to the USA as Japanese leader in September, partly in order to address the UN General Assembly [for opening of new session see p. 39667], and held talks with President Bill Clinton on Sept. 27. Although some of the economic measures taken by the new government were portrayed as important indicators of Japan's sincerity in taking steps to reduce its trade surplus with the USA, the issue of US access to Japanese domestic markets remained an outstanding source of bilateral tension. Hosokawa reiterated his government's opposition to the setting of specific numerical targets in reducing the surplus, and also asked the US government to be patient and to allow his reflationary policies to have an effect upon the surplus.

Prior to the meeting trade officials had held talks in which, it was reported on Sept 24, the USA had threatened "radical action" unless the current bilateral trade imbalance was redressed. By late September the US deficit with Japan for 1993 so far stood at \$60,000 million, compared with \$50,000 million for the whole of 1992.



It was also reported on Sept. 24 that, in a novel initiative to help redress the imbalance, the US administration had proposed to assist Japan in building a satellite-based missile defence system in return for advanced commercial technologies which could assist US industry.

The plan was related to Japanese defence concerns which had been dramatically heightened by the test-firing on May 29 of a North Korean Rodong I missile over the Sea of Japan. The missile was believed to have a range of some 1,000 km and, together with North Korea's alleged development of nuclear weapons [see pp. 39596-97], was seen as a serious threat to Japanese security. Japan's current anti-missile defences consisted of a first-generation Patriot system which was not scheduled for replacement by the more advanced version—that used in the Gulf War—until around 1995. Even then, it was unclear if even the most advanced Patriot technology would provide adequate protection against a North Korean attack.

#### **Visit by UK Prime Minister - Apology for treatment of POWs**

Hosokawa on Sept. 20 expressed his "deep remorse and apology" for Japan's treatment of British prisoners of war (POWs) during the Pacific War, but rejected claims that the government should pay compensation to former POWs. His remarks were made during a three-day visit by UK Prime Minister John Major. Hosokawa stressed that the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty had settled the compensation issue; however, he did not dismiss the possibility that payments might be made by non-governmental organizations.

Although Major's visit was designed to discuss trade and investment matters, Hosokawa's unprecedented August apology for Japan's wartime conduct [see p. 39597] had encouraged former POWs to press their case for compensation. The Japanese Labour Camp Survivors' Association, representing 12,000 British former prisoners, had claimed compensation payments of £13,000 for each of its members.

#### **Typhoon damage**

Southern and western Japan was hit on Sept. 3 by Typhoon Wancy, one of the most powerful storms to have struck Japan in the last 50 years. Winds of up to 212 km per hour caused widespread chaos, killing more than 40 people and injuring more than 150 others.

■ Last article pp. 39596-97; reference article pp. R69-70.

## **NORTH KOREA**

### **Relations with IAEA over nuclear inspection issue**

Confrontation continued throughout September between the government of North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), arising from the former's refusal to allow unrestricted access by IAEA inspectors to two sites in the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

In accordance with a commitment given in bilateral talks with the USA [see p. 39509], North Korea

resumed negotiations with IAEA representatives in Vienna on Sept. 1-3. No agreement on the Yongbyon sites was forthcoming, however, and a second round of negotiations was postponed after North Korea insisted that it be held in Pyongyang, a condition rejected by the IAEA. The matter was discussed at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting which convened on Sept. 21 and, despite a last-minute North Korean offer to attend further talks in Vienna, a special resolution was adopted on Sept. 23 to refer the matter to the 37th general meeting of the IAEA.

At the opening session of the general meeting, on Sept. 27, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix informed delegates that North Korea's willingness to comply with the agency's safeguards appeared "to have diminished rather than grown". He also confirmed that the agency's analysis of samples obtained from North Korea indicated that "some nuclear material exists that is not reported". The meeting approved a resolution on Oct. 1 which expressed "grave concern" over North Korea's refusal to submit to inspection and called upon the North Korean government to abide by the previous IAEA demands, issued since May, to implement fully the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement. The North Korean government expressed vehement objections to the issue being raised at the meeting, and responded by withdrawing its earlier offer of further talks in Vienna.

#### **Relations with USA and South Korea**

The unwillingness of the North Korean government to comply with IAEA demands hampered any progress in bilateral relations with either the USA or South Korea.

While the North Korean government was known to be eager to engage in further talks with the USA, the Clinton administration had made it clear that a third round of talks would be undertaken only when it was satisfied that North Korea was engaged in serious negotiations with the IAEA and with South Korea. The North Korean Foreign Ministry denounced these preconditions and on Sept. 22 warned that they might lead to a reversal of North Korea's decision to suspend its threatened withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [see p. 39509].

Bilateral talks between the two Korean states had been suspended since early 1993, following the South's refusal to concede to the North's demand to cancel its annual "Team Spirit" military exercises with the USA. On Sept. 1, however, the North appeared to relax its position by offering to exchange special envoys on Sept. 10 as a first step towards addressing the nuclear issue. The South Korean government expressed its willingness to participate, and suggested a meeting on Sept. 8. The proposal foundered, however, after North Korea added preconditions for the talks which included the South ending its support for international efforts to force the North to accept nuclear inspection, and—in an apparent reference to Team Spirit—providing a commitment to end its "nuclear war games".

■ Last article pp. 39597-98; reference article pp. R73-74.

## **SOUTH KOREA**

### **Continuing anti-corruption drive**

A further stage in President Kim Young Sam's rigorous anti-corruption campaign was achieved on Sept. 7, when the assets possessed by more than 1,500 public servants and legislators were revealed publicly. Although earlier in the year some leading officials had followed Kim's personal example in declaring the worth of their assets, there was no precedent for the scale of the September disclosures which included those of Cabinet Ministers, Vice-Ministers, judges, military officers and academics.

A government ethics committee began work immediately to examine the listed assets with a view to taking action against those officials who appeared to have accumulated wealth through corrupt or improper means. Just as the initial disclosure in March had led to a number of resignations among legislators, so the latest revelations were expected to have a similar, but more extensive, effect.

The disclosure was followed on Sept. 10 by the resignation of the head of the judiciary, Chief Justice Kim Deok Joo. For some time Kim had been under suspicion of having profited from real estate speculation, although the immunity enjoyed by judges meant that there was no executive means to remove him. His resignation was seen as opening the way for the Supreme Court to begin action against those judges whose assets suggested that they had profited from their office.

Prosecutor General Park Jong Cheol resigned on Sept. 13 in what was portrayed as a move to take responsibility for the widespread corruption which had been revealed—through the assets disclosure—among senior officials within the prosecution service. His resignation was followed on Sept. 20 by those of the head of the National Police Agency, Kim Hyo Eun, and the chief of the Seoul metropolitan police, Yo Kwan Ku, both of whom were accused of having amassed huge wealth through corruption.

#### **Investigation of Roh Tae Woo**

Notwithstanding Kim's stance against corruption, the chances of the prosecution of his predecessor Roh Tae Woo, for actions committed prior to or during his term as President, appeared to recede during September.

Government auditors, investigating allegations of corruption in connection with the 1991 purchase of US fighter aircraft, announced on Sept. 7 that they had found no evidence of wrongdoing by Roh, and that they would not be pressing charges over his refusal to answer all of the questions which had been put to him during their inquiry. On Sept. 13 the ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) indicated that it would prevent opposition efforts to force Roh to testify before the National Assembly as part of the legislature's separate probe into the affair.

#### **Visit by French President**

President Mitterrand of France made a three-day official visit to South Korea, beginning on



Sept. 14, during which he held talks with President Kim and agreed on joint measures in the fields of trade, technology and investment.

The visit, the first made to South Korea by a French head of state, began inauspiciously when Mitterrand vomited into his handkerchief while signing the guest book at the presidential mansion. He was attended by his doctor and within 30 minutes was able to resume his official functions.

■ Last article p. 39598; reference article pp. R74-75.

## CHINA

### Release of dissident

The Chinese authorities on Sept. 14 released Wei Jingsheng, the country's most prominent political prisoner, six months before the end of his 15-year prison sentence. The move came nine days before a vote by members of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to determine the venue of the 2000 Olympic Games, and was widely seen as an attempt by the Chinese government to improve the chances of Beijing being chosen to host the Games. [For IOC's decision to award the games to Sydney rather than Beijing, see p. 39667.]

Wei, 43, was released on probation by a court in Tangshan, in Hebei province, ostensibly on the grounds of good behaviour. He had been imprisoned in 1979 for "counter-revolutionary crimes" and the sale of military secrets, although most commentators believed that his real offence had been his involvement in the 1978-79 Democracy Wall protest movement and his criticism of China's veteran leader, Deng Xiaoping [see pp. 30495-96]. As a symbol of the struggle for greater democracy within China, Wei's release had been long sought by human rights organizations and Western governments. On Sept. 20, speaking for the first time since his release, Wei stated that he would continue "to fight for the cause of democracy", but would be forced to restrain his activities for three years while he remained on probation.

### Execution of finance workers - Arrest of journalist

Eight young financial workers were executed in Beijing on Sept. 27.

The death sentences were imposed as a response to what the authorities described as the largest instance of embezzlement of public funds since 1949. Those involved, most of whom had been accountants, were alleged to have profited from the poor management of the country's banks. The widespread publicity surrounding their deaths was seen as a clear attempt to deter others from taking advantage of the country's chaotic financial sector.

Also on Sept. 27, in an unrelated case, Xi Yang, a correspondent of the Hong Kong-based newspaper *Ming Pao*, was arrested by the Municipal State Security Bureau of Beijing and charged with "espionage regarding state secrets on banking".

### Visit by Vatican official

Cardinal Roger Etchegaray, the highest-ranking Vatican official to visit China since 1949, arrived on Sept. 3 to participate in the opening of China's national games.

Although invited as a personal friend of Wu Shaozu, the head of China's State Physical Culture and Sports Commission, Etchegaray described his visit as a "visible sign of the voluntary dialogue between the People's Republic of China and the Catholic Church". The Chinese government had severed diplomatic relations with the Vatican in 1950 and had forced the country's 3,000,000 Catholics to renounce the authority of the Pope and to join the government-sponsored Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association.

■ Last article p. 39598; reference article pp. R65-66.

## TAIWAN

### Relations with mainland

Taiwan and China opened a fresh round of "unofficial" talks in late August, the first since the historic Koo-Wang meeting in Singapore in April [see p. 39416-17]. The swift breakdown of the talks, however, coincided with the Chinese publication of a White Paper on its Taiwan policy which stressed a traditional "reunification" line. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of Sept. 16, the breakdown of the talks and the paper's publication "sharply reversed the pro-China sentiment in Taiwan" which had been in evidence since the Singapore meeting.

The meeting between the Taiwanese Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Chinese Association for Relations Across the Straits (ARATS) opened in Beijing, the Chinese capital, on Aug. 30. The following day, China published its policy paper entitled *The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China*. The paper reaffirmed China's claim to sovereignty of the island of Taiwan and reiterated its readiness to use force to realise its goal of unification. The SEF-ARATS meeting ended before schedule on Sept. 3 with no progress having been achieved.

The Chinese policy paper underscored the government's opposition to attempts to internationalize the Taiwan question. In particular, the mainland opposed Taiwan's drive for membership of the UN, which had gained political momentum during 1993 [for Taiwan's expulsion from the UN in 1971 at China's insistence see pp. 24941-44]. In early September a group of Latin American countries formally requested that the issue of Taiwan's membership of the UN be placed on the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly. The UN steering committee rejected the request prior to the opening of the Assembly in late September. However, Taiwanese officials stressed that Taiwan would continue to strive for entry to the UN.

### Threatened resignation of SEF official

On Sept. 7 Chiu Chin-yi announced his intention to resign as SEF secretary general. Chiu's announcement reportedly followed a series of bitter disputes within the SEF and the government over policy towards the mainland.

## Moves to combat corruption

On Sept. 2 the Executive Yuan approved an administrative reform plan which provided stiffer penalties for officials found guilty of corruption. The government had been under pressure to act following a series of high-profile corruption cases.

The plan ordered the strict supervision of all officials operating within 14 specified categories of public service. In addition, the government would pay rewards of up to NT\$6,000,000 (about US\$220,000) for information leading to the conviction of a corrupt official.

### Reports of US arms deals

The Taiwanese newspaper *China Times* of Sept. 5 reported that the USA had agreed to sell 41 Harpoon anti-ship missiles to Taiwan for some US\$75,000,000 [for 1992 arms deal with USA see p. 39095]. The report stated that documents relating to the sale had been signed by Taiwanese and US officials in Washington on Sept. 3.

Reuters reported on Sept. 17 that the USA had agreed to sell Taiwan four Hawkeye E-2T airborne early warning (AEW) command and control aircraft valued at some US\$700 million. There were also reports in September that the USA had agreed to lease Taiwan three Knox Class frigates.

The Chinese government protested to the USA against the arms sales.

### Easing of credit terms

On Sept. 16 the central bank eased its credit terms in an attempt to stimulate the flagging economy.

Bank reserve requirements were reduced by between 0.75 and 1 percentage points, a move calculated to encourage banks to increase lending and reduce interest rates.

■ Last article pp. 39598-99; reference article pp. R82-83.

## HONG KONG

### Further China-UK talks

Three further rounds of talks between China and the UK over the future of Hong Kong were held in Beijing on Sept. 4-5, Sept. 8-9 and Sept. 26-27. However, as in the previous rounds, there was no tangible progress in resolving the outstanding differences over the plan to hold democratic elections in the colony in 1995, two years before the scheduled reversion to Chinese sovereignty.

The Sino-British Joint Liaison Group also held its 27th meeting in Beijing on Sept. 14-16 without any visible progress. Its next meeting was scheduled to take place in London in December 1993.

The atmosphere for the 12th round of talks was made more tense when, on Sept. 24, the Chinese media gave great prominence to remarks made in 1982 by China's veteran leader, Deng Xiaoping. The emphasis on these remarks—which had been in the form of a warning to the then Prime Minister of the UK, Margaret Thatcher, that China might reassert its sovereignty over Hong Kong prior to



1997 if there were serious disturbances within the colony before then—was seen as an attempt by the Chinese government to increase pressure upon the UK authorities over the electoral issue.

### Appointment of Chief Secretary

The government of Hong Kong on Sept. 21 named Anson Chan, the Secretary for Economic Services, as the colony's next Chief Secretary, a post ranked second only to that of the UK-appointed Governor. Chan, a career civil servant, was the first woman and the first Chinese ever to be assigned to the post.

Chan, who was due to succeed Sir David Ford (Chief Secretary since 1986) in November, was a staunch supporter of Governor Chris Patten's plans to increase democracy within the colony. Her appointment was also seen as evidence of the government's commitment to introduce more Chinese into the upper echelons of the colony's government prior to 1997.

### Police raid on Allied group

The colony's largest fraud-related police raid upon a commercial company was conducted on Sept. 15 in an operation against the Allied group.

The action, which involved more than 100 officers, came 13 months after a still unpublished official inquiry had been launched into the activities of the group.

■ Last article p. 39599; reference article p. R67.

## MONGOLIA

### Conference on aid

An international conference on aid to Mongolia was held in Tokyo on Sept. 13-14.

This third meeting of the aid to Mongolia group, held under the co-chairmanship of Japan and the World Bank, was aimed at identifying priorities for Mongolia's medium- and long-term economic development. The previous two meetings had been held in Tokyo in September 1991 [see p. 38437] and May 1992.

Delegates to the third conference pledged some US\$150 million in aid to Mongolia for 1993-94. In addition, Japan provided a US\$71,000,000 loan for railway repairs and a US\$19,000,000 loan to cover the government's financial shortfalls.

■ Last article pp. 39510-11; reference article p. R77.

## TAJIKISTAN

### US aid agreement

US special ambassador Strobe Talbott signed an agreement in Dushanbe on Sept. 13 speeding up US aid to Tajikistan, but warned that the amount of aid available would depend upon the government's willingness to pursue democratic reform and improve its human rights record.

At a news conference that day Talbott said that despite the fact that US relief aid of US\$43,000,000 had already been allocated, "long-term [US] aid" could not be taken for granted so long as Tajikistan

had not met necessary conditions in the "spheres of democracy, human rights, economic reform and the observance of regional peace".

### Sentencing of opposition party member

The Supreme Court on Aug. 25 imposed the death sentence on a senior member of the Islamic Renaissance Party, Ajik Aliyev, for attempting to overthrow the government.

■ Last article p. 39599; reference article pp. R83-84.

## TURKMENISTAN

### Agreement with Russia

A military agreement with Russia, signed on Sept. 2, allowed Russian citizens to undergo military service in Turkmenistan, while enabling Turkmen officers to receive training at Russian military institutes. Turkmenistan also agreed to bear the cost of maintaining Russian forces on its territory after Jan. 1, 1994; in return Russia would preserve some strategic bases in Turkmenistan.

### New currency

The replacement of the Turkmen rouble by a new currency, the manat, from Nov. 1, was announced by President Saparmurad Niyazov on Aug. 19; the rate of exchange was initially fixed at one manat to the US dollar.

■ Last articles pp. 39320-21; 39421; reference article pp. 84-85.

## KIRGIZSTAN

### IMF loan

The IMF on Sept. 21 approved further drawings totalling SDR 18,060,000 (about US\$26,000,000) in support of the government's economic and financial programme. Of this total SDR 16,125,000 would be provided as a second drawing under the systematic transformation facility (STF—see p. 38489), the first drawing having been made in May [see p. 39465]. The remainder was made available under an SDR 27,090,000 standby credit, also approved in May.

### New Secretary of State

President Askar Akayev appointed Janysh Rustenbekov, 43, as the new Secretary of State on Sept. 13, replacing Turar Koychuyev.

■ Last article p. 39511; reference article pp. R72-73.

## INDIA

### Earthquake disaster

A powerful earthquake, measuring 6.5 on the Richter scale, devastated around 30 villages in the states of Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh on Sept. 30.

The epicentre of the earthquake lay at a point where Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra

Pradesh converged near Latur. Although known to be prone to some seismic instability, the region was not regarded as especially vulnerable to severe earthquakes. Among the areas worst affected were Osmanabad and Latur districts in western Maharashtra where entire villages were destroyed and their populations virtually wiped out. Thousands more perished around the towns of Khilari and Umargao, near the epicentre, about 450 km east of Bombay. Some 13 people were also reported dead in Karnataka.

While the government noticeably refrained from issuing an immediate appeal for international aid, offers of assistance came within hours of the disaster. Relief efforts meanwhile were co-ordinated by the army whose difficulties in reaching survivors in more remote areas were compounded by persistent heavy rain.

The last major earthquake occurred in northern Uttar Pradesh in October 1991 [see p. 38533]. The subcontinent's worst earthquake on record was in 1935 when an estimated 30,000 people died in Quetta, Pakistan. The death toll resulting from the Sept. 30 earthquake was initially expected to reach 25,000, but this figure was revised substantially downwards in early October [full details will be given in the October News Digest along with coverage of relief and rescue measures].

### Bomb explosions

About 150 people were arrested in Punjab after several Sikh extremist groups claimed responsibility for a car bomb explosion outside the New Delhi offices of the youth wing of the Congress (I) Party which killed eight people and injured 26 others on Sept. 11. Two more people were killed in a further blast at a railway reservation office in Secunderabad, Andhra Pradesh, on Sept. 12. Three other explosions in Manipur the same day caused no injuries.

### BJP march


The pro-Hindu *Bharatiya Janata* Party (BJP) began a nationwide march to Bhopal, starting simultaneously from Mysore, Jammu and Purbander on Sept. 11, in protest against a government bill, deferred in August [see p. 39601], banning political parties from using religious appeals in their campaign.

### Lorry drivers' strike

A 13-day strike by lorry drivers ended on Sept. 28 after the union government negotiated the easing of road haulage taxes with several state governments. Around 1,500,000 lorry drivers across the country had voted to resume their strike amid accusations that the union government had not implemented a settlement reached in early August [see p. 39601]. The latest strike, which contributed to price rises and severe food shortages, had turned violent after police on Sept. 27 shot dead a striker in the state of Tamil Nadu.

At least 3,000 people were arrested during a one-day general strike called by left-wing trade unions





In their joint statement India and China agreed "to undertake a series of confidence-building measures, including the reduction of military forces deployed along the India-China border . . . [and] pending a boundary settlement . . . to respect and observe the line of actual control (LAC)". An Indian embassy press release issued in Beijing added that the "extent, depth, timing and nature of the [troop] reductions will be worked out through mutual consultations".

on Sept. 9. The strike was the latest in a series against the government's economic reforms [see pp. 38682; 38727; 38967; 39008; 39601].

#### Reserve Bank of India report

The annual report of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), published on Sept. 9, warned that the government was in danger of exceeding borrowing targets set in its economic reform programme. According to the report government borrowing in July 1993, the latest period for which figures were available, stood at Rs 17,000 million (about US\$540 million)—more than twice the level for the equivalent month in 1992, and more than three times the level in March, the final month of the previous financial year.

In 1991-92, the first year of reform, the gross fiscal deficit had dropped from 8.4 per cent to 6 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP), but in the year to March 1993 the deficit fell only marginally to 5.7 per cent of GDP.

#### Cut in interest rate

The RBI on Sept. 1 cut the minimum lending rate for commercial banks by 1 percentage point to 15 per cent. The reduction, the fourth since October 1992 [see p. 39145; 39323; 39512], was prompted by slack demand for funds from industry and a further fall in the year-on-year inflation rate, from a peak of around 19 per cent in late 1992 to just above 6 per cent in early September.

#### Sino-Indian peace agreement

An agreement on troop reductions aimed at settling the 31-year border dispute with China was signed during a visit to Beijing by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao on Sept. 6-9.

The agreement, signed on Sept. 7 after talks between Rao and Chinese Premier Li Peng, made no mention of each country's conflicting claims to thousands of square kilometres of territory. Hailed by both sides as a landmark in bilateral relations, the agreement was described by some observers as the most significant development in Sino-Indian relations since the historic visit to China by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 [see p. 36381].

Other agreements signed during Rao's visit covered co-operation against trade in endangered species, the opening of a second border crossing point, and the exchange of radio and television programmes.

#### Other foreign relations

Prime Minister Rao held talks with Iran's senior officials during his first official visit to the country on Sept. 20-22. A joint communiqué issued afterwards called on "world countries not to interfere in the internal affairs of one another". Earlier both sides had signed two memorandums of understanding enhancing bilateral co-operation in surface transport, transit facilities and science and technology.

Irish President Mary Robinson met President Shankar Dayal Sharma and senior government ministers during her official visit on Sept. 26-28.

Three accords covering tourism, culture, and co-operation in science and technology were signed with South Korea during a visit by Prime Minister Rao on Sept. 9-11—the first by an Indian Prime Minister since diplomatic relations were established 20 years previously.

#### Developments in states

More than 48 people were killed in continuing clashes between Muslim militants and security forces in Kashmir on Sept. 16-20. A further 29 people were reported dead on Sept. 21.

Nearly 1,500 troops were airlifted to Manipur on Sept. 13 to quell renewed ethnic violence between Naga and Kuki tribespeople [see p. 39601]. Fighting had flared after the banned National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) issued Kuki residents with an ultimatum to leave the predominantly Naga region so that a separate Naga homeland could be established. By late September it was reported that more than 250 people had been

killed since August in fighting between the NSCN and the Kuki National Army (KNA).

More than 1,000 tribal guerrillas belonging to the All Tripura Tribal Force (ATTF) surrendered to the state government on Sept. 6 in accordance with a peace settlement concluded in late August. About 350 people had died in clashes since 1990, when local tribespeople had first claimed that they were threatened by an influx of Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh.

■ Last article pp. 39600-01; reference article pp. R67-69.

## PAKISTAN

### Approval of IMF loan - Strikes

A standby credit worth SDR 265 million (about US\$377 million) for the next 12 months was approved by the IMF on Sept. 16. The loan, originally sought to offset a sharp fall in foreign exchange reserves, was apparently agreed on the basis of economic and fiscal policies announced by the interim government in August as part of a comprehensive economic reform programme [see p. 39600]. The latest credit facility was expected to be replaced by a medium-term loan after negotiations with a new government following the October general election.

According to reports in mid-September the government was considering proposals to allow the State Bank of Pakistan (the central bank) to set its own monetary and administrative agenda. The move was said to have been prompted by the need to curb rampant public borrowing and end the manipulation of state institutions by officials, politicians and businessmen.

#### Strikes

The government's recently announced economic measures triggered a series of public protests in late August and September. None were reported to have generated nationwide support.

On Aug. 31 a strike by transport workers against petrol price increases was confined to Karachi, Pakistan's largest city. A subsequent general strike called by the Pakistan Islamic Front—a coalition of Islamic political parties—on Sept. 2 was rigidly observed in Karachi, but met with only lukewarm support elsewhere including Lahore, the country's second largest city. Businesses and commercial corporations in Karachi were reported also to have responded partially to a strike called by the Sind-based *Mohajir Qaumi Movement* on Sept. 18.

#### Assassination of former provincial Chief Minister

Ghulam Haider Wyne, former Chief Minister of Punjab and a close political ally of former Prime Minister Mian Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, was shot dead by unknown gunmen near Khanewal in central Punjab on Sept. 29.

The killing was attributed by police to a tribal rather than a political motive. Wyne, who was campaigning for the October elections, had been ousted from office in late April after being defeated in a no



confidence motion brought by factions opposed to Sharif and reportedly loyal to former President Ghulam Ishaq Khan [see pp. 39413; 39512].

At least eight suspected drug traffickers from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) were reported on Sept. 28 as having been barred from contesting the forthcoming general election. On Sept. 27 the government had announced stiff new penalties against drug traffickers, including the introduction of the death penalty as the maximum punishment for those found guilty of drug trafficking.

#### Talks with USA

Talks resumed in September aimed at the resumption of US military and economic aid.

US military and economic aid had been suspended in October 1990 [see p. 37764] under the Pressler amendment, a stipulation first introduced in 1985 (but waived prior to 1990 by the US administration) barring such aid unless the US Congress received presidential certification of the peaceful objectives of Pakistan's nuclear programme. Further sanctions were imposed in August 1993 [see p. 39600, where the date of the original embargo is wrongly given as August 1990] after US intelligence reports that Pakistan was importing medium-range missiles from China.

On Sept. 3 foreign secretary Shahryar Khan described as "constructive and positive" four days of bilateral discussions with US State Department officials in Washington which ended that day. On Sept. 14 the head of the US Central Command, Gen. Joseph Hoar, met acting President Wasim Sajjad in Islamabad. Afterwards Sajjad appealed for an urgent review of what he called the "discriminatory" Pressler Amendment.

A statement by Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi on Sept. 23 that Pakistan had "stopped and capped" its nuclear programme encouraged reports that the government might have acceded to US demands in return for the partial easing of US sanctions. However, a clarification issued by an official spokesman on Sept. 26 stressed that Pakistan did not intend to foreclose the nuclear option as long as India maintained its nuclear capability.

■ Last article p. 39600; reference article pp. R78-79.

## BANGLADESH

### Cabinet reshuffle

Three new ministers were inducted into the government of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia following a cabinet reshuffle on Sept. 13.

Gen. (ret'd) Shaikat Ali became Minister for Food; Col. (ret'd) Akbar Hossain became Minister for Environment and Forests; and Moeen Khan, a doctor, became Minister of State for Planning.

In a move aimed at reviving the government's privatization programme, Zia appointed Zahiruddin Khan, hitherto Planning Minister, as Minister for Industry to replace Shamsul Islam Khan, who had reportedly failed to accelerate the sale of loss-making state firms.

The creation of a new State Ministry of Science and Technology was announced on Aug. 14, to which M. A. Mannan was appointed.

### Jatiya Party split

The Jatiya Party led by former President Hussain Mohammad Ershad split on Sept. 10, with the launch by dissidents of the Jatiya Party (Nationalist). The new faction claimed Ershad as its chairman.

### Agreement with India

A water transit and trade accord with India, originally agreed in 1972 [see p. 25430 for friendship and co-operation treaty], was renewed on Sept. 14 for another two years.

■ Last articles pp. 39513; 39603; reference article pp. R60-61.

## BURMA

### Progress of national convention

On Sept. 17 the national convention to co-ordinate the drafting of a new constitution was adjourned until Jan. 17, 1994 [for opening of convention in January 1993 and subsequent developments see pp. 39275; 39323; 39415].

During the weeks prior to its adjournment the convention had studied some 22 constitutional proposals submitted by the delegate groups. A comprehensive list of basic principles of state, drawn from the proposals, was presented to the convention by Aung Toe, chair of the convention's work committee, on Sept. 16.

■ Last article p. 39415; reference article pp. R62-63.

## THAILAND

### Internal political developments

#### Planned merger of SAP and opposition

It was announced on Sept. 10 that the Social Action Party (SAP), a member of the Democrat-led ruling coalition, had agreed in principle to merge with four opposition parties to create a new "super-party" which would be the largest single party in the 360-member House of Representatives (the Thai legislature), with 90 seats.

The largest party in the ruling coalition was the Democrat Party with 79 seats, although the coalition currently controlled a total of 207 seats (including the SAP's 22).

The merger plan was reportedly brokered by the powerful and respected "elder statesman" politician Kukrit Pramoj, founder of the SAP and a former Prime Minister. However, most analysts believed that the plan was a last-ditch attempt by Maj.-Gen. Chatichai Choonhavan, former Prime Minister and leader of the *Chart Pathana* Party, to regain the premiership. *Chart Pathana* was by far the largest component of the prospective opposition party, with 60 seats, compared with the 22 held by the SAP and eight distributed among the other three merger participants (*Muan Chon*, *Prachakorn Thai* and *Rassadorn*).

The merger plan was not only denounced by the government and most sections of the Thai media, but was also opposed by factions within *Chart Pathana*. Korn Dabbaransi, the party's deputy leader and Chatichai's nephew, was reported to be

opposed to the move. *Chart Thai*, the opposition party (currently holding 77 seats) from which *Chart Pathana* had split in 1992, was apparently uninvolved in the machinations.

### Dismissal of SAP from ruling coalition

Chuan Leekpai, Prime Minister and leader of the Democrats, dismissed the SAP from his five-member coalition on Sept. 14 (despite the merger plan, the SAP had maintained that it wished to remain within the ruling coalition). The SAP was replaced by *Seritham* (which controlled eight seats); the total number of seats held by the ruling coalition was thus reduced by 14, and its overall majority was reduced from 54 to 26 seats.

### Cabinet appointments

Chuan carried out a Cabinet reshuffle on Sept. 23 to replace the dismissed SAP ministers. In addition, Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyut, the Interior Minister, was appointed concurrently to head the newly created Labour and Social Welfare ministry.

Sawai Phathano, a Democrat and hitherto Deputy Communications Minister, was appointed as Justice Minister in place of the SAP's Suwit Khunkitti. Arthit Urairat, leader of *Seritham*, was appointed as Minister of Public Health in place of the SAP's Buntham Khaewattana.

A number of deputy ministers were also appointed or reshuffled. Tuanchai Nu-upala, the new Deputy Public Health Minister, thereby became the first female member of the Cabinet.

### Improvement in trade relations with USA

The USA on Sept. 8 removed Thailand from a list of countries facing possible trade sanctions.

The US decision was based on the Thai government's progress in protecting patents and other intellectual property rights. The USA was Thailand's largest export market, accounting for 21 per cent of all Thai exports in 1992, to the value of US\$7,290 million.

The US had placed Thailand on its priority list of trade violators in April and had threatened to impose sanctions if agreement was not reached on disputed trade practices. The Thai government had responded by organizing a crackdown on pirated audio and video tapes, and by extending protection for pharmaceuticals and computer programmes.

### Resurgence of separatist violence in south

Muslim separatists launched a series of attacks in predominantly Muslim southern Thailand during August and early September. The attacks, reportedly carried out by the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (BRN), constituted the first concerted action by southern separatists since the early 1980s.

In early August PULO guerrillas had launched arson attacks on more than 30 schools in Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat provinces. A Buddhist temple in Narathiwat province was subjected to a grenade attack on Aug. 16, in which, according to some reports, a monk died. The following day a unit of army engineers was ambushed in Yala province and two soldiers were killed. On Aug. 22, guerrillas



ambushed a train in Narathiwat province, killing one civilian and injuring nine others. On Sept. 5, a group of soldiers clashed with BRN guerrillas in the Sisakon district of Narathiwat province.

Some reports claimed that Thai officials suspected that the guerrillas were based in the northern Malaysian state of Kelantan. However, during a visit to Thailand on Aug. 19-21, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed denied that Malaysia had offered any support to the separatists.

#### **Collapse of hotel**

The Royal Plaza hotel in the north-eastern town of Nakhon Ratchasima collapsed on Aug. 13, killing at least 123 people.

According to reports the building was originally a two-storey structure to which four additional storeys had been added illegally. The owner of the hotel and other local businessmen were subsequently charged with criminal negligence. In the aftermath of the disaster, Chuan ordered a nationwide inspection of high-rise buildings throughout Thailand.

■ Last article p. 39513; reference article p. R84.

## **CAMBODIA**

### **Promulgation of new Constitution - Election of Sihanouk as monarch**

Cambodia's new Constitution was ratified on Sept. 21 by the Constituent Assembly (elected in May 1993 as part of the UN peace plan for Cambodia—see p. 39461), by 113 votes to five with two abstentions. The new Constitution provided for a pluralistic liberal-democratic political system and for a limited monarchy. With the adoption of the Constitution, the mandate of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) effectively ended, although UN troops would remain in the country until mid-November. Yasushi Akashi, the UNTAC chief co-ordinator, left Cambodia on Sept. 26.

As head of state, Prince Norodom Sihanouk promulgated the Constitution on Sept. 24. Later that day, under the terms of the new Constitution, Sihanouk was crowned as King of Cambodia, thereby reclaiming a throne which he had abdicated in 1955.

Sihanouk had been formally, and unanimously, elected as monarch by a seven-member Throne Council, made up of the two Co-Chairs of the Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC)—Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen, three Assembly members and two Buddhist monks.

Under the terms of the new Constitution the King was said to "reign but not rule". The monarch had the power to make appointments, but only in consultation with ministers or senior civil servants. He could declare a state of emergency, but only with the consent of a Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

The Constituent Assembly itself was transformed into a National Assembly, with full legislative powers. The Assembly convened

for the first time on Sept. 28, but failed to elect a chair, and the formation of a new government was delayed until October.

The co-premier system adopted in June [see pp. 39513-14; 39559-60], under which there was shared control of the Cabinet by the two main political parties (the nationalist and monarchist United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia—Funcinpec—and the Cambodian People's Party—CPP), was to be retained in a modified form.

The Constitution required that ministers be chosen from parties represented in the Assembly, thus apparently precluding *Khmer Rouge* participation in the government. However, the PNGC, which remained in office as of early October, continued to offer the *Khmers Rouges* an "advisory role" on condition that they discontinued all military activities. Throughout September there were reports that *Khmer Rouge* fighters were surrendering to the provisional authorities.

Commentators noted that the new Constitution was ambiguous on the issue of human rights and possibly failed to guarantee the rights of the Vietnamese community in Cambodia.

#### **Aid commitments**

The first meeting of the International Committee on Reconstruction of Cambodia was held in Paris on Sept. 8-9. The meeting was chaired by Japan and attended by officials from 33 countries and 12 international organizations.

At the conference donors pledged some US\$119,000,000 in financial aid, in addition to the US\$880,000,000 pledged in 1992.

On Sept. 28 a group of six countries headed by France agreed to extend grants of US\$52,000,000 to cover Cambodia's arrears of payments to the IMF. This assistance paved the way for the IMF to resume commitments to Cambodia, which had been frozen since the *Khmer Rouge* victory in 1975.

The Japanese Foreign Minister, Tsutomu Hata, visited Cambodia in mid-September. Hata, the first Japanese Foreign Minister to visit Cambodia in 34 years, promised to deliver new development aid to Cambodia.

Cambodia and Russia signed on Sept. 8 a military and economic co-operation protocol, which provided for the replacement of worn-out "technical equipment".

■ Last article pp. 39601-02; reference article pp. R63-65.

## **VIETNAM**

### **Modification of US embargo**

The US government on Sept. 13 announced its decision to loosen rather than end its 18-year economic embargo against Vietnam. This was the third modification to the US embargo policy against Vietnam in less than a year [see pp. 39239; 39559].

US companies would now be allowed to bid for Vietnamese projects financed by international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. According

to White House press secretary Dee Dee Myers, other restrictions remained in place "to make clear to the Vietnamese that more needs to be done" to help account for US servicemen reported as missing in action (MIA) during the Vietnam war.

In an official statement released on Sept. 14, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry welcomed the relaxation, but added that it was "regrettable" that the USA was continuing with its embargo policy.

#### **Agreement to pay off IMF debt**

On Sept. 27 France, Japan and 13 other countries grouped together informally as the "Friends of Vietnam" announced details of a financial aid package to clear Vietnam's US\$140 million arrears with the IMF [see p. 39602] and thereby allow Vietnam to seek fresh IMF loans.

A statement issued by the group praised the Vietnamese government for its implementation of "courageous economic and structural reforms".

■ Last article p. 39602; reference article pp. R85-86.

## **INDONESIA**

### **East Timor issue**

#### **Talks between Indonesia and Portugal**

Ali Alatas and José Manuel Durão Barroso, respectively the Indonesian and Portuguese Foreign Affairs Ministers, met in New York on Sept. 17 for a third round of UN-sponsored talks on East Timor, the Indonesian-annexed former Portuguese colony [for first two rounds see pp. 39420; 39239]; the meeting was also attended by the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Commenting on the meeting, Durão Barroso said that there had been "no progress on the basic issue" but that there had been "some progress in the dialogue on confidence-building measures with regard to human rights". In an interview with Radio Republic of Indonesia on Sept. 18, Alatas said that the meeting had produced seven agreements, including a commitment to increase visits to each country by the other country's journalists.

The two sides agreed to hold a fourth meeting in Geneva in May 1994.

#### **US moves to link weapons sales with human rights**

On Sept. 8 the US Senate foreign relations committee amended the foreign aid appropriations bill so as to link US military sales to Indonesia with improvements in Indonesia's human rights record in East Timor. The amendment would become law if the bill to which it was attached won congressional approval in October.

Among the specific requirements of the amendment were that US President Bill Clinton should examine whether those East Timorese convicted in the aftermath of the army's massacre of East Timorese civilians in the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili in November 1991 [see pp. 38579-80] had been treated fairly; whether those East Timorese missing after the massacre had been accounted for; and



whether the Indonesian government was taking steps to halt human rights abuses in East Timor.

In a statement released on Sept. 9, the Indonesian Foreign Ministry expressed its "deep regret" about the amendment. In an interview on Sept. 12, State Secretary Maj.-Gen. (retd) Moerdiono said that the government would look into the possibility of purchasing arms from other countries.

The amendment further strained relations between Indonesia and the USA. In October 1992 the US Congress had approved a foreign aid appropriations bill which froze defence training aid to Indonesia in protest at the Santa Cruz massacre [see p. 39144]. In August 1993 the USA blocked a Jordanian sale of US-made fighter planes to Indonesia [see p. 39602].

A US congressional delegation visited Timor in early September. The London-based human rights organization Amnesty International alleged that the Indonesian authorities detained scores of students in East Timor prior to this visit.

■ Last article pp. 39602-03; reference article p. R69-71.

## PHILIPPINES

### Return of body of Marcos

The body of Ferdinand Marcos, whose 20-year tenure as President had been characterized by massive corruption and human rights abuses, was returned to the Philippines on Sept. 7 for interment in his home town of Batac, in the northern province of Ilocos Norte.

Marcos had been overthrown in February 1986 by a combination of a "people power" uprising and a military mutiny. He fled to Hawaii where he died in 1989 at the age of 72 [see p. 36893]. Requests by his widow Imelda that the corpse be permitted to return to the Philippines were denied by Corazon Aquino, who had succeeded Marcos as President and who held the former dictator responsible for the assassination in 1983 of her husband, Benigno Aquino, a prominent opposition leader. It was feared that the return of the corpse would be used as a focus for rallying the supporters of Marcos, some of whom had been implicated in the numerous coup attempts against the Aquino government. Although Fidel Ramos, Aquino's successor as President, rescinded the ban, he refused requests that Marcos be interred in Manila.

The organizers had predicted that up to 1,000,000 people would attend the homecoming, but in the event only a few thousand turned out. For several days the sealed coffin was the centre of a series of ceremonies, and restorative work was carried out on the corpse, whose facial features had deteriorated during the four years spent in a refrigerated crypt; as eventually displayed in Batac, the face resembled that of a vigorous man who had died in middle age, prompting speculation—vigorously denied by Imelda Marcos—that the corpse had been replaced by a wax replica. The funeral was held on Sept. 10 and the body was interred in an elaborate glass sarcophagus in a specially built mausoleum. Family members suggested that the body would remain on public display until the government acceded to requests to allow it to be buried in Manila.

The occasion also provided the opportunity for the burial of Marcos's mother, Donna Josefa, who had died in 1988. Her body had been kept in a refrigerated coffin for five years as the Marcos family had refused to inter her until her son's remains had been returned to the Philippines.

### Sentencing of Imelda Marcos

Imelda Marcos was on Sept. 24 found guilty on two counts of corruption; she was sentenced to between 18 and 24 years' imprisonment, and disqualified permanently from holding public office. She was acquitted on a further two counts, and faced more than 100 other criminal and civil actions.

Although she remained free pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, the convictions and sentences, the first to have been achieved against her by the authorities, were seen as symbolic of the Ramos government's determination to continue the campaign of its predecessor to recover funds which she and her husband had allegedly plundered during their years in power.

### Extension of deadline for disbanding private armies

It was reported by the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of Sept. 16 that Ramos had extended his deadline for the disbanding of private armies to Nov. 30.

The original 60-day deadline given by Ramos to the Philippine National Police had been due to expire on Sept. 9 [see p. 39603]. By early September, however, the police reported that only 258 of an estimated 562 armed groups had been disbanded, and that only 1,200 weapons had been voluntarily surrendered.

■ Last article p. 39603; reference article pp. R79-80.

## AUSTRALIA

### Progress towards republican status

Prime Minister Paul Keating announced on Sept. 19 that Australia would become a republic by 2001, the centenary of the country's federation, provided that such a change was endorsed by a referendum. He stated that Queen Elizabeth II had informed him that she would accept any such democratic decision, and would "act on the advice of her Australian ministers".

Keating made his announcement on his arrival in Ireland after an official visit to the UK on Sept. 16-19, which had culminated in an audience with the Queen and an overnight stay at Balmoral Castle on Sept. 18. He had used the occasion of his visit to the UK to give formal notification to the Queen of his government's intention to sever links with the British monarchy. He described his audience with her as "friendly and relaxed", and reiterated that his strong advocacy of the creation of a republic was a matter of principle and did not reflect any personal animosity towards the Queen. During a royal visit to Australia in 1992, Keating had offended royal protocol by putting his arm around the Queen while introducing her to guests at a reception, and had later caused outrage by suggesting

that the Queen had enjoyed his attentions [see p. 38770].

Following his March 1993 election victory Keating had established a commission to examine the issue of removing the monarchy by 2001. The most recent opinion poll, conducted in August 1993, suggested that 62 per cent of Australians were in favour of a republic compared with 34 per cent who opposed the move. The royalist cause had been boosted on Sept. 13, however, when the country's Governor-General (the Queen's representative), Bill Hayden, had expressed fears that the replacement of the monarchy with an elected President would produce political instability and a "high degree of turbulence". Hayden, a former leader of the ruling Australian Labor Party (ALP) and avowed supporter of the republican cause, had been appointed Governor General in 1989. He revealed his volte face upon the issue of the monarchy in the form of an interview with his ALP leadership successor (and Keating's predecessor) Bob Hawke, segments of which were shown on UK television five days before Keating's audience with the Queen.

The decision on Sept. 23 by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to allow Sydney to host the games in the year 2000 [see p. 39667] was welcomed by Keating as providing further impetus for the republican cause. Upon returning to Australia on Sept. 26, Keating remarked that it was a "possibility" that Australia could have a President by September 2000, the scheduled opening of the games, and suggested that it was desirable for the event to be opened by somebody other than the Queen.

### Difficulties associated with budget

The republican issue and the decision of the IOC helped to deflect attention away from difficulties faced by Keating over the 1993/94 budget (i.e. for the 12 months ending June 30, 1994).

Introduced on Aug. 17, the budget was unpopular with many of Keating's ALP colleagues, the trade union movement and a large segment of the population particularly because it postponed the promised income tax cuts while increasing taxes on petrol, wine and many consumer goods. After several government concessions, including greater assistance to low-income families and a reduction in the size of the petrol tax increase, the budget was eventually passed by the House of Representatives on Sept. 28. At the end of the month the Senate (where the ALP held only 30 seats and the Liberal-National opposition 36, and the balance of power was held by the Australian Democrats and Greens) had yet to approve the budget. Both the Australian Democrats and the Greens, however, had given assurances that they would not precipitate a general election by creating an indefinite budgetary impasse.

■ Last article pp. 39515-16; reference article pp. R87-88.

## NEW ZEALAND

### Announcement of elections

Prime Minister Jim Bolger on Sept. 14 called a general election for Nov. 6, one month before its latest possible constitutional date. Although the opposition Labour Party, which



had been ousted from office by Bolger's National Party in 1990 [see pp. 37781-82], retained a narrow lead in the opinion polls, in recent months Bolger's government had recovered some of its former standing with the electorate.

In addition to the two main parties commanding similar levels of support, the outcome of the contest had been made even more difficult to predict by the formation in July of the New Zealand First Party (NZFP), led by Winston Peters, a former minister in Bolger's government who had a strong personal following among the electorate. The country's traditional two-party structure had also been challenged since the 1990 election by the formation of the Alliance Party, a coalition of several smaller opposition groups.

In accordance with a preliminary referendum held in 1992 [see p. 39101], the election was to be concurrent with a referendum on the country's electoral system. Voters would be asked to choose between retaining the current system of simple plurality (first-past-the-post) and switching to a system of mixed-member proportional representation.

■ Last articles p. 39421; 39469; reference article pp. R92-93.

## TUVALU

### Inconclusive general election

Tuvalu held its fourth general election since independence on Sept. 2. When the newly elected 12-member Parliament met in Funafuti, the country's capital, however, it was unable to agree upon a choice for Prime Minister.

Although the country had no formal political parties, its political system was based upon a complex system of alliances and loyalties derived from clan and family connections. The legislature was evenly divided between supporters of incumbent Prime Minister Bikenibeu Paeniu and former Prime Minister Tomasi Puapua, whom Paeniu had ousted from office after the 1989 election [see p. 36977].

After two unsuccessful attempts to break the legislative deadlock, Governor-General Sir Taoripi Lauti dissolved Parliament on Sept. 22 with the intention of calling fresh elections. No date for the new ballot was announced.

■ Last article p. 36977; reference article p. R95.

## IN BRIEF

**LAOS:** Somlak Chanthamat, a member of the politburo of the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party since 1991, died on Sept. 2.

**SRI LANKA:** President D. B. Wijetunge on Sept. 6 disbanded the Joint Operations Command (JOC) hitherto responsible for co-ordinating operations against Tamil separatist guerrillas belonging to the Tamil Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The JOC was replaced by a Defence Committee headed by former JOC chief, Gen. Hamilton Wanasinghe.

# EUROPE

## POLAND

### Election victory for former communists

A general election held on Sept. 19, called by President Lech Walesa after the government of Hanna Suchocka lost a vote of no-confidence in May [see p. 39473], resulted in the composition of the new *Sejm* (lower house of parliament) being radically different from that elected in 1991 [see pp. 38535-36].

The changes resulted from a swing to the left and the application of new electoral regulations, adopted in May [ibid.], under which parties (except national minority groups) had to gain 5 per cent of the vote to qualify for seats (with alliances needing at least 8 per cent), and bonus seats were awarded to parties with more than 7 per cent. Only six parties and alliances secured representation, compared with 29 in 1991, and a large number of parties, particularly on the right, failed to reach the threshold, leaving 35.1 per cent of the voting electorate unrepresented in the *Sejm*.

The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), both with roots in the party structure of the former communist regime, emerged as the principal victors, winning respectively 20.4 per cent and 15.4 per cent of the vote, and 171 and 132 seats in the 460-member *Sejm*. Significant gains were also made by the Labour Union (UP), which had its roots in Solidarity but put forward a

more mainstream left-wing programme than the other Solidarity successor parties.

The dominant partner in the SLD was the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland (SdRP), the direct successor to the communist Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). The PSL had been allied with the PZPR during communist rule. Both the SLD and the PSL had young leaders relatively untainted by the communist regime, respectively Aleksander Kwasniewski (who had been a minister in the last communist government) and Waldemar Pawlak.

All the parties which had participated in the various coalition governments since the partially free elections of 1989 lost support. The centre-left Democratic Union (UD) nevertheless won 74 seats, whereas the centre-right Centre Alliance (PC), Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD) and Peasant Alliance (PL), all of which had their roots in the Solidarity movement which had led the opposition to communist rule in the 1980s, all failed to achieve the minimum threshold for representation.

The other main losers were the parties on the right. Only two won seats, namely the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN) and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR), the political movement launched by Walesa in June [see p. 39520]. Despite protracted negotiations in the months leading up to the vote, the parties on the centre-right had been unable to form broad-based electoral alliances, and as a result even Homeland (*Ojczyzna*), a four-party alliance including the Christian National Union (ZChN), failed to win sufficient support to enter parliament.

The poor performance of most right-wing parties was seen in part as a reaction against their loyalty to the Catholic Church and their support for the strict anti-abortion law adopted in January [see p. 39282]. However, observers interpreted the results in general as a protest against the social and economic costs of Poland's transition to a market economy. The SLD and PSL, like all the other main parties, supported the market-oriented reforms in principle, but argued that the costs to the poorer sections of the community should be alleviated.

The results for the 100-seat Senate, which was elected on a provincial basis, were as follows: SLD 37 seats, PSL 36, Solidarity 10, UD four, others 13. Both the SLD and PSL had called for the abolition of the upper chamber.

The turnout—52.1 per cent—was significantly

### Polish election results

	1993	1991	1993	1991
	Percentage of vote		Seats	
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD)	20.4	11.9	171	60
Polish Peasant Party (PSL)	15.4	8.7	132	48
Democratic Union (UD)	10.6	12.3	74	62
Labour Union (UP)*	7.3	2.1	41	4
Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN)	5.8	7.5	22	46
Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR)	5.4	-	16	-
German minority organizations	n/a	n/a	4	7
Homeland ( <i>Ojczyzna</i> or KKW"O")†	6.4	8.7	0	49
Solidarity	4.9	5.1	0	27
Centre Alliance (PC)	4.4	8.7	0	44
Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD)	4.0	7.5	0	37
Real Politics Union (URP)	3.2	n/a	0	3
Self-Defence ( <i>Samoobrona</i> )	2.8	-	0	-
Party X	2.7	n/a	0	3
Coalition for the Republic (KdR)	2.7	-	0	-
Peasant Alliance (PL)	2.3	5.5	0	28

\*Labour Solidarity (SP) in 1991.

†Catholic Electoral Action (WAK) in 1991.

A number of minor parties won smaller percentages of the vote.



up on 1991, when it had been 43.1 per cent.

### Coalition negotiations

The SLD and PSL began negotiations on the formation of a government on Sept. 21. The UD refused to take part in any coalition talks and said that the other two parties should take responsibility for governing. The UP expressed an interest in participating in an anti-SLD coalition with the PSL and UD.

On Sept. 28 the SLD and PSL signed an initial agreement on forming a coalition.

## Departure of last Russian troops - Reburial of Sikorski - Inquiry into Katyn massacre

The withdrawal of the last remaining Russian troops from Polish soil was marked in a ceremony on Sept. 17, the 54th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Poland.

Later the same day Gen. Wladyslaw Sikorski, the leader of the Polish government-in-exile during the Second World War, was reburied in a state funeral in Krakow. The ceremony was attended by all the country's leaders, and thousands of Poles lined the city's streets to pay Sikorski their last respects. He had died in an air crash in 1943 and was initially buried in the UK. It had been his last wish to be buried in a Poland free of foreign domination.

It was widely claimed that Walesa had brought forward both ceremonies to two days before the general election for symbolic and party political reasons. The completion of the withdrawal of Russian troops had originally been planned for Oct. 1.

Justice Minister Jan Piatkowski announced on Sept. 8 that the State Prosecutor's Office was to hold an official inquiry into the Katyn massacre of thousands of Polish officers by the Soviet secret police in 1940 [for historical background and Soviet admission of guilt see pp. 37383-84].

### Indictment of former interior minister

A former Interior Minister, Antoni Macierewicz, was charged on Sept. 8 with revealing state secrets. His decision in June 1992 to disclose a list of people who had allegedly collaborated with the security services under communist rule had led to his dismissal and that of the then government [see p. 38972].

■ Last article p. 39607; reference article pp. R118-19.

## BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

### President's foreign visits - Prospect of NATO force

Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic visited Turkey (on Sept. 2-5, also attending an economic meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in Istanbul), the USA (on Sept. 5-9), Saudi Arabia, Iran (on Sept. 12-13) and Kuwait, to rally support and ask for financial assistance for Bosnian Muslims.

On Sept. 7 he urged UN Security Council members at a closed meeting in New York either to "defend us [with military action against forces blocking humanitarian relief] or let us defend ourselves [by lifting the former Yugoslavia arms embargo in

respect of Bosnia]". On Sept. 8 he pressed US President Bill Clinton and US congressional leaders to offer troops to monitor any eventual peace agreement. Clinton said before their meeting that any US commitment would need congressional backing and should be part of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation, not a UN operation.

US Defence Secretary Les Aspin said on Sept. 12 in Brussels that NATO was considering providing some 50,000 troops, no more than half of whom would be from the USA, if requested to do so by the UN to back up an eventual Bosnian peace agreement. NATO ambassadors were to consider this plan, whether non-NATO countries (including Russia) might provide troops, and whether the force would be under formal UN command and control (as preferred by the UK and France) or have "clear and direct command lines" under the NATO commander southern Europe. Part of any European commitment was expected to involve redeploying those currently serving with the UN humanitarian mission in Bosnia. According to the *Guardian* of Aug. 24, UN forces in Bosnia (including Sarajevo) amounted to some 4,625 from France, 2,312 UK, 1,160 Spain, 1,062 Canada, 517 Netherlands, 433 Ukraine, 428 Egypt, and 382 others, with a Nordic force of 1,200 dispatched in early September.

### Lack of success in latest peace talks

Talks convened by the international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg on Sept. 20, which had appeared to hold some prospect of agreement on a three-way partition following the signature of Muslim-Croat and Muslim-Serb ceasefire agreements in mid-month, ended with insufficient progress to warrant a second meeting.

Izetbegovic's Sept. 14 joint declaration with Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, signed after talks in Geneva, had called for a ceasefire by Sept. 18 between the Bosnian army and troops of the Bosnian Croat Defence Council (HVO), and the release by Sept. 21 of all those held in detention camps. They expected that this would "contribute to the efforts to find a definite solution to ending the war", but did not attempt to resolve the principal issues involved in such a settlement, in particular the key Muslim demand for access to the sea. Previously, in a statement on Sept. 5, Tudjman had insisted strongly that Croats would not cede the town of Neum on the Adriatic coast—one of the "minimum requirements" without which Izetbegovic had refused to sign the previous peace formula at Geneva on Sept. 1 [see p. 39605].

Izetbegovic's Sept. 16 Geneva agreement with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's representative Monicilo Krajisnik, who had met the mediators secretly the previous day in Montenegro, similarly specified a ceasefire (by Sept. 18) and closure of detention camps (by Sept. 20).

In a significant concession by Izetbegovic, this agreement (witnessed by Owen and Stoltenberg) also provided that, two years after agreement on a "loose union" of a three-republic Bosnia-Herzegovina, the republics should hold referendums on whether to remain within that "union" (i.e., implicitly, that they should be allowed to join a "greater Serbia" or "greater Croatia"). The Muslim state

would, in this event, retain "all the rights of the union, including UN membership". The distribution of territory as between the republics, an issue on which Izetbegovic made it clear that the Muslims would require concessions beyond the 30 per cent previously offered to them, was not tackled explicitly at this stage.

Lord Owen, who visited Macedonia, Turkey and the Serbian capital Belgrade on Sept. 17-18 in an intensive round of diplomatic contacts, said on Sept. 18 that "I expect the agreement will be signed" on a full tripartite basis, with leaders of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats participating, at a ceremony scheduled for Sarajevo airport on Sept. 21. By Sept. 20, however, two days of talks in Split had suggested that the territorial issue would still prevent agreement, with Bosnian Croats and Serbs unwilling to make concessions (to meet, in essence, the Muslim demand for a further 4 per cent of the territory, as in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly's "conditional acceptance" formula of Aug. 29—see p. 39605).

A protracted negotiating session on Sept. 20 on board the British warship *HMS Invincible* in the Adriatic, involving Izetbegovic, Karadzic, Tudjman and Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban, failed to resolve the remaining issues and the Sarajevo airport ceremony planned for the following day was accordingly cancelled.

Izetbegovic, who was to call a session of the Bosnian Assembly to consider what was now on offer, was believed to have secured sufficient concessions from the Croat side over sea access, but to hope for further territory at the expense of Bosnian Serbs. Karadzic said afterwards, however, that the Serb side could go no further than to cede an area near Gorazde and to offer further possibilities to exchange territory, and that "if the Muslim side insists on more land, then the package will not be signed". Izetbegovic told a news conference in Sarajevo on Sept. 21 that "I personally am not inclined towards" recommending acceptance by the Assembly.

### Fighting

The protagonists had agreed to observe a ceasefire, in the aftermath of the previous (Sept. 1) breakdown in negotiations. Conflict continued, however, to a limited extent between Serbs and Muslims in the north around Doboj and Brcko and also around Sarajevo, but more notably between Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces around the besieged Muslim-held town of Mostar in the south and around Croat-held Vitez in central Bosnia.

In early September thousands of civilians fled from their homes to escape this fighting, with some 10,000 Muslim refugees in Jablonica, some 2,800 displaced Croats reaching Tomislavgrad in western Bosnia and a similar number in Livno. A UN statement in Zagreb supported Croat claims that 34 civilians were among 54 people killed in a Muslim attack on Uzdol on Sept. 14, prompting Bosnian army authorities to promise an investigation. Fighting intensified around Mostar on Sept. 17, as reports spread of Muslim guerrilla attempts to infiltrate Croat-held areas of the town and force a link through to the Adriatic coast; a UN aid convoy reached the town on Sept. 24 during a lull in fighting. From Sept. 21, a Muslim offensive on the central front was pushing towards Vitez.



The authorities of the self-proclaimed Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna released 541 detainees on Sept. 23 from the notorious Dretelj prison camp near Medjugorje, one of a number of camps in which thousands of Muslims were being held in conditions which had attracted growing international criticism. Under strong US pressure to curb Bosnian Croat excesses, Croatian President Tudjman had called on the HVO on Sept. 6 "to secure the humane treatment of prisoners", an appeal which had resulted in the almost immediate opening of the camps to inspection.

#### **Banja Luka mutiny**

Units of the Krajina Corps, a powerful element within the Bosnian Serb forces, took control on Sept. 10 of the north-western Serb stronghold of Banja Luka to conduct what they claimed was a popularly welcomed "decisive battle" against war profiteers. By Sept. 14 they had gone on to articulate political demands including the resignation of Karadzic's Bosnian Serb government—a challenge which he survived when the "September 93" mutiny was brought to an end on Sept. 17 with a combination of concessions and the arrest of some of its leaders. There was considerable speculation that Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had encouraged the mutiny to undermine Karadzic after an angry clash with him over the Bosnia peace plan negotiations.

■ Last article pp. 39603-605; reference article pp. R101-102.

## **YUGOSLAVIA**

### **Increased centralization of authority**

The passage on Sept. 22 of a new and more unitary Law on Defence reflected the growing centralization of authority within the government structure of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, empowering the Federal Assembly to declare a state of emergency in a constituent republic or province without reference to its own assembly. A new law on the Yugoslav army was passed on the same day, while on Sept. 16 the government of Montenegro, acting "in accordance with the recommendation of the FRY government", had agreed to abolish the republic's separate Ministry of Defence in an apparent prelude to constitutional changes.

Reports suggested, however, a growth of resentment in Montenegro over the dominance of Serbia in the FRY. The Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LS) withdrew on Sept. 2 from the republican government in which it had been a junior coalition partner of the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS). There were suggestions of a referendum on leaving the FRY federation, particularly because Montenegro's import trade and tourism had suffered severely under UN sanctions, and because Serbia had banned food exports to Montenegro. The Montenegro government, it was noted, had recently taken steps against anti-Muslim Serb activism along the republic's northern border with Bosnia, and had also tried to mark out a more independent policy towards Albania to the south. A delegation led by Montenegrin President Momir

Bulatovic visited Albania on Sept. 15-16 for talks described as "comprehensive", at a time when FRY-Albanian relations remained highly confrontational and marked by mutual accusations about cross-border violence (although there were suggestions that Bulatovic's visit indicated a desire for better relations with Albania at the FRY level).

#### **Arrests in Kosovo**

The FRY and Serbian authorities were apparently engaged in a continuing crackdown during September on ethnic Albanian activists seeking to "internationalize" the Kosovo issue and to oppose the closure of Albanian-language schools in the province.

The departure from Kosovo in late July [see p. 39565] of the human rights monitoring mission from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) had reportedly been followed by the arrest of many ethnic Albanians who had had contact with the CSCE mission. The ethnic Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK) and of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, met a CSCE delegation (representatives from Sweden, currently chairing the CSCE, and from former and future CSCE chairs Slovakia and Italy) in Pristina, the Kosovo provincial capital, on Sept. 16. The following day Rugova, pressing for the internationalization of the Kosovo issue, spoke of the intensification of Serbian terror against the Albanian people and their institutions in Kosovo, and of the arrest of DSK activists in Pristina on Sept. 15.

According to reports from Tirana (Albania) on Sept. 18, the FRY had "ordered the closing of the 58 secondary schools and 21 of the 350 elementary schools in the Albanian language". A series of arrests on Sept. 6-7 had obstructed the efforts of a delegation from Kosovo to attend a meeting of the Geneva international conference on the former Yugoslavia which was due to discuss the issue of Albanian language education (and which was boycotted by Serbia).

#### **Radical Party "shadow Cabinet" - Opposition party developments within Serbia**

The Serbian Radical Party (SRS) led by Vojislav Seselj, which had hitherto broadly supported Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) at the republican and federal level, announced on Sept. 2 that it was forming a "shadow Cabinet" (headed by Tomislav Nikolic) to challenge government policies. On Sept. 20 the SRS announced that it was to put forward a motion of no confidence in the Serbian government.

The opposition Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) indicated on Sept. 21, however, that it would not attend the Federal Assembly session on the SRS's no confidence motion, which it regarded as an attempt by the latter to "divert attention from its responsibility" as a long-time ally of the SPS. SPO general secretary Vladimir Gajic had complained at a Belgrade press conference on Sept. 14 of the continuing persecution of his own party's members, dozens of whom had been sentenced and some 40 of whom still faced trial in connection with the June 1-2 demonstration where party leader Vuk

Draskovic had been arrested [see pp. 39518; 39564].

#### **Economy - Food coupons - Currency redenomination - Trial of former ministers for profiteering**

With the economy suffering from hyperinflation and with the impact of sanctions compounded by drought in the worst heatwave for 70 years, an effort was made from Sept. 13 to provide for the purchase of basic foodstuffs in the Belgrade area with food coupons issued to over 500,000 families. On Sept. 22 the Yugoslav dinar was "revalued", with the removal of six zeros from its face value.

The trial began on Sept. 13 of two former ministers, Sava Vlajkovic and Velimir Mihajlovic, arrested in March and charged with profiteering over the distribution of oil supplies following the imposition of UN sanctions.

■ Last article pp. 39605-606; reference article pp. R128-30.

## **CROATIA**

### **Renewed conflict with Serbs in Krajina**

Croatian army units launched an offensive on Sept. 9 ostensibly directed at driving out "terrorist groups" in three villages near Gospić in the southern part of the Serb-inhabited self-proclaimed "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (RSK).

One day prior to this offensive, the five main Croat opposition parties had joined union leaders in criticizing the government of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman for "colluding" with Serbia in its pro-partition policy on Bosnia [see p. 39645] and thereby responding to the aspirations of Hercegovina Croat leader Mate Boban, despite what Social Democrat Ivan Racan called the "strategic interest of the Croat state and people" in preserving a united Bosnia.

The most recent Croat-Serb fighting in Croatia had centred mainly on the strategic Maslenica bridge. Following the Sept. 9 Croatian army offensive, the Serb side responded with a show of strength in the form of long-range shelling and rocket attacks, notably against the town of Karlovac on Sept. 11 and 13 but also reaching as far as Zagreb and including the use of Soviet-made FROG (free-flight rocket over ground) weapons believed to have been moved up from Serbia itself. Tudjman on Sept. 12 announced a 24-hour unilateral ceasefire, under pressure from a high-level UN delegation to end the offensive, which represented the worst fighting in Croatia since January 1992.

A Croat MiG-21 fighter aircraft was shot down over Krajina on Sept. 14. The Croat air force was known to include at least two MiG-21s, but a Serbian press report claimed that Germany had been involved in supplying 36 more via Hungary, in contravention of the embargo on arms sales to former Yugoslavia. The German government denied this allegation on Sept. 16.

A ceasefire agreement was signed on Sept. 15, providing for some 500 French and Canadian troops of the UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) to interpose them-



selves in a "buffer zone" between the opposing front lines.

RSK forces confirmed on the following day that Croat troops had pulled out of the villages of Citluk and Divoleso, adding that the Croats had suffered "enormous" casualties and subsequently accusing them of massacring some 50 civilians during their occupation of the villages. There were also reports of violent incidents between Croats and UNPROFOR troops, but by Sept. 21 the deployment of UNPROFOR was completed and both Croat and RSK forces were observing a demarcation line agreed the previous day.

#### **Croatian government call for stronger UNPROFOR mandate to disarm militias**

The Croatian government on Sept. 23 warned that it would ask for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Croatia by Nov. 30, unless its mandate was strengthened to extend to the disarming of Serb militias.

UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had reported to the Security Council on Sept. 20, recommending the extension of UNPROFOR's mandate for a further six months from the end of September. The Croat government's demand, however, was seen as a "wilful misreading" of that mandate, which was essentially to separate the combatants rather than to enforce a peace settlement.

#### **New leader of Party of Rights**

The Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) at an extraordinary assembly on Sept. 12 elected a new main committee, the party's governing body, with Boris Kandare as chairman and Vlado Jukic as secretary.

■ Last article p. 39605; reference article pp. R103-104.

## **SLOVENIA**

### **Continuing arms smuggling allegations**

The embargo-breaking arms-to-Bosnia smuggling scandal, which began with the discovery of a 120-tonne arms consignment at Maribor airport in July [see p. 39606], extended in early September to allegations against Slovenian President Milan Kucan, who on Sept. 2 denied being involved.

Defence Minister and leading Social Democrat Janez Jansa claimed that Kucan had arranged the shipment and was conspiring also in arrangements to provide training for Bosnian Muslim forces. On Sept. 13 Jansa made further criticisms of Kucan, alleging that he had funded his 1992 election campaign by manipulation of former communist networks of influence. Jansa himself, however, was central to other versions of the arms smuggling scandal. The weekly *Mladina* of Sept. 8 claimed that the Defence, Interior and Foreign ministries were all party to the smuggling but that a Bosnian Muslim intermediary now based in Croatia, Hosan Cengic, had disputed a payment due, and that this had led Jansa to reveal the existence of the consignment at Maribor. A warrant was issued on Sept. 6 by the Slovene Interior Ministry for Cengic's arrest on arms smuggling charges.

■ Last article p. 39606; reference article p. R123.

## **BULGARIA**

### **Resignation of Deputy Prime Minister**

On Sept. 8 the National Assembly accepted the resignation of a Deputy Prime Minister, Neycho Neev. Several government ministers had called for his dismissal after he met four officials from Yugoslavia in August, and this was also the reason given by Prime Minister Lyuben Berov for his departure; Neev himself, however, cited differences over economic policy as the main reason for his resignation.

#### **Dismissal of security chief**

The director of the National Security Service, Arlin Antonov, was dismissed by President Zhelev on Sept. 21. He had been accused of incompetence by his immediate superior, Interior Minister Viktor Mikhaylov.

#### **Imprisonment of communist officials**

Georgi Atanasov, who had been Prime Minister under communist rule in 1986-90, and Stoyan Ovcharov, Minister of the Economy and Planning in 1987-89, were taken to prison by a police convoy on Sept. 2 to start respectively a 10- and a nine-year prison sentence, even though their cases were still due to be heard on final appeal by the Supreme Court. Both had been convicted of embezzlement in November 1992 [see p. 39199].

■ Last article p. 39606; reference article p. R102.

## **HUNGARY**

### **Horthy reburial controversy**

The ashes of Adml. Miklos Horthy, regent of Hungary in 1920-44 who died in exile in Portugal in 1957, were reburied on Sept. 4 in the family's vault in Kenderes, eastern Hungary.

Prime Minister József Antall described Horthy as a "committed Hungarian patriot". In neighbouring countries, however, he was regarded as a symbol of Hungarian irredentism and his regime was generally assessed as having been militaristic, conservative-fascist, anti-semitic and anti-democratic. The controversial reburial ceremony was attended by 30,000 to 50,000 people, including several ministers and Antall's wife and son, and broadcast live on state television. The previous day some 1,000 people had attended ceremonies organized by Jewish organizations and the Democratic Charter group to commemorate the victims of the Horthy regime, to protest against "the revival of the spirit of the inter-war years", and to "bury militarism, irredentism and anti-semitism".

#### **Relations with Romania**

Foreign Minister Géza Jeszenszky visited Romania on Sept. 15-19, holding talks in Bucharest with his Romanian counterpart Teodor Viorel Melescanu, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu and President Ion Iliescu. Although

two economic agreements were signed, a basic bilateral treaty was still under negotiation.

As regards the 1,700,000-strong Magyar minority in Romania, Jeszenszky said that the Romanian state had to "articulate laws which should guarantee the Hungarians' rights in keeping with international norms", while Iliescu said that mutual "suspicions had evaporated or were evaporating".

#### **Expulsion of two deputies from MDF**

Two more Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) deputies were expelled from the party on Sept. 20, reducing the strength of the MDF group to 137 out of 386 deputies [see p. 39521 for MDF split].

#### **IMF standby credit - Devaluation**

On Sept. 15 the International Monetary fund (IMF) approved a standby credit of SDR 340,000,000 (US\$478,000,000) over 15 months to support the government's economic programme for 1993-94.

As from Sept. 29 the forint was devalued by 4.5 per cent; as at Oct. 4, 1993, US\$1.00=96.5041 forints. The devaluation, the fifth in 1993, followed a 27-28 per cent fall in Hungarian exports in the first seven months of 1993 as compared with the same period of 1992.

■ Last article p. 39566; reference article pp. R111-12.

## **ROMANIA**

### **First step towards Council of Europe membership**

In a vote on Sept. 28, the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe approved the admission of Romania. Full admission awaited approval of a meeting of ambassadors of the Council's 31 member states. The Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, which had recommended that the council delay Romanian membership pending guarantees on ethnic rights, nevertheless welcomed the decision in a Sept. 29 statement [see above, this page, for Hungary's policy towards Hungarian communities in Romania].

#### **Resignation of privatization chief**

Aurelian Dochia, head of Romania's Privatization Agency, resigned on Sept. 8. Dochia claimed that the planned Ministry for Privatization would further delay the sale of state enterprises.

#### **Ethnic violence in Transylvania**

Three ethnic Romanies (Gypsies) were killed in an incident near Tirgu Mures, Transylvania, on Sept. 20.

According to the Rompres news agency, two of them were lynched by several hundred local ethnic Hungarians and Romanians following the violent death of an ethnic Romanian earlier the same day, and the third died in one of 11 houses set on fire by the crowd. A government statement of Sept. 23 blamed the violence on "mounting social tensions" in the area and pledged to work "to encourage the process of social integration".



**Government corruption scandal**

Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu admitted on Sept. 2 that an investigation into the allegedly corrupt sale of shares in Romania's merchant shipping fleet [see p. 39566] had revealed "large deposits" in the foreign bank accounts of high-ranking officials.

■ Last article p. 39607; reference article pp. R120-21.

**SLOVAKIA****Controversy over alleged anti-gypsy remarks by Meciar**

Minority groups and human rights organizations abroad expressed strong condemnation following reports on Sept. 7 that Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar had referred to Slovakia's Roma ("gypsy") minority as "socially unadaptable" and "mentally backward". Meciar's alleged remarks were immediately censured by the Vienna-based League of Jewish Persecutees of the Nazi Regime, and denounced by the International Helsinki Federation of Human Rights which called for their retraction.

The controversy began when the Czech News Agency (CTK), reporting on Meciar's visit on Sept. 3 to the eastern town of Spisska Nova Ves, quoted him as having called for cuts in family benefits "to achieve a reduction in the extensive reproduction of the socially unadaptable and mentally backward population". These remarks, widely construed as being directed against gypsies, who comprised some 13 per cent of the town's total population, were not broadcast on state radio, however, nor were they included in the text of Meciar's speech as subsequently released by the Slovak government, and on Sept. 10 Meciar began legal action against CTK journalist Karel Hirman, claiming that he had been libelled.

Fears of a resurgence of anti-Semitism grew following an assault on the chief rabbi of Bratislava, Baruch Mayers, on Sept. 5, by two youths demanding the expulsion of Jews.

**Repatriation agreements**

A readmission treaty was signed between Slovakia and Romania on Sept. 20 allowing each country to repatriate illegal aliens and asylum seekers; both sides also concluded a crime prevention co-operation agreement at the same time.

Refugee repatriation treaties had been signed with Ukraine and Poland on Aug. 12 and 30 respectively.

■ Last article p. 39607; Czechoslovakia reference article pp. R104-05.

**COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES****Agreement on economic union**

A Moscow summit of leaders of member republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on Sept. 24 agreed on a frame-

work designed "gradually [to] build a common economic space on the basis of market relations".

According to the *Financial Times* of Sept. 25-26, the agreement envisaged the gradual removal of customs tariffs and other impediments to internal trade; eventual currency union, under a mechanism to allow republics' currencies to float against the rouble within defined limits; and measures to encourage joint ownership of companies (in part to allow republics to pay for Russian energy supplies with shares in their industrial enterprises).

Nine countries signed the agreement; Armenia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan [admitted to the CIS as a full member—see also p. 39650]; Ukraine said that it would join the union as "an associate member", the status of which had yet to be agreed. Turkmenistan implied that it might sign at a later date. Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patatsia attended the summit as an observer.

**Rouble zone agreement**

In an agreement signed on Sept. 7, Russia agreed to permit four CIS states to continue to use the rouble as their currency. In return Armenia, Byelarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan pledged to make their monetary and financial legislation compatible with Russian law.

■ Last article p. 39607; reference article pp. R121-22.

**RUSSIA****Suspension of Parliament**

Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued on Sept. 21 a decree *On Constitutional Reform* (its full title being "On stage-by-stage constitutional reform in the Russian Federation"), declaring the suspension of all "legislative, administrative and control functions" of the Russian Parliament (the Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet), and calling elections to the State Duma (lower house) of a newly constituted bicameral legislature, the Federal Assembly, on Dec. 11-12, 1993. On Sept. 23 Yeltsin said that presidential elections would be held on June 12, 1993.

The decree stated that any attempt to obstruct the elections was to be deemed a criminal act. The Ministries of Defence, Interior and the Security Service were awarded the power "to take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the state and society".

Yeltsin claimed in his decree *On Constitutional Reform* that the Supreme Soviet had blocked the process of economic and constitutional reform—citing in particular its policies on the budget and privatization [see p. 39567], and arguing that it had systematically usurped executive and judicial functions from other institutions. In a television address on the evening of Sept. 21, Yeltsin claimed that the resulting political stalemate in Russia would ultimately have led to "the disintegration of Russian statehood", with "cata-

strophic" results. Yeltsin asserted that "the security of Russia and her peoples [was] more precious than formal obedience to contradictory norms established by a legislature that [had] definitively discredited itself".

**Impeachment of Yeltsin by Congress of People's Deputies and appointment of Rutskoi as President - Constitutional Court ruling against Yeltsin**

Yeltsin's conservative Vice-President and rival Aleksandr Rutskoi immediately denounced the decree *On Constitutional Reform*, which he claimed was unconstitutional, and accused Yeltsin of an "overt coup". An emergency session of the Congress of People's Deputies, the supreme legislative body from which the subordinate Supreme Soviet was elected, was convened on Sept. 23 and early on Sept. 24 voted to impeach Yeltsin. The Congress also confirmed Rutskoi, who had been sworn in to the office at the Supreme Soviet's session on Sept. 21, as President.

An emergency meeting of the Constitutional Court late on Sept. 21 had concluded that *On Constitutional Reform* and Yeltsin's televised statement were "in violation of the Constitution" and formed "the basis for impeaching the President".

**Popular reaction to crisis**

Rutskoi and Supreme Soviet Chair Ruslan Khasbulatov repeatedly called for industrial action against *On Constitutional Reform*. Igor Klochkov, leader of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (formerly an official state organ), which had some 50,000,000 members, on Sept. 22 denounced the restrictions on the Supreme Soviet as unconstitutional and threatened to call a general strike. Nevertheless, there were no reports of major strikes in support of Parliament. Sotsprom, a smaller, independent trade union, said on Sept. 22 that it would discourage strikes.

There were no reports of major demonstrations, either for or against the dissolution of Parliament, outside Moscow.

**International reaction to crisis**

A number of Western leaders issued statements in support of Yeltsin's action.

After a telephone conversation with Yeltsin on Sept. 21, US President Bill Clinton said that he believed that Yeltsin's strategy for elections to the new legislature was "ultimately consistent with the democratic and reform course that [Yeltsin had] charted". A UK Foreign Office statement asserted that "[Yeltsin's] mandate for radical economic and political change [had] been regularly thwarted by institutions with less democratic credentials" and implied that Yeltsin was justified in taking "exceptional measures in exceptional circumstances". French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, in an interview on Sept. 21, said that Yeltsin had "democratic legitimacy", while on Sept. 22 Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany said that "President Yeltsin deserves our full support for this". Kohl was apparently reassured by Yeltsin's commitment to



December elections as a way of resolving the impasse.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatolii Zlenko was among the first from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to express support for Yeltsin when he said on Sept. 21: "This is a decisive step, perhaps not entirely democratic, but there was no other way."

#### **Struggle over key ministries - Loyalty of military**

Rutskoi attempted to wrest control of several key ministries on Sept. 21 by dismissing ministers and replacing them with political allies.

Vladislav Achalov, a retired general with links to the radical nationalist National Salvation Front (NSF), was declared Defence Minister; Viktor Barannikov, a centrist dismissed from the Council of Ministers by Yeltsin on July 27 [see p. 39568], was reappointed to the post of Security Service Minister; and Andrei Dunaev, a serving deputy Interior Minister, was promoted to Interior Minister.

On Sept. 21 Khasbulatov demanded that "all servicemen, policemen and employees of the Security Ministry" should disobey "criminal orders coming from the President [Yeltsin]".

Defence Minister Pavel Grachev claimed on Sept. 22, during a walkabout in Central Moscow with Yeltsin and Interior Minister Viktor Erin, that senior military officers were united behind Yeltsin. The Chief of General Staff, Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov, said on Sept. 22 that he would take orders only from Grachev and Yeltsin.

There was speculation that Yeltsin's recent visits to military bases, which included a Sept. 16 trip, accompanied by Erin, to the elite Dzerzhinsky division of Interior Ministry troops based near Moscow, had been part of an attempt to canvass support among the military.

#### **Sealing off of White House by pro-Yeltsin troops - Preparations for defence of the building**

The Yeltsin camp used a series of measures to increase pressure against those in the White House (the seat of parliament, and officially titled the House of Soviets). On Sept. 22 telephone links were cut, and on Sept. 24 the electricity supply was cut and the water supply reduced. On the other hand a decree of Sept. 23 pledged compensation for deputies, and presidential spokesman Vyacheslav Volkov said that 76 deputies had been offered new jobs.

Demonstrators gathered outside the White House from Sept. 21, many of them reportedly armed from a store of light weaponry held in the White House.

Many of the demonstrators, said by witnesses to number several hundred, were middle-aged or elderly; further reports claimed that many were supporters of the NSF. On Sept. 23 a policeman and a bystander were killed in an unsuccessful attempt, allegedly by associates of Achalov, to enter the military headquarters of the CIS, which reportedly contained equipment capable of communicating

with military units throughout the former Soviet Union. Deputy Defence Minister Konstantin Kobets responded on Sept. 24 by authorizing troops "to open fire to kill in the event of similar sorties".

One of the largest demonstrations in the capital was a rally on Sept. 26 of some 10,000 people organized by the pro-Yeltsin Democratic Russia movement.

Addressing several thousand supporters outside the White House on Sept. 26, Rutskoi warned that "we will fight to the last cartridge" and that "there will be blood". On Sept. 26 Khasbulatov said that his supporters were prepared to defend the White House for "a whole year if necessary".

The White House was sealed off by some 2,000 troops on Sept. 27.

On the night of Sept. 28-29 an officer of the traffic police, Lt.-Col. Vladimir Reshtuk, was pushed under a moving car and killed during disturbances in Moscow. On Sept. 29 Gen. Albert Makashov, a leading member of the NSF organizing the defence of the White House, claimed that the supporters of Parliament had enough firepower to repel any attack by pro-Yeltsin forces. Despite denials that the White House would be stormed, on Sept. 29 the Council of Ministers reportedly threatened "serious consequences" for anyone remaining in the White House by Oct. 4. The Supreme Soviet recorded 527 deputies present on Sept. 29 (a presidential spokesman had claimed that only around 150 remained).

#### **Yeltsin's imposition of media controls**

The Supreme Soviet voted late on Sept. 21 to assume control of the state media. Rutskoi demanded an immediate television address to the nation. However transmissions of the *Parliamentary Hour* programme were cancelled from Sept. 21. Reports said that opposition views were not featured on the main television news bulletins until Sept. 23. In addition, publication of the daily pro-Parliament newspaper *Rossiskaya gazeta* was prohibited from Sept. 23.

#### **Stalemate in negotiations**

On Sept. 23, Khasbulatov rejected compromise with Yeltsin and his allies, calling them "coup plotters". However, Constitutional Court Chair Valery Zorkin canvassed support for a "zero-option" plan, envisaging that each side would retract any steps taken from the time of the signing of *On Constitutional Reform*. Under this plan, first suggested on Sept. 22 and backed by the Constitutional Court on Sept. 23 in meetings with Rutskoi and the Yeltsin aide Mikhail Poltoranin, the Supreme Soviet would operate with limited powers until simultaneous December elections to the presidency and to the Parliament, and the Council of Ministers would be supervised not by the President but by the Constitutional Court itself.

Yeltsin insisted on Sept. 27 that "I will not make this compromise", adding: "Dual power is very dangerous today. . . . A power vacuum is even more dangerous, when both powers are engaged in elections and have no time to work."

On Sept. 28 the Court attempted to impose part of its plan, ordering both sides to rescind all decrees made since the moment Yeltsin's decree was signed on Sept. 21.

#### **Division of loyalty among Russia's regions**

Khasbulatov remarked on Sept. 30 that "everything [would] now be decided by the regions".

On Sept. 21 Rutskoi had urged Russia's regions and republics to denounce *On Constitutional Reform*. Prime Minister Victor Chemomyrdin, admitting that he had been worried over how the regions and republics might respond, told the Itar-Tass news agency that in telephone conversations with regional leaders on Sept. 22 "everyone spoke in favour of stabilization and supported the measures taken by the President". However, on Sept. 25 Yeltsin told Ostankino television that "two or three regions [had] reacted badly", adding that "the heads of these administrations [would] be dismissed from their posts". One of those critical of *On Constitutional Reform*, Yuri Lodkin, the Governor of Bratsk region, was arrested and reportedly beaten on Sept. 26.

A meeting in Moscow on Sept. 30 of representatives from 62 of Russia's 89 regions and republics, called for an end to the blockade of the White House, and threatened to use "all necessary measures of economic and political pressure", thought to imply the withholding of both taxes and oil and gas exports, to restore "constitutional legality".

The meeting decided to form a Federation Council to pre-empt that planned by Yeltsin as an appointed upper chamber of the Federal Assembly. The Deputy Prime Minister and Chair of the State Commission on Nationalities Policy, Sergei Shakhrai, who attended the meeting, dismissed it as "unrepresentative".

#### **Reappointment of Gaidar - Confirmation of Golushko as Security Minister - Resignation of Glazyev**

The radical former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for the Economy on Sept. 16. He warned of "tough decisions in the area of state expenditure" if inflation was to be reduced.

Gaidar replaced the centrist Oleg Lobov, who was appointed as Secretary of the Security Council. Lobov's call on Sept. 3 for major changes to the privatization programme had been criticized by Anatoli Chubais, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for Privatisation, who had said on Sept. 13 that Lobov's proposals could not "be taken seriously by anybody".

A decree of Sept. 20 confirmed Nikolay Golushko in the post of Security Service Minister. Golushko was reportedly a State Security Committee (KGB) officer of long standing.

The Foreign Economic Relations Minister Sergei Glazyev resigned on Sept. 22, protesting at Yeltsin's "unconstitutional" decree *On Constitutional Reform*.



### Discontinuation of corruption charges against Rutskoi and Shumeiko - Other cases

Gennady Ponomarev, the Moscow prosecutor supervising the investigation into allegations of corruption against Rutskoi, said on Sept. 19 that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with a prosecution. Reports on Sept. 21 said that First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shumeiko had been similarly exonerated.

Yeltsin had suspended Rutskoi in a decree of Sept. 1, prompting Khasbulatov to accuse him of "a shocking betrayal of the constitution". On Sept. 3 the Supreme Soviet had voted to lift Rutskoi's suspension. Shumeiko had also been suspended on Sept. 1.

On Sept. 6 Ponomarev said that there was no evidence for allegations made in August [see p. 39608] by Andrei Makarov, a member of the Security Council interdepartmental Commission on Crime, that Russian Prosecutor General Valentin Stepankov had planned to murder him.

On Sept. 16 Poltoranin was charged with exceeding his authority and with forgery after an investigation into the sale of a state-owned house in Berlin.

■ Last article pp. 39608-09; reference article p. R121-22.

## ARMENIA

### "Catastrophic" blockade

Armenian Prime Minister Hrand Bagratian said on Sept. 17 that the rebellion in western Georgia [see p. 39651] had closed the last remaining (northern) overland supply routes to Armenia, creating a "catastrophic" situation in which emergency supplies of rice and grain would have to be flown in by plane. The country's (Muslim) neighbours to the south and west, Iran and Turkey, had forbidden trade with Armenia in protest over what they considered to be its aggression towards its neighbour, Azerbaijan.

■ Last articles pp. 39332-33; 39575; 39614; reference article p. R99.

## AZERBAIJAN

### Announcement of presidential elections

The *Milli Majlis* (National Assembly or rump parliament) voted on Sept. 1 to hold presidential elections on Oct. 3. Acting President and Supreme Soviet Chair Geidar Aliyev said on Sept. 1 that following the Aug. 29 referendum, in which only 2 per cent of those voting had expressed "trust" in ousted President Abulfaz Elchibey [see p. 39609], the latter "henceforth [was] not the President of Azerbaijan".

On Sept. 6, the pro-Elchibey Popular Front and *Musavat* parties announced a boycott of the elections, saying that a fair election campaign was impossible while emergency government controls over the media were in place.

On Sept. 13 the Turan News Agency reported that further arrests of senior Popular Front officials had taken place, including that of the Front's chief press officer.

### New government appointments

Reuters reported several new government appointments on Sept. 2.

Gasam Gasanov, who had been Prime Minister under the administration of President Ayaz Mutalibov (which fell in March 1992—see pp. 38827-8) and then ambassador to the UN [see p. 38877], was named as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Maj.-Gen. Mamedrafi Mamedov became Defence Minister, and Lidiya Rasulova, a former trade union leader, was appointed Minister of Education.

The appointment of Abbas Abbasov, a Deputy Prime Minister, as Chair of the newly created State Committee for International Relations was approved by the *Milli Majlis* on Sept. 20. A report on Azerbaijani television on Sept. 16 said that Aliyev had dismissed Ragim ogy Guseinov from the post of Minister of Health.

### Resolution on CIS membership

The *Milli Majlis* resolved on Sept. 20 that Azerbaijan should seek full membership of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The decision followed a meeting between Aliyev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on Sept. 6, at which Yeltsin had secured a pledge from Aliyev on CIS membership. Aliyev told the *Milli Majlis* on Sept. 20 that there had been "no pressure from Russia at all". However Tofik Gasymov, Foreign Minister in the pro-Turkish administration of Elchibey, said that CIS membership would restrict Azerbaijan's independence.

### Nagorny Karabakh

#### Extension of ceasefire - Peace talks

Talks held in Moscow on Sept. 9-14 between Azerbaijan and officials of the ethnically Armenian enclave of Nagorny Karabakh ended with an agreement to extend the ceasefire, formally announced on Aug. 31, until Oct. 5. The Karabakh authorities had said on Sept. 8 that Karabakh had no territorial claims on Azerbaijan. Russian TV reported on Sept. 13 that Armenian troops had withdrawn from Kubatly.

After a meeting between Aliyev and Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosian in Moscow on Sept. 25, both sides expressed confidence that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was possible.

#### Russian criticism of Armenian advance - Turkey's warning on Nakhichevan - Presence of Iranian troops in Azerbaijan

Early in September there had been reports of serious violations of the Aug. 31 ceasefire. On Sept. 3 the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry claimed that the town of Goradiz, near the Iranian border, had fallen to Armenian troops pushing south from Nagorny Karabakh. The Russian Foreign Ministry warned on Sept. 3

that Russia would not permit "the Karabakh forces [to push] a highly dangerous conflict on to the international level".

Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller warned Armenia in early September not to attack the Autonomous Republic of Nakhichevan—separated from the rest of Azerbaijan by Armenian territory—which shared a border with Turkey and Iran.

According to the Turkish daily *Hürriyet* of Sept. 4, Ciller said: "If one spot of Nakhichevan is touched, I will go to the Parliament and obtain authorization for war." Ciller also said that more troops had been sent to the border with Armenia; however, after meeting Yeltsin in Moscow on Sept. 9, she stated: "We see no immediate threat to Nakhichevan. We are watching what our neighbours do."

A Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman warned on Sept. 9 that an incursion into Azerbaijan by some 1,000 Iranian troops was regarded "with neither understanding nor support" and that it contributed "to an escalation of the conflict".

Iran had agreed on Sept. 7 to build facilities in southern Azerbaijan to house 100,000 of the estimated 800,000 to 1,000,000 Azeri refugees displaced by the Karabakh war.

■ Last article p. 39609; reference article p. R100.

## GEORGIA

### Victory of Abkhaz rebels

The Black Sea resort of Sukhumi fell to separatist Abkhaz rebels on Sept. 27 after a surprise assault launched on Sept. 16. The Georgian President (Supreme Council Chair) Eduard Shevardnadze claimed on Sept. 27 that "hundreds of people" had been killed in the attack. Some 120,000 civilians reportedly fled south into western Georgia, and a further 14,000 were evacuated by ship. Shevardnadze himself, having pledged on Sept. 17 that he would not leave the town "until the danger is removed", fled by plane to the Georgian capital Tbilisi on Sept. 28.

Sukhumi's defences had been considerably weakened by the withdrawal of much of the heavy armour used to defend the town, as part of the ceasefire agreement of July 27. On Sept. 30 the towns of Gali and Ochamchira were taken, with little resistance, leaving the rebels in control of virtually the whole of Abkhazia.

#### Controversy over Russian role in capture of Sukhumi

Shevardnadze blamed Russia on Sept. 27 for the loss of Sukhumi, complaining of "betrayal" and of Russia's refusal to honour a pledge (allegedly made as part of the Russian-brokered tripartite ceasefire agreement of July 27—see p. 39569) to impose peace by military force if necessary. Alluding to a decision by the Cabinet of Ministers on Sept. 26 to join the Russian-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) pending popular ap-







9, saying that constant criticism and opposition in the Supreme Council had made his job impossible.

On Sept. 28 the conservative Yukhim Zvyagilsky was reappointed First Deputy Prime Minister, having served temporarily as Prime Minister from Sept. 22. A further decree of Sept. 28 established a 10-member committee to co-ordinate reform at all levels of government.

#### **Announcement of early elections - Cancellation of referendum**

The Supreme Council voted on Sept. 24 to hold early election—to a new parliament on March 27, 1994, and to the Presidency on June 26. A national referendum on confidence in the Supreme Council and the presidency, planned for Sept. 26, was cancelled; Kravchuk had admitted on Sept. 23 that there was “no confidence in the authorities”.

The cancellation of the referendum, which had been arranged as part of a deal with striking miners in June [see p. 39523-24], led to calls by several trade unions for a general strike to demand the resignation of the Council of Ministers. There were also protests against plans announced on Sept. 8 to raise the price of subsidized food, energy and services by 300-500 per cent.

#### **“Persecution” of Orthodox Church**

A report published by the Russian Orthodox Church on Sept. 21 claimed that churchgoers and clergy who favoured the Moscow Patriarchy over the Kiev Patriarchy had been persecuted by the Ukrainian authorities, including “people’s deputies and local representatives of the President”, particularly in the region of Rovno. The report claimed that worshippers had been beaten.

#### **Cancellation of agreement with Russia on fleet**

Confusion surrounded an agreement over the Black Sea Fleet, apparently struck at a Russian-Ukrainian summit held at Massandra, in the Crimea, on Sept. 3.

According to reports in the Western press, the agreement would have exchanged Ukraine’s half of the fleet for “more or less” (as Russian President Boris Yeltsin put it on Sept. 3) the cancellation of Ukraine’s debt to Russia, which reportedly stood at US\$2,500 million (the sum varied according to the means chosen to calculate the value of imported Russian oil and gas). The fleet would remain at Sevastopol. Kravchuk insisted on Sept. 4, however, that no decisions had been taken, and on Sept. 6 the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry denounced reports of the summit agreement as “disinformation”.

Ukrainian nationalists had responded to reports of the deal with alarm. Vyacheslav Chornovil, leader of the opposition *Rukh* movement, had on Sept. 4 accused Kravchuk of behaviour “tantamount to high treason”.

Reuters reported on Sept. 21 that Russia had annulled a second agreement reached at Massandra, in which Russia had agreed to supply

fuel for Ukraine’s nuclear power stations in exchange for the return of the 1,800 nuclear warheads based in Ukraine, which would then have been dismantled in Russia.

■ Last article p. 39610; reference article pp. R126-27.

## **LITHUANIA**

### **Resignation of Defence Minister after mutiny**

A mutiny by some 140 members of the Volunteer Home Guard Service in Kaunas, which had begun on Sept. 16, ended on Sept. 23 with the surrender of the troops involved. The Minister of National Defence, Audrius Butkevicius, had resigned on Sept. 21, saying that his “authority [had] been put into question”.

The troops were reportedly demanding the removal of ex-communists from positions of power, and improved social guarantees. Their leader, Lt. Jonas Maskvytis, reportedly remained at large.

#### **Prosecution of Lithuanian Bank Chair**

The chair of the Bank of Lithuania, Romualdas Visakavicius, was charged with abuse of power, following allegations that the Bank had granted favourable credits to a commercial bank partly owned by him, according to Lithuanian Radio on Sept. 8.

■ Last article p. 39610; reference article p. R115.

## **BALTIC STATES**

### **Baltic free trade agreement**

At a heads of government meeting in the Estonian capital Tallinn on Sept. 13, Prime Ministers Mart Laar of Estonia, Valdis Birkavs of Latvia and Adolfas Slezevicius of Lithuania signed a free trade agreement. The *Baltic Independent* of Sept. 17-23 said that the agreement, which awaited ratification by the legislatures of the three countries, would abolish tariffs on most non-agricultural goods traded between the Baltic states, and would provide for common customs and visa regulations.

#### **Papal visit**

Pope John Paul II, who visited the Baltic states on Sept. 4-10, urged respect for ethnic minorities, saying on Sept. 5 that the Vatican “acknowledged the aspirations of citizens of Russian origin asking to enjoy full human rights in their country of residence”. The Pope also cautioned on Sept. 9 that “exploitation” under “inhumane capitalism . . . is indeed an evil”.

Some 100,000 worshippers reportedly attended an open-air mass on Sept. 26 at Kaunas in predominantly Catholic Lithuania. A similar event held on Sept. 7 in Latvia, which had more divided religious loyalties, attracted 40,000 people.

■ Last article p. 39334.

## **GERMANY**

### **Hamburg elections**

In elections to the Hamburg *Bürgerschaft* (city parliament) on Sept. 19 the ruling Social Democrats (SPD) lost their absolute majority, winning 40.4 per cent of the vote and 58 seats compared with 48 per cent and 61 seats in 1991; the Christian Democrats (CDU) saw their share of the vote fall by 10 per cent to 25.1 per cent; and the Free Democrat (FDP) share fell below the 5 per cent of votes required to win representation. By contrast, the Green Alternative List (GAL) nearly doubled its share of the vote, from 7.2 to 13.5 per cent, and the newly formed *Statt-Partei* (“Instead of a Party”—see below), with 5.6 per cent, gained representation. On the extreme right, the Republicans quadrupled their vote to 4.8 per cent and the German People’s Union (DVU) also made gains.

The election had been called after the Hamburg constitutional court ruled in May 1993 that the elections in June 1991 [see p. 38297] were invalid because of “serious breaches of democratic procedure” in the selection of CDU candidates. The case had been brought by former CDU politician Markus Wegner who then formed the *Statt-Partei*.

#### **Presidential candidates**

On Sept. 13 the SPD formally nominated Johannes Rau, 62, Minister President of North Rhine-Westphalia, as its candidate for the May 1994 presidential elections.

There was considerable controversy surrounding the expected CDU candidate, Stefan Heitmann, 49, a former East German Lutheran pastor and the hardline Justice Minister in Saxony.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl, expressing support for Heitmann at the start of the annual CDU conference in Berlin on Sept. 13, said that his selection would be “an important sign for people in the east”. Heitmann was widely criticized for his strongly conservative views, including saying that it was time to put the Nazi holocaust “in its proper place” in history, speaking of an *Überfremdung* (“over-foreignization”) of Germany, and advocating that a woman’s place was in the home. On Sept. 25 Klaus Kinkel, Federal Foreign Minister and chair of the FDP, said that “Heitmann is not our man” and there was talk of a possible separate FDP candidacy.

#### **Trial of former East German leaders**

On Sept. 16 a Berlin court found three leading former East German politicians guilty of complicity in the “shoot-to-kill” policy under which people seeking to flee East Germany had been shot dead.

Heinz Kessler, a former Defence Minister, Fritz Streletz, his deputy, and Hans Albrecht, a regional party leader, were sentenced to 7½, 5½ and 4½ years’ imprisonment respectively. In that they had condoned the “shoot-to-kill” policy the three were found guilty of violating human rights. [For cases of border guards convicted for “shooting to kill” see pp. 38736; 38782; 38977.]



The case had begun in November 1992 but the other three originally indicted, including former East German leader Erich Honecker, were found too ill to stand trial [see pp. 39209; 39288; 39433].

#### Grams affair repercussions

In the wake of the June killing of Wolfgang Grams when the GSG-9 anti-terrorist unit sought to arrest him [see p. 39572], the federal government published an interim report on Aug. 19. This acknowledged 17 different mistakes, especially failures of communication particularly on the part of the Federal Criminal Office, but failed to resolve the question of how Grams was killed.

An independent forensic report by specialists at the University of Münster on Sept. 21 concluded that traces on Grams's own pistol, which it had been determined in July was the gun which killed him, indicated that he had fired the fatal shot himself. A further independent report commissioned by prosecutors was still expected from the Zürich city police.

#### Espionage arrests

On Sept. 30 the Federal Prosecutors' office announced that a secretary who had worked in the Chancellor's office for 13 years had been arrested on suspicion of espionage on behalf of East Germany. Her husband, who was alleged to have been her controller, was also detained. [For August 1993 espionage arrest see p. 39612.]

#### Large-scale job losses

On Sept. 17 Daimler-Benz, Germany's largest industrial concern, announced that it would cut 43,900 jobs (of which 35,000 were in Germany) during 1993 and 1994, in addition to 16,100 shed in 1992, as part of a plan to save DM 8,000 million (about US\$5,000 million) in 1992-97. [For July unemployment figures see p. 39612.]

Daimler-Benz registered a deficit of DM 949 million in the first half of 1993 as a result of switching to US accounting standards in advance of its listing in October on the New York Stock Exchange (the first by a German company), but even under German accounting techniques profits would have been down by 80 per cent as compared with the same period in 1992.

On Sept. 21 Ruhrkohle, Germany's largest hard coal producer, announced 6,000 job cuts in 1994 in addition to 12,000 already planned. A coal mine at Bergkamen was to be closed and two others partially closed. The announcement prompted protests and work stoppages throughout the Ruhr.

■ Last article p. 39612; reference article pp. R109-10.

## AUSTRIA

#### Trial of neo-Nazi

Gottfried Küssel, 35, was sentenced on Sept. 29 to 10 years' imprisonment for organizing a neo-Nazi group, the *Volkstreue ausserparlamentarische Opposition* (People's Extrapar-

liamentary Opposition). [For 1992 changes to anti-Nazi legislation and for other trials see pp. 38823; 38929.]

#### Debate on Haider Initiative

On Sept. 23 the *Nationalrat* (lower house of parliament) debated an initiative against foreigners, which had been launched by Jörg Haider of the Free Democrats (FPÖ) in November 1992 and had gained sufficient support to require such a debate [see pp. 39209; 39289; 39336]. As expected the initiative was rejected by a large majority.

■ Last articles pp. 39479; 39530; 39575; reference article pp. R99-100.

## LIECHTENSTEIN

#### Calling of elections

Prince Hans-Adam II dissolved the *Landtag* (unicameral parliament) on Sept. 15 and called an early general election, expected on Oct. 23.

A motion of no confidence in Markus Büchel, Prime Minister since May 1993 [see p. 39484], had been brought by his own Progressive Citizens' Party (FBP) amid criticism of his style of government, and approved on Sept. 14 by 17 out of the 25 parliamentary deputies. Prince Hans-Adam did not, however, act to implement a further motion requesting him to dismiss Büchel.

■ Last articles pp. 39336; 39484; reference article p. R115.

## SWITZERLAND

#### Referendums

On Sept. 26 voters approved five national referendums by large majorities. The measures adopted included cost-saving changes to unemployment and health insurance provisions proposed by the federal government; the declaration of the national holiday, Aug. 1, as a work-free day throughout the country; tighter controls on the sale of guns; and transfer of the Laufental district from the canton of Bern to Basel-Land.

This last decision, which required the approval of all other cantons, marked the first time that a political unit in Switzerland had opted to leave one canton to join another. The German-speaking Laufental district, with a population of 15,000, had been cut off geographically from Bern after the creation of the French-speaking canton of Jura in 1979.

In a cantonal referendum voters in Zurich rejected a proposal to restrict expansion of its international airport, the country's largest.

■ Last article, pp. 39528-29; reference article p. R125.

## NORWAY

#### Increased Labour Party majority in general election

The ruling Labour Party increased its support in the general election on Sept. 12-13, winning 67 seats in the 165-member *Storting*. The Centre Party (Sp), which nearly trebled its share of the vote, became the country's second-largest party, whereas the Conservatives (*Hoeyre*) lost a third of their support, and the right-wing populist Progress Party (Frp) also suffered major losses. The turnout was 75.9 per cent, the lowest since 1927 [for 1989 elections see p. 36901].

The success of the Sp was almost entirely due to its opposition to Norway's accession to the European Communities (EC). The party's strong showing threw into doubt the future of the application, since analysts estimated that opponents of membership were now in a majority in parliament. The Labour government announced that it would press ahead with the application, however.

Apart from EC membership, the other dominant issue in the campaign was unemployment, with Labour arguing that its economic austerity policies were beginning to bear fruit, and that increasing taxation and creating more jobs in the public sector should be the means of reducing unemployment. Labour also argued that there was no other viable alternative government. The key role played by government officials in achieving the breakthrough in relations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) [see pp. 39658-62], which became public in early September, was also thought to have benefited the party.

A computer breakdown and the resultant confusion over the introduction of manual voting systems cast doubt over the results in Oslo, the capital. The city's election committee proposed a re-election for the 15 seats affected, but a final decision would be taken by the *Storting* standing committee on credentials.

#### Norwegian election results

	Percentage of vote		Seats	
	1993	1989	1993	1989
Norwegian Labour Party (DNA)	37.0	34.3	67	63
Centre Party (Sp)	16.8	6.5	32	11
Conservative Party ( <i>Hoeyre</i> )	16.9	22.2	28	37
Christian People's Party (KrF)	7.9	8.5	13	14
Socialist Left Party (SV)	7.9	10.1	13	17
Progress Party (Frp)	6.3	13.0	10	22
Liberal Party ( <i>Venstre</i> )	3.6	3.2	1	0
Red Electoral Alliance (RV)	1.1	0.7	1	0
Others	2.5	1.5	0	1

■ Last article p. 39025; 39435; reference article p. R118.



## UNITED KINGDOM

### BNP victory in local council by-election

The extreme right-wing British National Party (BNP) won a local council seat for the first time at a by-election in east London on Sept. 17.

By the narrow margin of only seven votes, the BNP's Derek Beackon captured a former Labour-held seat, defeating candidates from the country's three main parties, in the Millwall ward in the Liberal Democrat-controlled borough of Tower Hamlets.

The election came only one week after Quddus Ali, a youth of Bangladeshi origin, was critically injured in a racially motivated attack in east London. More than 10 per cent of recorded racial incidents in England and Wales in 1992 had been in east London, where a total of 816 were reported. Of the 10 racist-related deaths in the UK during 1992, at least half had been in east or south London.

The BNP victory in Millwall was condemned by the government and by Labour and the Liberal Democrats. However, the Liberal Democrats were forced on to the defensive by Labour accusations that the party had distributed racist leaflets during the Millwall election campaign. Paddy Ashdown, leader of the Liberal Democrats, swiftly announced an inquiry into the activities of local party members. At the party's annual conference in Torquay on Sept. 20-24, much attention was focused on the activities of Liberal Democrats in Tower Hamlets.

#### Labour Party conference

The main opposition Labour Party held its annual conference in Brighton on Sept. 27-Oct. 1. The conference was a triumph for the leader, John Smith, and other so-called "modernizers" who succeeded in reforming the party's links with trade unions.

The crucial vote on Sept. 29 was preceded by what the *Financial Times* of Sept. 30 described as "a day of arm-twisting, pleading and cajoling" by Smith and his supporters. A critical point in the debate was a speech backing Smith's reforms delivered by John Prescott, the party's transport spokesman and a leading figure on the left of the party.

In the Sept. 29 vote, delegates narrowly voted in favour of a "one-member-one-vote" (OMOV) system to select the party's parliamentary candidates,

#### Racist-related deaths in Western Europe 1992

Belgium	4
Denmark	2
France	13
Germany	27
Italy	4
Netherlands	3
Portugal	1
Spain	2
Switzerland	1
United Kingdom	10
Total	67

Source: *Statewatch*.

thereby ending the unions' right to cast up to 40 per cent of the total vote. In addition, the "modernizers" succeeded in weakening the union block vote at the annual conference and union dominance of the electoral college which elect the party leader and deputy leader.

#### Developments in coal industry

On Sept. 21 the government released preliminary details of its privatization strategy for the British Coal Corporation (British Coal)—the nationalized coal industry. A privatization bill was scheduled to be put to the next parliamentary session with the aim of selling the industry during the first half of 1994.

Tim Eggar, Minister for Energy, announced that the industry was to be offered for sale as five regional businesses, namely Scotland, Wales, the north-east, Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire. The plan was drawn up in the face of strong opposition from British Coal, which favoured selling the industry in one or two segments. Eggar said that he had already received expressions of interest reaching "double figures".

With regard to the 19 pits put out to licence tender by British Coal following its decision to discontinue working them [see also p. 39526], the deadline passed in early September with bids having been placed in the case of only 10 pits, three of which involved the use of surface assets only. The *Financial Times* of Sept. 10 reported that British Coal would prepare for closure the nine pits which had received no bid, namely Bolsover, Easington, Grimthorpe, Houghton Main, Parkside, Sharlston, Shirebrook, Taff Merthyr and Westoe.

#### First conviction in BCCI affair

The first criminal conviction over the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in July 1991 [see pp. 38355; for most recent report see p. 39480] was secured on Sept. 27 when Syed Ali Akbar, former head of the bank's treasury division, admitted 16 charges of false accounting involving over £484 million (about US\$730 million) of depositors' misused money. Akbar, who had been extradited from France in early 1993, was on Sept. 28 sentenced to six years in prison.

Akbar's conviction marked the first success for authorities in the UK, the USA and the United Arab Emirates in their efforts to bring a series of prosecutions concerning alleged fraud in the bank's handling of clients' funds. The only previous case to be brought before a court—the trial in New York of a Washington lawyer, Robert Altman—had ended in acquittal in August 1993 [see pp. 39590-91].

■ Last article p. 39611; reference article pp. R127-28.

## NORTHERN IRELAND

### Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference meeting

A meeting of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference was held in London on Sept. 10 [for May meeting see p. 39480].

A joint statement issued after the meeting said that the UK and Irish governments "underlined the urgency and importance of the search for political agreement". Publicly, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to restarting the "round-table" (inter-party) talks which had been halted since November 1992 [see p. 39207]. However, privately, according to reports which emerged in late September, the two sides established a joint working party of civil servants to draft a constitutional settlement for Northern Ireland with a view to reviving the talks.

#### Progress of Hume-Adams talks - Other developments

On Sept. 25 John Hume, leader of the (largely Catholic) Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), and Gerry Adams, leader of *Sinn Féin*, the political wing of the Irish republican movement, announced that they would submit a joint report on the progress of their bilateral talks, which had opened in April [see p. 39433], to the US and Irish governments.

The *Financial Times* of Sept. 27 reported that the Hume-Adams report included a proposal to appoint a US mediator to break the impasse in Northern Ireland.

Hume had held a round of talks with UK Prime Minister John Major in London on Sept. 16. At this meeting, Hume told Major that the SDLP would return to the round-table talks as long as there were no preconditions set by any other participants.

On Sept. 13 the Democratic Unionist Party had presented Major with a set of new proposals in a document entitled *Breaking the Logjam*.

#### Ruling on case of 1988 Gibraltar killing of IRA members

The European Commission of Human Rights ruled on Sept. 6 that there was a case to be heard by the European Court of Human Rights concerning the three Irish Republican Army (IRA) members shot dead in Gibraltar in 1988 [see pp. 36236; 36405].

Relatives of those who died argued that the shooting violated the European Convention on Human Rights which guaranteed the right to life. It emerged after the shootings that the two men and a woman, who were suspected of being about to plant a bomb, had been unarmed at the time. An inquest had returned a verdict of lawful killing [see p. 37098].

■ Last article p. 39611; reference article p. R128.

## NETHERLANDS

### Asylum restrictions

On Sept. 23 the *Staten Generaal* (legislature) completed approval of legislation restricting the right to asylum. [For similar restrictions in Germany see pp. 39428; 39573; and in France pp. 39527, 39612; this page.]

The legislation would allow the authorities to declare a large number of requests "unfounded" including those of individuals (i) with false papers; (ii) who reached the Netherlands via a "safe" third country; and (iii) who had earlier unsuccessfully



requested asylum in the Netherlands or another European country. Individuals lost the right of second appeal to a court of cassation if their first appeal was rejected.

### Reform of social security system

On Sept. 7 a parliamentary commission proposed radical reforms of the social security system, replacing the concept of maximum collectivization of risks with an individual legal guarantee of minimum social protection.

Sick pay would no longer be paid at 70 per cent of full salary for up to 12 months, but instead at least the minimum wage for up to 18 months. Invalidity payments (currently received by 920,000 individuals or nearly 15 per cent of the workforce) would in future be reserved for those at least 66 per cent incapacitated. The commission also recommended that the social security bureaucracy should be de-regulated and privatized.

■ Last articles pp. 39335; 39531; 39575; 39614; reference article p. R118.

## FRANCE

### 1994 budget

The 1994 budget unveiled by Budget Minister Nicolas Sarkozy on Sept. 22 offered fresh incentives to encourage investment, and proposed using privatization proceeds to reduce the budget deficit. Economic growth was forecast to recover, after an estimated 0.8 per cent drop in gross domestic product (GDP) in 1993, with growth of 1.4 per cent in real terms in 1994 due largely to increased foreign demand for French goods.

Among the budget's other main features were (i) some F 19,000 million in tax cuts to provide relief to middle-income earners, and a reduction in the number of tax brackets from 13 to seven; (ii) a reduction in the budget deficit, from an estimated F 317,000 million to F 300,000 million in 1994, made possible by the sale of state companies which was expected to yield some F 55,000 million in 1994; and (iii) an increase in overall spending in 1994 of 1.1 per cent—below the predicted rate of inflation of 2.2 per cent—targeted mainly at defence and police, but also at reducing unemployment. (US\$1.00=F 5.6282 as at Sept. 20, 1993.)

On Sept. 20 Prime Minister Edouard Balladur had ordered state-owned companies to minimise job cuts by reviewing redundancies in the light of the government's recently announced five-year employment package [see p. 39612].

### New central bank governor - Sale of BNP

Jean-Claude Trichet was named governor of the Bank of France (the central bank) on Sept. 13; he replaced Jacques de Larosière who had been appointed president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) [see p. 39614].

The Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) on Sept. 20 became the first of 21 state-owned companies to be sold off as part of the government's five-year privatization programme.

### Ruling on immigration legislation

The *Conseil d'État* (the State Council) ruled on Sept. 23 that a constitutional amendment would be "indispensable" if the government's immigration legislation strengthening controls against asylum seekers were to be enforced.

The verdict, given in response to an appeal by Balladur, was regarded by observers as a boost for the government, which had supported a limited revision of the Constitution in order to push forward the legislation [see p. 39612]. Reports suggested, however, that Balladur was unlikely to rush through any procedures for a constitutional amendment for fear of jeopardising the "cohabitation" between his centre-right government and (socialist) President François Mitterrand.

### Retirement of Marchais

The secretary-general of the French Communist Party (PCF), Georges Marchais, announced in late September that he intended to resign from his post at the party's next congress in January 1994. In a letter addressed to the party's central committee, reported on Sept. 30, Marchais said that chronic ill-health had forced him to give up the post he had held for nearly 21 years.

Marchais, 73, had emerged as one of France's most influential left-wing leaders in 1972 when the PCF commanded almost 25 per cent of the electoral vote. A fierce advocate of democratic centralism, his orthodox views came to be seen by critics as a contributory cause of the PCF's political decline and its slump in recent opinion polls to around 7 per cent [see also p. 39382].

### Acquittal of Bérégovoy aide

Alain Boubil, a senior aide of former Prime Minister Pierre Bérégovoy, was acquitted of fraudulent share trading by a court in Paris on Sept. 29. In May Bérégovoy had committed suicide amid allegations, which he consistently denied, that he was privy to the trading deal between Boubil and businessman Roger-Patrice Pelat, who had provided Bérégovoy with an interest-free loan to buy a flat [see pp. 36706; 38591; 39477].

■ Last article p. 39612; reference article pp. R107-08.

## SPAIN

### 1994 budget

The Cabinet completed on Sept. 24 the drafting of the 1994 budget, incorporating fiscal measures designed in particular to cut the budget deficit.

The minority Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) government had expected that the budget would be presented to Congress with the support of trade unions and employers, but negotiations on a social pact (which began in July—see p. 39571) failed to reach a consensus. Instead the government needed the support of the Catalan nationalist Convergence (CiU) and the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), which demanded in return a government commitment to grant power to the autonomous regions to spend 15 per cent of the tax raised in their region.

The draft as presented to the Congress on Sept. 30 contained proposals that in 1994 there should be a civil service pay freeze, and that public pension increases should be kept to 3.5 per cent (in line with the government's projected inflation figure for the year).

Economic targets for 1994 included 1.3 per cent growth in gross domestic product (GDP), compared with an expected negative rate of 0.8 per cent in 1993; 3.5 per cent inflation; and reduction of the budget deficit to 5.7 per cent of GDP. Finance Minister Pedro Solbes Mira announced that the 1993 deficit would be around 6.2 per cent of GDP rather than the over-optimistic figure of 3 per cent suggested by his predecessor Carlos Solchaga Catalán. Solbes warned that the modest growth in the economy would not lead to an increase in jobs, but predicted that the number of jobs lost would fall from 630,000 in 1993 to 150,000 in 1994.

Several rounds of talks on the social pact were held early in September, and on Sept. 9 the unions agreed to negotiate an agreement on pay moderation for the next three years.

The main point of contention was that while the unions wanted rises pegged to the inflation rate of the previous year, the government proposed that they be index-linked to the projected inflation figure for that year. The unions consistently maintained that the government's proposals demanded too high a sacrifice if they failed to create new jobs. Eventually both parties had to agree to abandon the deadline date of Sept. 20 for concluding a wage pact. Further talks on pay moderation were scheduled for October.

Within the social pact the employers' organizations sought legal reforms to allow them greater flexibility to dismiss or reallocate workers. Their chief concern was to attract higher foreign investment, which, they argued, was discouraged by current Spanish industrial legislation.

### Death of ETA suspects in police custody

After a period of relative quiet [see p. 39612], Basque separatist feelings again ran high after the death in police custody of two members of the Basque Separatist organization ETA.

Miren Gurutze Yanci (31) died of a heart attack on her way to hospital on Sept. 24. ETA sources claimed that she had been tortured by the police, while the national press reported that her coronary was due to obesity and heavy smoking. Xabier Galparsoro (27) died on Sept. 26, having been in a coma for two days after attempting to escape by jumping out of a window, according to police reports. Interior Minister José Luis Corcuera Cuesta ordered a full investigation into the two deaths, which sparked off riots in Bilbao, San Sebastian and Pamplona on Sept. 26.

### Refusal of pardon for Tejero

The government announced on Sept. 17 that it had decided to downgrade the prison status of former Lt.-Col. Antonio Tejero Molina, the leader of the 1981 attempted coup [see pp. 30821-26], to allow him day release, but not to grant him a pardon. Tejero was the only one of the conspirators still held in prison.

■ Last article pp. 39612-13; reference article pp. R123-124.



## ITALY

### Draft budget

The Cabinet on Sept. 10 adopted a draft budget for 1994 which included cost-saving measures of L 28,000,000 million (US\$17,700 billion) and fiscal measures which would raise L 4,000 billion. The budget would thus reduce the public-sector deficit to L 144,000 billion, equivalent to 9.7 per cent of gross domestic product (twice the European Community average).

Prime Minister Carlo Azeglio Ciampi said that the budget sought to "spread the burden of sacrifice" and would send a "strong signal" to the international community that Italy was determined to put its public finances in order. [For austerity measures adopted in May, see p. 39482.]

Major savings were to be achieved through a reform of public administration and the reduction of civil servants' privileges. Among the proposals were the transformation of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications into an agency, the abolition of the Ministry of Merchant Marine, the abolition of most interministerial committees, devolution of decision-making in the educational sector, a virtual freeze on the recruitment of civil servants, and restrictions on pension privileges. All ministries would be expected to cut their spending by 3 per cent in real terms.

### Crotone industrial action

A dispute at a state-owned chemical plant in Crotone, in the southern region of Calabria, was resolved after 11 days on Sept. 16 when the redundancy notices issued to 333 workers were withdrawn and the government undertook to find most of them jobs elsewhere.

The strike proved highly controversial because it was widely regarded as a test case of the government's resolve to rationalize loss-making industries. The terms of the settlement were strongly criticized by the opposition Northern League led by Umberto Bossi. Arguing that uncompetitive factories should be closed, Bossi threatened to call a "tax strike" in protest against further state subsidies.

### Deal on payments to EFIM creditors

The European Commission on Sept. 8 authorized the terms under which the Italian government would be able to honour debts amounting to L 7,000 million accumulated by the EFIM state industrial holding company, which was placed in liquidation in July 1992.

As part of the agreement—required under the EC's fair competition regulations—the government would (i) impose a freeze on further lending to state-owned companies by the end of 1993; (ii) reduce debt to levels obtaining in equivalent private-sector companies by the end of 1996; and (iii) revoke its loan guarantee arrangements with state-owned companies.

### Ciampi's visit to USA

In the course of a two-day official visit to the USA on Sept. 17-18 Ciampi held several meetings with President Bill Clinton, government officials and members of the US Congress. Issues under discussion included differences over the role of UN peacekeeping forces in Somalia and the strained relations between Italian and US troops deployed in that country [see also p. 39627].

### Developments in corruption scandals

In a new twist to the country's interlinked political corruption scandals, the head of the Milan commercial court, Diego Curtò, was arrested on Sept. 4 on charges of aggravated corruption and abuse of power. It was the first time that a member of the judiciary had been so directly implicated in the scandals. Curtò subsequently admitted accepting a bribe of L 320 million in July—more than a year after the scandal first broke in Milan—for his role in the judicial investigations of the affairs of the Enimont chemical concern [see p. 39573].

In other developments in part related to the Enimont affair, a warrant was issued on Sept. 10 for the arrest of Enrico Bragiotti, the former chief executive of the Banca Commerciale Italiana (BCI), the largest state-owned commercial bank.

Bragiotti, who was currently chair of a Monegasque bank but had gone missing, was wanted in connection with a bribe paid to BCI's former deputy chief executive, Vincenzo Palladino. On Sept. 18 Arturo Ferruzzi, a former president of the Ferruzzi holding company, was informed by magistrates that he was under investigation in connection with the near-collapse of the concern, Italy's second largest private company.

### Allegations against PDS

The property and assets director of the opposition Democratic Left Party (PDS), Marco Fredda, was arrested on Sept. 18 and charged with receiving a bribe of L 900 million from a construction firm to which the party had sold one of its prime property sites. The payment was not declared as a donation and therefore breached the laws on party financing. A party spokesman said that it was "not a particularly edifying episode", but constituted "only a fiscal offence, not a penal one".

Corruption allegations had been laid in recent months against members of the Italian Communist Party, the PDS's predecessor [see p. 39481], but the PDS had consistently argued that these were isolated cases and that it was the only established party which could claim to be "clean".

Media reports that the Milan team of magistrates involved in operation "clean hands" had uncovered evidence that the PDS had received a kickback of L 621 million on a public works contract and paid it into a secret bank account operated by a former party official in Switzerland were subsequently refuted. Prosecutors

said that allegations that the party had opened secret accounts in Switzerland to deposit bribe money were based on "unfounded information".

### Investigations of former ministers

On Sept. 21 Giulio Andreotti, the former Prime Minister, made his first appearance in court on charges of complicity in the murder of a journalist in 1979 [see pp. 39431; 39529]. Having previously denied any involvement, he now admitted receiving the bribe from an industrialist which had been the centrepiece of a story which the journalist, Mino Pecorelli, had been planning to write when he was murdered.

On Sept. 23, Rome magistrates called for the prosecution of a former minister, Giovanni Prandini, for allegedly extorting a total of L 20,500 million in bribes while he was Minister of Public Works from 1989 until 1992. Along with a fellow Christian Democrat member of parliament and the former head of the State Roads Authority (ANAS), he was accused of having forced companies to pay bribes to obtain contracts.

On Sept. 24 the Chamber of Deputies refused by a two-vote margin an application by Naples magistrates to arrest a former Health Minister, Francesco Lorenzo, who was alleged to have extorted bribes in return for granting anti-aids campaign contracts and allowing increases in drug prices.

### Catania bomb - Murder of priest

A bomb explosion in the Sicilian city of Catania on Sept. 18 injured four *Carabinieri* officers and wrecked the barracks in which they were stationed. In recent months Catania had seen the strongest backlash against the Mafia criminal organization, with a reforming politician pledged to a clean-up of local government being elected mayor in June. Four of the city's leading Mafia members were arrested the same month [see also p. 39529].

A priest who had frequently spoken out against the Mafia was shot in Palermo on Sept. 15.

Fr Giuseppe (or "Pino") Puglisi had on several occasions called in the police to uncover arms caches and, it was reported, had agreed to provide names and information on Mafia activities on the basis of confessions which he had heard. He was the first priest to be murdered for criticizing the Mafia.

■ Last article p. 39613; reference article pp. R113-14.

## GREECE

### Resignation of government - Calling of elections

Constantine Mitsotakis, Prime Minister since April 1990 [see p. 37388], submitted the resignation of his government on Sept. 9 and requested the holding of early elections,



which were duly called the following day by President Constantine Karamanlis. Polling day was scheduled as Oct. 10.

Mitsotakis, 75, had headed a single-party New Democracy party (ND) government since April 1990 with support from the Democratic Renewal party. His position was weakened, however, by a rift with Antonis Samaras, 42, whom he had dismissed as Foreign Minister in April 1992 [see p. 38873]. Samaras set up a populist nationalist splinter party known as Political Spring in June 1993 and on Sept. 6 called on like-minded ND MPs to rally to Political Spring and bring down the government; over the succeeding three days one resigned his seat and two announced that they would sit as independents, thereby depriving Mitsotakis of a working majority. These divisions on the right created the likelihood of a comeback by the Greek socialist party PASOK led by the ailing Andreas Papandreu, 74, Prime Minister in 1981-89.

■ Last articles pp. 39482; 39531; 39614; reference article p. R111.

## TURKEY

### New Deputy Prime Minister and head of SHP

Murat Kuraylcin was named Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State on Sept. 19. He had been elected on Sept. 12 as leader of the Social Democratic Populists (SHP), the junior member of the ruling coalition, in succession to Erdal Inonu, who resigned on Sept. 11 after announcing in June his forthcoming retirement [see p. 39530].

Kuraylcin, 50, mayor of Ankara since 1989, was known for his reformist zeal and liberal views. As mayor he had backed several ambitious urban projects, most notably the construction of the Ankara metro, and was reported recently to have favoured easing restrictions on the use of Kurdish in education and broadcasting.

#### Other party developments

The New Horizon Party (YUP) founded in August [see p. 39614], dissolved itself on Sept. 16 and merged with the True Path Party (TPP).

Aydin Menderes was re-elected leader of the Great Change Party (GCP) at its first congress on Sept. 18.

In late August Mesut Yilmaz had been re-elected leader of the main opposition Motherland Party (ANAP).

#### Assassination of Kurdish deputy - Release of Western tourists

Mehmet Sincar, a Kurdish deputy belonging to the Democracy Party (DEP), was shot dead by armed gunmen in the south-eastern town of Batman on Sept. 4. Responsibility for the killing was attributed by the government to the Turkish *Hezbollah* group, although some DEP members suspected the involvement of the security forces.

The DEP, the successor party to the pro-Kurdish People's Labour Party (HEP) which had been

banned in July [see p. 39574], had 17 deputies in the Grand National Assembly. Sincar was the highest-ranking of the 54 Kurdish party members killed so far in a series of assassinations aimed at alleged Kurdish sympathisers of the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

On Sept. 16 police arrested DEP leader Yasar Kaya, who was not a member of parliament, on charges of conducting "separatist propaganda".

More than 116 people were reported killed in the last week of September in fresh outbreaks of violence between Kurdish rebels and security forces.

Seven Western tourists kidnapped by Kurdish guerrillas in August [see p. 39613], were released on Sept. 14 near Dogubayazit, eastern Turkey.

#### Ciller's visit to Russia and Germany

An agreement on Sept. 9 on halting Armenian military action in Azerbaijan [see also p. 39651] marked the end of a two-day visit to Russia by Prime Minister Tansu Ciller. Under the agreement Russia and Turkey undertook to seek a peaceful solution to this conflict; additional reports indicated that Turkey had asked to be included in a proposed peacekeeping force initially to be drawn from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

A trade protocol signed by the two sides provided for the increase of Siberian gas exports from Russia to Turkey. About 40 per cent of the revenue from Russian gas exports would be used to pay off Russian debts to Turkey, said by Ciller to amount to US\$520 million.

Ciller held talks in Bonn with her German counterpart, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, during an official visit on Sept. 20-22.

Discussions focused on the expansion of bilateral ties and the establishment of a joint committee to monitor neo-Nazi attacks and to consider citizenship rights for Germany's estimated 1,800,000 Turkish residents [for conflicting attitudes in Germany to dual citizenship see p. 39527].

According to other reports Ciller had urged the German government to end its allegedly tolerant policy towards the PKK, which was said to have about 400,000 supporters in Germany.

■ Last article p. 39613-14; reference article pp. R125-26.

## EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

### Bundesbank interest rate cut

On Sept. 9 the German Bundesbank lowered its discount and Lombard rates by half a percentage point, to 6.25 and 7.25 per cent respectively. The Bundesbank had refused to cut interest rates for over two months in what the *Financial Times* of Sept. 10 described as "a stubbornness which led directly to the July upheaval in the European exchange rate mechanism" [see pp. 39610-11].

The German move was immediately followed by interest rate cuts in Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and Belgium (where the discount rate was cut by half a percentage point to 6.5 per cent, only one week after it had been raised by one percentage

point to quell speculation against the Belgian franc); however, while France trimmed its five-to-10-day lending rate from 10 to 7.75 per cent, it left the more important intervention rate unchanged at 6.75 per cent.

#### Spanish steel restructuring agreement

On Sept. 29 the Commission of the European Communities (EC) gave its support to a proposed restructuring plan for the Spanish steel industry.

The plan would involve capacity cuts of 2,320,000 tonnes, the creation of a new concern, Corporación Siderurgia Integral (CSI), and the closure of a plant in Ansio in the Basque region by June 30, 1995; the proposed creation of a small new private plant at Sestao, also in the Basque region, with a capacity of 1,000,000 tonnes, would mean that capacity cuts would come only to 1,320,000 tonnes. State aid was to amount to ECU 2,800 million.

Agreements had still to be concluded with the Italian and German governments on their steel industries, and the EC therefore extended the Sept. 30 deadline, which had been set in February [see p. 39339 for agreement on need to restructure the steel industry].

#### Revised agreement on Japanese car exports

The European Commission and Japanese officials agreed on Sept. 5 on a limit for 1993 of 980,000 Japanese cars to be exported to the EC, a fall of 17.6 per cent when compared with 1992. A higher 1993 quota, of 1,090,000 units, had been agreed in April, but, with EC demand in the first six months of 1993 falling by 18.5 per cent, the Commission had asked for further cuts.

■ Last article pp. 39610-11; reference article pp. R130-32.

## IN BRIEF

**BELGIUM:** Herman Van Rompuy, president of the Christian Socials (CVP), was appointed on Sept. 5 as an additional Deputy Prime Minister; he also took over as Budget Minister from Mieke Offeciers-Van De Wiele (also CVP), who returned to a post with the Flemish employers' federation.

**CYPRUS:** UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report on the progress of talks on Cyprus, submitted to the UN Security Council on Sept. 15 and reportedly especially critical of the Turkish Cypriot side for not giving "co-operation and active support", was in turn criticized on Sept. 16 by Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denkash as "unrealistic and pro-Greek Cypriot" and as being based on a misdiagnosis of the problems.

**CZECH REPUBLIC:** The chief public prosecutor, Gen. Jiri Setina, resigned on Sept. 16 following months of controversy sparked by allegations that he had broken housing regulations and lied to obtain a second apartment in Prague.

**DENMARK:** on Sept. 12 former Prime Minister Poul Schlüter stepped down as chair of the opposition Conservative Party (KF) and was replaced by Hans Engell, a former Minister of Defence (1982-87) and of Justice (1989-93) and leader of the KF parliamentary group; Torben Rechendorff became secretary-general.



# MIDDLE EAST - ARAB WORLD

## MIDDLE EAST

### Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement

Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) signed a historic peace agreement in Sept. 13.

The accord, preceded by agreement on mutual recognition, followed months of secret Israeli-PLO negotiations brokered by the Norwegian government. It provided for an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho and the handover of the two areas to full Palestinian authority, and a lesser degree of self-rule in the rest of the West Bank.

While being widely hailed as a major breakthrough by most countries, the agreement was greeted with hostility and scepticism by many Palestinians and Israelis. The agreement triggered substantial progress in negotiations between Israel and Jordan and acted as a catalyst for developments in Israel's relations with other Arab countries. However, the agreement appeared to have little impact on Israel's negotiations with Syria and Lebanon which remained deadlocked.

#### Announcement of agreement - Background

It was announced on Aug. 30 that Israel and the PLO had secretly negotiated a draft peace agreement.

The agreement had recently been finalized at a secret meeting in Norway between Shimon Peres, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazan), a leading PLO official and Johan Joergen Holst, the Norwegian Foreign Minister. During 1993 Holst, Peres, Abbas and other leading PLO officials including Abu Ala had held numerous secret meetings in Norway, Tunisia (President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali apparently being the only Arab leader aware of the clandestine talks) and other undisclosed European locations. The meetings had run parallel to the four-track Middle East peace talks which had begun in Madrid in November 1991 [see pp. 38594-95], but which had remained in a state of deadlock during nine subsequent rounds [see p. 39532 for 10th round held in Washington in June-July 1993]. News of the agreement completely overshadowed the 11th round of peace talks, which took place in Washington during the first two weeks of September; no progress was reported at the talks.

#### Mutual recognition - Resumption of US-PLO talks

On Sept. 10 Israel and the PLO exchanged letters formally recognizing each other. The terms of mutual recognition were agreed after last-minute talks between Israeli, PLO and Norwegian officials in Paris on Sept. 8.

In his letter to Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin, PLO chairman Yassir Arafat confirmed the following PLO commitments: (i) recognition of the right of the state of Israel to exist in peace and security; (ii) acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) [see pp. 22473; 25029; 26197]; (iii) the resolution of issues relating to "permanent status" through negotiation; (iv) renunciation of terrorism and the assumption of responsibility for "all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance"; and (v) agreement to amend those article of the Palestinian Covenant (the PLO's founding charter) which denied Israel's right to exist.

In a second letter to Holst, Arafat confirmed that after the signing of the Israel-PLO agreement, he would "encourage" Palestinians in the occupied territories to "take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life". This was widely interpreted as a commitment by Arafat to call a halt to the *intifada*.

In his letter to Arafat, Rabin said that the government of Israel had "decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process".

Shortly after the declaration of mutual recognition, US President Bill Clinton announced that the USA would renew its contacts with the PLO. Talks between PLO and US officials were held in Tunis on Sept. 29-30.

The USA had suspended its 18-month-long dialogue with the PLO in June 1990 after Arafat had refused to condemn a Palestinian military attack on Israel [see pp. 37547-48].

#### Signing of Declaration of Principles

The Israeli-PLO agreement, officially entitled a Declaration of Principles (DOP), was signed in Washington on Sept. 13 by Peres and Abbas.

The signing ceremony was attended by some 3,000 guests, including Arafat, Rabin and Clinton. The occasion marked Arafat's first visit to the USA since 1974 when he addressed the UN in New York. Following the signing of the DOP a smiling Arafat offered his hand to Rabin, who, with undisguised reluctance, accepted it.

Rabin's speech included the following: "This signing of the Israeli-Palestinian declaration of principles here today, it's not so easy, neither for myself as a soldier in Israel's war, nor for the people of Israel, nor for the Jewish people in the diaspora who are watching us now with great hope mixed with apprehension. It is certainly not easy for the families of the victims of the wars, violence, terror, whose pain will never heal; for the many thousands who defended our lives with their own and have even sacrificed their lives for our own. For them,



this ceremony has come too late. . . . We have come from Jerusalem, the ancient and eternal capital of the Jewish people. We have come from an anguished and grieving land. We have come from a people, a home, a family that has not known a single year, not a single month, in which mothers have not wept for their sons. . . . Let me say to you, the Palestinians, we are destined to live together on the same soil in the same land. . . . We are today giving peace a chance and saying to you—and saying again to you—enough. . . . Our inner strength, our higher moral values have been derived for thousands of years from the Book of the Books, in one of which, Koheleth [Ecclesiastes], we read: "To every thing there is a season and a time to every purpose under heaven. A time to be born and time to die, a time to kill and a time to heal, a time to weep and a time to laugh, a time to love and a time to hate, a time of war and a time of peace." Ladies and gentlemen, the time for peace has come."

Arafat's speech included the following: "Mr President, I am taking this opportunity to assure you and to assure the great American people that we share your values for freedom, justice and human rights—values for which my people have been striving. My people are hoping that this agreement which we are signing today marks the beginning of the end of a chapter of pain and suffering which has lasted throughout this century. My people are hoping that this agreement which we are signing today will usher in an age of peace, co-existence and equal rights. . . . Now as we stand on the threshold of this new historic era, let me address the people of Israel and their leaders, with whom we are meeting today for the first time, and let me assure them that the difficult decision we reached together was one that required great and exceptional courage.



## Declaration of Principles

Extracts from the agreement (final agreed draft of Aug. 19, 1993) between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization on interim self-rule for Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories.

"The Government of the State of Israel and the Palestinian team [in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference] (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to the decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

**Article I: Aim of the negotiations.** "The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations with the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council") for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

**Article II: Framework for the interim period.** "The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

**Article III: Elections.** "(i) In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free, and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order. (ii) An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles. (iii) These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step towards the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

**Article IV: Jurisdiction.** "Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

**Article V: Transitional period and permanent status negotiations.** "(i) The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. (ii) Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people's representatives. (iii) It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and co-operation with other neighbours, and other issues of common interest. (iv) The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or pre-empted by agreements reached for the interim period.

**Article VI: Preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities.** "Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority

from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council. . . . Authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in . . . education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities. . . .

**Article VII: Interim agreement.** "(i) The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement"). (ii) The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs. (iii) The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above. (iv) In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities. (v) After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

**Article VIII: Public order and security.** "In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

**Article IX: Laws and military orders.** "(i) The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it. (ii) Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

**Article X: Joint Israeli-Palestinian liaison committee.** ". . . A Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring co-ordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

**Article XI: Israeli-Palestinian co-operation in economic fields.** "Recognizing the mutual benefit of co-operation promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon entry into force of this Declaration of Principles an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Co-operation Committee will be established. . . .

**Article XII: Liaison and co-operation with Jordan and Egypt.** "The two parties will invite the governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and co-operation arrangements. . . . These arrangements will include

the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. . . .

**Article XIII: Redeployment of Israeli forces.** "(i) After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV. (ii) In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas. (iii) Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

**Article XIV: Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.** "Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

**Article XV: Resolution of disputes.** "(i) Disputes . . . shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee [or by] a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties [or by] arbitration. . . .

**Article XVI: Israeli-Palestinian co-operation concerning regional programmes.** "Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a 'Marshall Plan', the regional programmes and other programmes, including special programmes for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. . . .

**Article XVII: Miscellaneous provisions.** "(i) This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing. (ii) All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part thereof."

**Annexes:** These covered election arrangements, the withdrawal of Israeli forces and development programmes. Annex I, on elections, stipulated that "Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there" would have the right to participate, and that "the future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on June 4, 1967, will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate". Annex II laid down that the military withdrawal agreement was to be signed within two months and that the withdrawal would begin immediately and be completed within a further four months. The agreement would cover arrangements for the transfer of power except for "external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations and other mutually agreed matters". The Palestinian police force would be recruited locally and among Palestinians with Jordanian passports or with Palestinian documents issued by Egypt. The agreement would cover "a temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon"; a joint Palestinian-Israeli Co-ordination and Co-operation Committee for mutual security purposes; an economic development and stabilization programme, with an Emergency Fund; arrangements for passage between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, Gaza-Egypt and Jericho-Jordan. Other than these agreed arrangements, "the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period".



**Peace plan timetable**

**Sept. 13, 1993.** Signature in Washington of Declaration of Principles.

**Oct. 13, 1993.** Declaration becomes effective. Israeli military administration begins to transfer authority in West Bank and Gaza to "authorized Palestinians".

**Dec. 13, 1993.** Israel and Palestinians to have agreed protocol on withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza Strip and Jericho area. Military withdrawal to begin upon signing.

**April 13, 1994.** Israel to have completed military withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho area. Israel to transfer powers to nominated Palestinian authority. Beginning of the five-year period of interim self-government to a permanent settlement begins.

**July 13, 1994.** Elections to a Palestinian Council to have been held. Elections to be followed by inauguration of Council and the dissolution of Israeli military-run civil administration in the occupied territories.

**April 13, 1996.** Israel and the Palestinians to have begun negotiations on a permanent settlement.

**April 13, 1999.** Permanent settlement to be in force.

We will need more courage and determination to continue the course of building co-existence and peace between us. This is possible and it will happen with mutual determination and with the effort that will be made with all parties on all the tracks to establish the foundations of a just and comprehensive peace."

The DOP aimed to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, in the form of an elected Council for Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The DOP would come into force a month after signing, but several protocols were required to be negotiated before the end of 1993 to flesh out the agreement in such areas as elections, policing and the withdrawal of Israeli troops.

**Reaction to agreement****Knesset endorsement of declaration**

After a stormy three-day debate the *Knesset* (the Israeli legislature) on Sept. 23 endorsed the DOP, the mutual recognition package and the Israel-Jordan "common agenda" [see below]. Drafts had been approved by the Cabinet on Aug. 30. Demonstrators opposed to the agreement congregated outside the *Knesset* during the debate; demonstrations both against and in favour of the accord were commonplace in Israel throughout September.

The government won the vote by a margin of 61 to 50, with eight abstentions including five members of *Shas*, the ultra-orthodox party which had effectively removed itself from the Labour-led coalition in early September following the resignation of its leader, Aryeh Der'i, from the Cabinet [see p. 39662]. *Shas* had campaigned for a referendum to be held on the peace accord and there had been some speculation that the party would vote against

the government. The opposition *Likud* voted against the agreement and called for a general election to be held on the issue.

**Palestinian reaction**

Predictably, the agreement was vehemently opposed by the "rejectionist" Palestinian factions which had, in 1991, disputed Arafat's decision to enter into negotiations with Israel.

Arafat's principal Palestinian opponents were the Islamic *Hamas* and the Damascus-based 10-party "rejectionist front" led by the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The agreement was rejected by such groups on the grounds that it fell far short of Palestinian demands for an independent state.

Although Arafat managed to win approval for the deal from the *Al-Fatah* central committee and the PLO executive committee, his acceptance of a limited Palestinian autonomy, along with Israeli conditions for mutual recognition, cost him the support of some of his closest allies, including, according to some reports, Farouk Qaddumi, the secretary-general of *Al-Fatah* and the PLO "foreign minister".

**Arab reaction - Other international reaction**

The announcement of the agreement sent shock waves through Arab capitals and many leaders were unable to hide their displeasure at the secretive manner in which the PLO had conducted the negotiations.

Throughout September, Arafat toured the Arab states to rally support for the deal, which was approved, but not without considerable objection, at a meeting of the Arab League Council in Cairo on Sept. 19.

The agreement was warmly welcomed by the government of Egypt, which had, according to some reports, played a major role in its advancement.

When news of the agreement was released in late August, the official media in Syria swiftly denounced the principle of Arab parties reaching separate and incomplete deals with Israel. However, the commentaries refrained from direct criticism of either the PLO or Arafat.

Syrian displeasure at the turn of events was evident in the tone of official statements released following talks between Arafat and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad in Damascus on Sept. 5. According to a presidential spokesman, Arafat explained the deal "and circumstances surrounding it". Assad in turn "affirmed Syria's attitude in consolidating the rights of the brethren Palestinian people and that it is up to this people and its institutions... to approve what it considers fit". In a long and detailed interview published in the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Akhbar* of Sept. 20, Assad was openly critical of the deal. "In my opinion," Assad stated, "the PLO has lost, as have the Arabs." Assad stopped short of threatening to oppose the agreement, but said that there was nothing he could do to prevent conflict between those who supported it and those who were against it. "If we had wanted to oppose the agreement," he said, "we could have made it fail."

King Hussein of Jordan expressed deep reservations over the agreement, but insisted that he would support the will of the Palestinian people.

The King's initial reaction upon hearing of the news was to visit Syria for emergency talks with Assad. An official statement said that the two leaders had "discussed the Palestinian-Israeli accord which was a surprise to the two countries and over which there has been no co-ordination between Arab parties". On Sept. 20 Arafat visited Jordan in an attempt to assuage King Hussein's fears over the agreement. Hussein was concerned not only that Jordan was being excluded from the peace process, but over the practical impact of the agreement with regard to his country's economic links with the West Bank and the future status of Palestinians in Jordan, who made up over half the population.

The government of Lebanon criticized the PLO leadership for breaking Arab ranks and for securing what it regarded as a severely flawed autonomy agreement. A march organized in Beirut's predominantly Shi'ite southern suburbs on Sept. 13 by *Hezbollah* to protest against the agreement resulted in the death of eight people during clashes between the army and demonstrators.

The Gulf Co-operation Council in early September issued a statement supporting the agreement. The support of the GCC was significant given that relations between the member states (especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) and the PLO had been poor since the Gulf war, when Palestinians had largely rallied behind Iraq. The agreement was denounced by Iraq.

Speaking on Sept. 14, President Hashemi Ali Akbar Rafsanjani of Iran condemned those who had signed "the greatest act of betrayal of the Palestinian people". He vowed that the forces of Islam would not rest until "every last piece" of Palestine had been liberated.

On Sept. 10 the leader of Libya, Col. Moamer al Kadhafi, described the agreement as "one of the comedies of history" which "should be considered as an object of ridicule and a farce and not a serious matter".

The agreement was widely welcomed outside the Arab world, with statements of firm support being issued by the USA and Russia (co-chairs of the Middle East peace talks), China, India, Japan and the European Communities (EC).

**Financing of the peace**

One of the major issues arising from the peace agreement was the question of future financing for the economic and social development of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There were a number of widely differing estimates of the amount of money needed.

A World Bank report on the occupied territories estimated that the territories required investment of the order of US\$3,000 million in infrastructure and human resources over a 10-year period. However, on Sept. 21 the executive board of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) announced that between US\$7,000 million and US\$10,000 million was required over the next 10 years to rehabilitate the economies of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. A Palestinian report prepared in April 1993 for the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) estimated that investment of US\$11,648 million was required for the period 1994-2000.



## From Camp David to Gaza-Jericho

### 1978

Sept. 17. Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat initial the framework for an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty after two weeks of face-to-face talks at Camp David, USA.

### 1979

March 26. Begin, Sadat and US President Jimmy Carter sign the first-ever Israeli-Arab peace treaty in Washington.

### 1981

Oct. 6. Islamic fundamentalists assassinate Sadat in Cairo. Dec. 14. The Golan Heights, captured from Syria in 1973, are effectively annexed by Israel.

### 1982

April 25. Israel completes its withdrawal from Sinai.  
June 6. Israel launches a full-scale invasion of Lebanon.  
Aug. 21. The PLO begins its retreat from Beirut; a new headquarters is established in Tunis.

### 1983

Nov. 4. 29 Israeli troops are killed in a suicide bomb attack in Tyre, south Lebanon.

### 1985

Jan. 14. The Israeli Cabinet approves an Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon; the withdrawal is completed in June, but Israel maintains a "security zone" in the south.  
Oct. 1. Israeli fighter bombers attack the PLO headquarters in Tunis, killing up to 80 people.  
Oct. 7. Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) guerrillas hijack the *Achille Lauro* cruise ship.

### 1986

Aug. 5. The *Knesset* prohibits meetings between Israelis and PLO members.

### 1987

Nov. 25. Six Israeli soldiers are killed by a lone Palestinian fighter who crosses into Israel from Lebanon by hang-glider.  
Dec. 9. The *intifada* begins in the Gazan camp of Jabalya after an Israeli taxi ploughs into a group of Palestinian labourers, killing four.

### 1988

April 16. Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir), the PLO "number two", is assassinated, presumably by Israeli agents, in Tunis.  
Nov. 15. The Palestine National Council proclaims an independent State of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital and Arafat as its president.  
Dec. 13. At a UN General Assembly session in Geneva, Arafat denounces terrorism and acknowledges Israel's right to exist.  
Dec. 16. US-PLO negotiations open in Tunis.

### 1989

April 6. Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir outlines details of a "peace plan" involving elections in the occupied territories.

Oct. 10. Details are released of a series of unofficial US proposals (the "five-point framework" of Secretary of State James Baker) to facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.

### 1990

May 20. Seven Gaza labourers are shot dead by a deranged Israeli gunman at Rishon Le Zion; the killings prompt some of the most intense rioting of the *intifada*.

June 20. The USA suspends its dialogue with the PLO after Arafat refuses to condemn an unsuccessful PLF attack on Israel.

Aug. 2. Iraq invades Kuwait; Palestinians and the PLO rally behind the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein.

Oct. 8. Israeli police kill at least 17 unarmed Palestinians during unrest at the Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount) in Jerusalem.

### 1991

March 2. The UN Security Council passes Resolution 686 on a ceasefire in the Gulf war.

Oct. 30. The Middle East peace conference opens in Madrid, with Israeli, Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian-Palestinian delegations participating; direct talks begin in early November, multilateral talks in January 1993.

### 1992

June 23. Labour wins a general election in Israel and, three weeks later, Itzhak Rabin is sworn in as Prime Minister.

Dec. 16. Israel deports over 400 Hamas supporters to southern Lebanon.

### 1993

Jan. 19. The *Knesset* revokes the ban on contacts between Israelis and the PLO.

March 30. Following an escalation in violence in the occupied territories, the Israeli government imposes a closure order on the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

Aug. 30. It is announced that after 14-months of secret talks between Israeli and PLO officials in Norway the two sides have agreed on an Israeli-Palestinian "declaration of principles" providing for self-rule in the Gaza Strip and Jericho and more limited autonomy for the rest of the West Bank.

Sept. 13. An Israeli-PLO peace accord is signed in Washington.

In an interview on Sept. 26, the governor of the Bank of Israel, Jacob Frenkel, stated that Israel might provide technical assistance, and even financing, for the development of the territories.

## Diplomatic developments

### Israel-Jordan "common agenda"

Israel and Jordan took a significant step towards a peace treaty when they signed a formal "common agenda" for negotiations in Washington on Sept. 14. Analysts believed that the agenda had been ready to sign for months, but that Jordan had insisted on waiting until progress had been made in the Israeli-Palestinian track. The signing of the agenda meant that Jordan became the first Arab state to reach an understanding with Israel since Egypt signed a full peace agreement in 1979.

The agenda, whose overall aim was "the achievement of just, lasting and comprehensive peace between the Arab States, the Palestinians and Israel", was signed by Elyakin Rubinstein, head of the Israeli delegation to the Middle East peace talks, and Fayez Tarawneh, his Jordanian counterpart.

The document contained undertakings from both sides to refrain from threatening each other's security and established the main areas for future negotiation—notably on water rights, economic co-operation, minor border issues and the status of refugees. In addition it suggested that potential for bilateral co-operation should be explored in the areas of natural resources, human resources, infrastructure and economic issues including tourism.

### Rabin's visit to Egypt - Mubarak-Assad talks

Rabin visited Egypt on Sept. 19 for talks with President Hosni Mubarak.

According to reports of the meeting, Rabin told Mubarak that negotiations with Syria would continue, but that the Palestinian track was Israel's priority. He said that real progress on the Israel-Syria track was largely dependent on Syria moving to restrain the activities of Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon.

On Sept. 22 Assad visited Egypt to hear at first hand Mubarak's assessment of his earlier meeting with Rabin. After his meeting with Assad, Mubarak urged Israel to press ahead swiftly to produce a peace deal with Syria.

### Other meetings

Rabin paid a brief visit to Morocco on Sept. 14 for talks with King Hassan II. According to analysts, Rabin's visit underlined King Hassan's role in facilitating contacts between Israel and the Arab states. When asked when Morocco would recognize Israel officially, Rabin replied that "the very kindness, warmth of the King's reception and his readiness to assist speak for themselves".

Rabin was reported to have paid a secret visit to Morocco in 1976. In 1986 King Hassan had openly received Peres, then Prime Minister of Israel.

There were numerous reports in the Israeli media of a secret meeting between Rabin and King Hussein in the Jordanian port of Aqaba on Sept.

In mid-September US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that an international conference would be held in Washington in early October to raise funds for Palestinian infrastructural projects. The World Bank held a meeting on Sept. 20-21 to discuss the economic aspects of the peace agreement.

On Sept. 9 the UN announced that it had established a high-level task force to focus on economic and social development in Gaza and the West Bank.

Also in mid-September Christopher said that the USA would contribute US\$250 million in cash,

loans and guarantees to the Palestinians over the next two years. Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa announced on Sept. 26 that Japan would contribute some US\$200,000,000 over the next two years.

The *Middle East Economic Digest* of Oct. 8 reported that the European Commission had proposed that the EC provide some US\$600 million to the Palestinians for the period 1994-98. The Commission also approved draft negotiating directives for a new EC-Israel association agreement designed to replace a more limited co-operation agreement concluded in 1975 [see p. 27132].



26. According to the reports, Rabin reassured the King that Jordan would not be left out of the peace process.

The first official Israeli delegation to visit Tunisia completed three days of talks with government officials on Sept. 23.

The visit was arranged to prepare for multilateral negotiations on refugees scheduled to be held in Tunis in October. However, the Israeli delegation, made up of foreign ministry officials, reportedly met with Mahmoud Abbas and Hakam Bala'wi, the PLO representative in Tunis.

## Unrest in occupied territories

There were a number of violent incidents in the occupied territories during September as rejectionists attempted to disrupt the agreement.

On Sept. 2 an Israeli soldier was shot dead in the West Bank town of Hebron. The army blamed *Hamas* for the attack.

Bloody clashes erupted in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and parts of Israel on Sept. 12, the eve of the signing ceremony in Washington.

In the most serious incident, three Israeli soldiers were shot and killed by *Hamas* fighters in an ambush in Gaza City. Three rejectionists, two from the PFLP, also died during fighting in the camps of Gaza. Near Ashod, a Palestinian stabbed an Israeli civilian to death before being killed by a soldier.

Sept. 13, the day of the signing ceremony, was generally peaceful. However, the next day an Israeli soldier was injured in a shoot-out in Gaza; his Palestinian assailant was subsequently shot dead. Later that day a Palestinian suicide-bomber died in Gaza; there were no other casualties. Another suicide-bomber died in Gaza on Sept. 26, again with no other casualties.

Israel imposed a general closure order on the Gaza Strip during the Rosh Hashana holiday period (Sept. 15-19). However, unrest continued in the West Bank. On Sept. 15 a Palestinian was killed in Nablus and four Israeli soldiers were injured in a shoot-out in Hebron.

Mohammad Abu Shaban, one of the most prominent *Al-Fatah* members in Gaza, was shot dead at a rally in Gaza on Sept. 21. Some reports claimed that Shaban was the victim of rivalry within *Al-Fatah*.

On Sept. 22, Israeli soldiers shot dead a Palestinian youth in Gaza. The next day *Hamas* guerrillas killed an Israeli civilian near Ra'anana.

Israeli forces arrested a small number of Black Panther (*Al-Fatah*) leaders in the West Bank on Sept. 29. The PLO claimed that the arrests constituted a clear violation of the spirit of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement, in that Arafat had publicly called on all Black Panther and *Fatah* Hawk members to cease military operations against Israel.

As agreed in August [see p. 39615], over 180 of the 395 *Hamas* activists deported to Lebanon in December 1992 were allowed back into Israel on Sept. 9.

■ Last article pp. 39614-15.

## ISRAEL

### Resignation of Der'i

Aryeh Der'i, a leader of the Sephardic Torah Guardians (*Shas*), part of the Labour-led government coalition, resigned as Interior Minister on Sept. 14 over corruption allegations.

On Sept. 8 Israel's Supreme Court ruled that Der'i and his *Shas* colleague, Deputy Religious Affairs Minister Raphael Pinhasi, should be dismissed from the Cabinet because of accusations of corruption against them. Both men submitted their resignations on Sept. 12 and they became effective 48 hours later. On Sept. 26 the *Knesset* (legislature) house committee voted to lift parliamentary immunity from Der'i, thus permitting criminal charges formally to be brought against him.

Der'i had been under investigation by the police fraud squad since 1990 [see pp. 37547; 37728]. In June 1993 the Attorney General had submitted to Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin a draft charge-sheet accusing Der'i of taking bribes, fraud, violating the public trust, embezzlement and falsifying corporate documents. Pinhasi was accused of falsifying corporate documents, false declarations and attempted fraud.

The two remaining *Shas* members of the government, Arye Gamliel and Moshe Maiya (Deputy Ministers of Housing and Education, respectively), resigned in solidarity with Der'i and Pinhasi.

The effective withdrawal of *Shas* from the Labour-led coalition reduced the government's overall majority in the *Knesset* to two, assuming the support of the five deputies of the two Arab parties (the Arab Democratic party and *Hadash*) which were not members of the coalition, which now consisted only of Labour and *Meretz*. Hence, following the resignation of Der'i, Labour made strenuous efforts to bring *Shas* back into the coalition. Towards this end, Labour promised to set up a state commission to probe allegations by *Shas* of persecution and discrimination in the state's handling of the Der'i investigation. It was also announced that a Sephardi, Michael Ben-Yair, would take over as Attorney General in November.

### Meeting between Chief Rabbi and Pope

On Sept. 21 Pope John Paul II met with Yisrael Meir Lau, Chief Rabbi of Israel's Ashkenazi Jews, at the pontiff's summer residence of Castel Gandolfo outside Rome.

The meeting was the first between a Roman Catholic pontiff and one of Israel's chief rabbis since the founding of the Jewish state in 1948. During the meeting Rabbi Lau invited the Pope to visit Jerusalem.

### Re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Gabon and Mauritius

Gabon and Mauritius re-established on Sept. 29 full diplomatic relations with Israel, severed in 1973 and 1976 respectively [see p. 39576 for signing by Vietnam and Israel of a

memorandum of understanding on the establishment of diplomatic relations].

■ Last article p. 39576; reference article pp. R138-39.

## JORDAN

### Confirmation of November election

The Jordanian Prime Minister, Abdel-Salam al-Majali, confirmed on Sept. 28 that parliamentary elections would be held, as scheduled, in early November. King Hussein had announced elections in early August [see p. 39615], but the signing of the peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in mid-September [see pp. 39658-60] had led to speculation that the poll would be delayed.

### Release of US aid

US President Bill Clinton announced on Sept. 15 that he would release US\$30,000,000 in aid to Jordan which had been delayed by Congress as a result of Jordan's pro-Iraqi stance during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis. Clinton made the announcement one day after Jordan and Israel had initialled a negotiating agenda [see p. 39661].

The aid money was part of Jordan's 1993 allocation and was evenly divided between economic and military assistance.

### Opening of assassination attempt trial

The trial of eight men charged with plotting to assassinate King Hussein in June 1993 [see p. 39615] opened in Amman on Sept. 16.

■ Last article p. 39615; reference article p. R139-40.

## LEBANON

### Economic co-operation agreements with Syria

A Syrian delegation headed by Prime Minister Mahmoud Zubi visited Lebanon on Sept. 15-16. The Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, had paid a visit to Syria on Sept. 13 for talks with President Hafez al-Assad.

During the Zubi visit, the two sides signed four important new agreements which opened the way to closer economic links. Few details of the agreements were released, but according to an official communiqué they covered: (i) the movement of people and goods between the two countries; (ii) agricultural co-operation; (iii) health; and (iv) economic and social co-operation. The two sides also agreed to continue co-operation on foreign policy issues.

### Further Arab aid commitments

In early September Hariri concluded his tour of Arab states aimed at securing aid pledges to deal with the effects of Israel's bombardment of southern Lebanon in July [see pp. 39575-76; 39615]. In late July the Arab



League had made a commitment to provide US\$500 million for reconstruction.

After visiting Saudi Arabia on Sept. 7-9, Hariri had secured an estimated total of US\$370 million, including US\$150 million from the Saudi government and US\$75,000,000 each from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Much of the aid was thought to be in the form of products and equipment, although US\$100 million of the Saudi commitment was cash.

The *Middle East Economic Digest* of Oct. 1 reported that the Islamic Development Bank had pledged a total of US\$87,500,000 in development aid to Lebanon.

### Security situation in south

The security situation in southern Lebanon remained relatively stable during September. The only incident of note occurred in Israel's self-declared "security zone" on Sept. 23, when *Hezbollah* fighters attacked a patrol of the Israeli-proxy South Lebanon Army (SLA), killing two SLA soldiers; the SLA responded with an artillery assault on *Hezbollah* positions north of the "security zone".

■ Last article pp. 39615-16; reference article pp. R140-41.

## IRAQ

### Dismissal of Prime Minister

President Saddam Hussein on Sept. 5 dismissed Prime Minister Muhammad Hamzah al-Zubaydi and appointed new Oil and Industry ministers.

Zubaydi was replaced by the current Finance Minister, Ahmad Husayn Khudayyir who retained his original portfolio. Khudayyir (whose tribal name Ahmad al-Samarrai was dropped in keeping with government practice) had first been appointed to the Cabinet in 1991 [see p. 38083].

Hussein's son-in-law and adviser Lt.-Gen. Hussein Kamil al-Majid, Defence Minister in 1991, was appointed Minister for Industry and Military Industrialization, a post he had held in 1988-91, and for Minerals. Safa Hadi Jawad (also known as Safa al-Habubi), former head of a London-based Iraqi arms procurement company, was named Minister for Oil. Five former ministers of the outgoing Cabinet, not including Zubaydi, were appointed advisers to the President.

No official explanation was given for the Cabinet re-shuffle although a press release issued by the Iraqi embassy in Amman, Jordan, said that they were intended "to give a new momentum to Iraq's construction quest following the Gulf crisis". Opposition parties claimed, however, that the reshuffle had been prompted by Zubaydi's dismissal for his failure to prevent a recent coup attempt planned by sections of Saddam Hussein's Takriti clan [see p. 39616].

### Reported coup attempt - Executions

Reports emerged in September of a co-ordinated move by the regime to crush remaining pockets of political opposition.

### Key members of Iraqi Council of Ministers

- \*Ahmad Husayn Khudayyir (Ahmad al-Samarrai) Prime Minister, Finance
- Tariq Aziz Deputy Prime Minister
- Wathban Ibrahim al-Hasan Interior
- Muhammad Said Kazim al-Sahhaf Foreign Affairs
- Ali Hasan al-Majid Defence
- Samal Majid Faraj Planning
- Mohammad Mehdi Saleh Trade
- \*Safa Hadi Jawad (Safa al-Habubi) Oil
- \*Lt.-Gen. Hussein Kamil al-Majid Industry and Military Industrialization; Minerals
- Hamid Yusuf Hammadi Information and Culture
- \*New appointment.
- \*Altered responsibilities.

On Sept. 6 Jordan-based opposition parties said that Saddam Hussein had ordered "dozens of executions and arrests" after foiling a coup attempt by members of his own Takriti clan. The allegations followed reports in late August of the execution of five former members of the regime, including two from the Takriti clan. On Sept. 14 a Kurdish radio station in northern Iraq reported that Maj.-Gen. Salam, the most senior officer in the Iraqi airforce, had been executed in Baghdad on Sept. 7.

The human rights organization, Amnesty International, confirmed on Sept. 7 that scores of prominent Sunnis, traditionally thought to be loyal to the regime, had been detained in the second half of August. Among them were two former ministers (not associated with the outgoing Cabinet), and several members of the Jabour tribe who had been arrested in retaliation for the defection in August of Hamed Alwan al-Jabouri [see p. 39616].

Several human rights organizations also corroborated reports of the summary execution in late August of more than 1,000 inmates, mostly Shias, at the al-Radwanieh prison camp, south-west of Baghdad. The killings were said to have been supervised by Hussein's son-in-law Kamil al-Majid. Earlier the Tehran-based Shia opposition grouping, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), had alleged that 4,000 detainees from southern Iraq had been executed for their part in a popular uprising staged at the end of August.

### Talks with UN on arms monitoring

High-level negotiations between Iraqi and UN officials on the long-term monitoring of Iraqi arms, which began in New York in late August [see p. 39616], ended on Sept. 11 without an accord.

Reports said that talks were suspended after UN officials failed to obtain a guarantee by Iraq that it would not resume its military programme.

On Sept. 1 Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz met the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in New York to discuss the lifting of UN sanctions. The move came amid renewed calls for an end to the international embargo on exports to Iraq.

In early September Turkey announced that it was resuming certain exports to Iraq and providing US\$13,500,000 in humanitarian aid to Iraqi Kurds.

Figures released by the Health Ministry on Sept. 12 showed that more than 300,000 people had died as a result of medical shortages during three years of UN trade sanctions.

On Sept. 21 the UN Security Council, in its routine 60-day sanctions review, voted to continue the economic embargo against Iraq.

### UN weapons inspection

Monitoring cameras at the Yawm al-Azim and Rafah missile sites [see pp. 39576; 39616], were activated on Sept. 24. The use of the cameras had been provisionally agreed during talks in July between government officials and the UN Special Commission on Iraq [see p. 39576].

On Sept. 16 the UN introduced low-level helicopter flights to extend its surveillance of Iraqi arms after some initial opposition from the government.

### Release of Swedish nationals

Three Swedish engineers imprisoned in September 1992 for illegally entering the country [see p. 39116], were released on Sept. 22 after obtaining a presidential pardon in response to an appeal by King Carl Gustaf of Sweden.

■ Last article p. 39616; reference article pp. R137-38.

## SAUDI ARABIA

### Decree on provincial system of government

A royal decree issued on Sept. 16 gave details of a new provincial system of government which had been announced in March 1992 [see p. 38839]. In August royal decrees had been issued announcing the membership of a Consultative Council and codifying Cabinet reforms [see p. 39617].

### Saudi regions and governors (regional capital in parenthesis)

Riyadh (Riyadh)	Prince Salman Ibn Abdel-Aziz
Mecca (Mecca)	Prince Majed Ibn Abdel-Aziz
Medina (Medina)	Prince Abdel-Majeed Ibn Abdel-Aziz
Qassim (Brida)	Prince Faisal Ibn Bandar Ibn Abdel-Aziz
Eastern Region (Dammam)	Prince Mohammad Ibn Fahd
AsirD (Abha)	Prince Khaled al-Faisal
Tabuk (Tabuk)	Prince Fahd Ibn Sultan Ibn Abdel-Aziz
Hail (Hail)	Prince Miqren Ibn Abdel-Aziz
Northern Border (Arar)	Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdel Aziz Ibn Musaad Ibn Jiluwi
Jizan (Jazan)	Prince Mohammad Ibn Turki al-Sudairi
Narjan (Narjan)	Prince Fahd Ibn Khalid al-Sudairi
Baha (Baha)	Prince Mohammad Ibn Saud Ibn Abdul Aziz
Jouf (Sakaka)	Prince Sultan Ibn Abdelrahman al-Sudairi



The new decree confirmed that the kingdom was divided into 13 regions, each with a governor responsible to the Interior Minister. Regional councils, made up of officials and citizens appointed by the Prime Minister, would monitor development in the region and advise the government.

■ Last article p. 39617; reference article p. R144.

## EGYPT

### Approval of IMF extended fund facility - Second tranche of debt-forgiveness programme

On Sept. 20 the executive board of the IMF approved a three-year credit under the extended fund facility (EFF) to support the Egyptian government's medium-term economic and financial reform programme. Policies agreed by the government and the IMF for the 1993-96 period aimed to increase economic growth rates, while controlling the budget deficit and reducing inflation. Commenting on the reform programme, the IMF said that it "should establish a firm foundation for increasing confidence and lead to accelerated investment, growth and employment".

The board approval followed agreement between the Egyptian government and IMF officials on a letter of intent in July 1993 [see p. 39578]. The agreement authorized drawings of up to the equivalent of SDR 400 million (about US\$569 million) in six-monthly tranches.

Approval of the EFF automatically triggered forgiveness on a second 15 per cent tranche of debt reduction agreed with the "Paris Club" of government creditors in 1991. The 1991 agreement aimed to halve Egypt's US\$20,000 million government-to-government debt by an immediate forgiveness of 15 per cent, followed by a second 15 per cent cut in 1993 and a further 20 per cent to be written off in mid-1994 [see p. 38209].

#### Continued Islamist violence

During September Islamic fundamentalist militants targeted for attack police and security officials in the southern region of Asyut, an area renowned as a fundamentalist stronghold.

As many as nine police officers were assassinated in Asyut during September. The Islamic League (*Gamaat i-Islami*) claimed responsibility for a number of the attacks.

The Agence France-Presse news agency reported on Sept. 15 that dozens of Coptic Christians had been wounded in clashes with Muslim fundamentalists in Upper Egypt. According to the report, Muslim extremists had killed 34 Copts, mostly in Upper Egypt, since the fundamentalists launched their campaign to topple the government in March 1992.

The Supreme Military Court on Sept. 15 sentenced two out of eight Muslim militant defendants to death for attempting to assassinate a senior military officer, Gen. Uthman Shahin, in mid-July. [An incorrect Agence France-Presse report led to the erroneous statement on p. 39578 that Gen. Shahin

had been killed in the attack.] Four other defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment (three in absentia) and the remaining two were acquitted.

In all 27 Islamists had now been sentenced to death by military courts since December 1992; of these, 15 were hanged in June and July 1993 [see pp. 39536; 39578].

#### Visit by Sudanese Foreign Minister

Sudanese Foreign Minister Husayn Sulayman Abu Salih visited Cairo on Sept. 7-10 for talks with his Egyptian counterpart Amr Mohammed Moussa and with President Hosni Mubarak [see p. 39537 for details of the poor state of relations between Egypt and Sudan]. Details of the discussions were not released.

■ Last article p. 39617; reference article pp. R135-36.

## TUNISIA

### Approval of reforms to voting system

The *Middle East Economic Digest* of Sept. 17 reported that the government had approved a series of reforms to the voting system.

According to the report, the changes effectively opened the way for opposition parties to enter the National Assembly. In Assembly elections held in 1989 the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) won all 141 seats despite nominal competition from six legalized opposition parties.

■ Last article p. 39578; reference article p. R145.

## ALGERIA

### Appointment of new Cabinet

Redha Malek, Prime Minister since Aug. 21 [see p. 39618], appointed a new Cabinet on Sept. 5. According to the *Middle East Economic Digest* of Sept. 10, the delay in its appointment reflected divisions within the ruling junta, the High Committee of State (HCS), over the direction of economic policy as well as "deep factional differences".

At the swearing-in ceremony on Sept. 5 Malek indicated that he would maintain a hard line towards the Islamist opposition. "One of our priority actions," he said, "is to restore order and to guarantee the safety of people and property." On his government's economic policies, he said that "we will go to a free market economy with pragmatism, taking into account the particular needs of our society".

The new Interior Minister Col. (ret'd) Salim Saadi, a close ally of Malek, had served as Agriculture and Industry Minister in the early 1980s; he succeeded Mohammed Hardi, a civilian, whose replacement had been advocated by the military. Brig.-Gen. Zeroual remained as Minister of National Defence, a post to which he had been appointed in July 1993 [see p. 39578].

Mohamed Salah Dembri, hitherto Algerian ambassador to Greece, replaced Malek as Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to the *Middle East Economic Digest* of Sept. 17, Dembri was a political ally of HCS chair Ali Kafi.

## New Algerian Cabinet

- \*Redha Malek Prime Minister
- Brig.-Gen. Lamine Zeroual National Defence
- \*Mohamed Salah Dembri Foreign Affairs
- \*Col. (ret'd) Salim Saadi Interior and Local Communities
- Mohamed Tegui Justice
- \*Mourad Benachnou Economy
- \*Mohamed Merzoug Communications
- \*Abdelfid Amokrane Religious Affairs
- Ahmed Djebbar National Education
- \*Sid-Ali Lebib Youth and Sports
- Tahar Allan Post and Telecommunications
- \*Hacene Laskri Vocational Training
- \*Lounes Bourenane Labour and Social Protection
- Ahmed Hasmim Agriculture
- Mokdad Sifi Equipment
- \*Mokhtar Meherzi Industry and Mines
- Mohamed Arezki Isli Transport
- Mohammed Seghir Babes Health and Population
- Brahim Chibout War Veterans
- \*Ahmed Benbitour Energy
- \*Mohamed Meghlaoui Housing
- Ali Brahiti Minister Delegate for Budget
- Mustapha Mokraoui Minister Delegate for Commerce
- \*Redha Hamiani Minister Delegate for Small and Medium Enterprises
- \*Boubekeur Benbouzid Minister Delegate for Universities and Scientific Research
- \*Ahmed Ouyahia Secretary of State for Co-operation and Maghreb Affairs
- \*Said Bouchair Government Secretary-General
- \*New appointment.
- \*Altered responsibilities.

Mourad Benachnou, a former World Bank executive director, was appointed as Economy Minister, a post previously held by Malek's predecessor as Prime Minister, Belaid Abdesselam. Benachnou was known to be an advocate of debt rescheduling, and his appointment therefore gave rise to speculation that the government would depart from its past policy and attempt to reach a formal agreement on its debts with the IMF and other official creditors. According to World Bank figures, Algeria's total external debt stood at US\$28,636 million in 1991.

Ahmed Benbitour was promoted from Minister-Delegate to the Treasury to take over the important Energy portfolio place of Hacene Mefti.

### Attacks by Islamists - Government response

The war between armed Islamist groups and the state security forces continued during September. The Islamists maintained their policy of attacking high-profile opponents, including journalists and academics, and continued to inflict damage on the country's economy by carrying out arson attacks on factories and farmland. For their part, the security forces continued to arrest Islamist suspects; others were killed during frequent shoot-outs.



A journalist with the weekly *Elminbar* (the organ of the Popular Society for Unity and Action) was kidnapped and killed in Blida province on Sept. 10-11. Author and intellectual Abderrahmane Chergou, who had published a number of anti-Islamist articles, was shot dead outside his home in Mohammadia on Sept. 27.

#### Opening of Merbah assassination trial

On Sept. 30 a group of 36 people were formally charged with, among other things, involvement in the assassination of former Prime Minister Kasdi Merbah in mid-August [see p. 39618].

On Sept. 8 a special court in Algiers sentenced five militants to death on charges which included setting up a "terrorist" group, inciting insurrection, and murder.

#### Killing of French civilians

Two French surveyors kidnapped by Islamists near Tlelat in south-western Algeria on Sept. 20 were found dead the following day. They were the first foreigners to die in an incident linked directly to the Islamist insurgency. The authorities blamed the killings on a fringe group identified as the United Company of Jihad.

#### Release of prominent FIS figures in Germany

Rabeh Kebir, the main spokesman in Europe for the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), and Oussama Madani, son of the FIS leader Abbasi Madani, were released from detention in a German prison on Sept. 7.

Kebir and Madani had been arrested by the German authorities in June after the Algerian government had issued an international arrest warrant over their alleged role in the August 1992 bombing of Algiers airport [see pp. 39072; 39489; 39536]. German prosecutors ordered their release after finding that it could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt that they had participated in the attack. Of the 38 defendants convicted in Algeria of the bombing, seven were executed in late August [see p. 39618].

■ Last article p. 39618; reference article pp. R133-34.

## MOROCCO

### Indirect elections

Indirect elections to 111 seats in the Chamber of Representatives, the Moroccan legislature, took place on Sept. 17. Direct elections to 222 seats had taken place on June 25 [see pp. 39535-36]. The ruling centre-right coalition, the *Entente Nationale*, emerged as the largest bloc, with 154 seats in the enlarged 333-member chamber. The leftist opposition *Bloc Démocratique* finished with 120 seats.

The 111 members were elected by electoral colleges consisting of members of urban and rural communal councils, members of professional chambers and trade unions.

The *Entente Nationale* made significant gains in the indirect elections, winning 66 of the 111 seats. The *Bloc Démocratique*, which had made a breakthrough in the June elections, performed relatively

### Final results of Moroccan general election

	June 25	Sept. 17	Total
<b>Entente Nationale*</b>			
<i>Union Constitutionnelle</i>	27	27	54
<i>Mouvement Populaire</i>	33	18	51
<i>Parti National Démocrate</i>	14	10	24
<i>Mouvement National Populaire</i>	14	11	25
<b>Bloc Démocratique*</b>			
<i>Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires</i>	48	4	52
<i>Istiqlal</i>	43	7	50
<i>Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme</i>	6	4	10
<i>Confédération Démocratique du Travail</i>	0	4	4
<i>Union Générale des Travailleurs Marocains</i>	0	2	2
<i>Organisation de l'Action Démocratique et Populaire</i>	2	0	2
<b>Other parties*</b>			
<i>Rassemblement National des Indépendants</i>	28	13	41
<i>Parti Démocratique pour l'Indépendance</i>	3	6	9
<i>Union Marocaine du Travail</i>	0	3	3
<i>Parti de l'Action</i>	2	0	2
<i>Indépendants</i>	2	2	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>333</b>

\*The alignments are not as given for the June elections on p. 39535, but should be regarded as correct as of September.

poorly in the indirect polling, winning only 21 seats.

#### Meeting of Franco-Moroccan commission

The joint Franco-Moroccan military commission convened in Rabat on Sept. 28-29. It was

the commission's first official meeting since 1975, although senior officers from the French and Moroccan armed forces had always maintained close links.

■ Last article p. 39618; reference article p. R142.

## WESTERN SAHARA

### New SADR government

Radio France Internationale (RFI) reported on Sept. 19 a reshuffle of the government-in-exile of the self-proclaimed Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR, proclaimed as an independent state by the Polisario Front in 1976).

Bouchraya Bayoune was appointed as Prime Minister in place of Mahfoud Ali Beiba, who became Minister of Health. Brahim Ghali replaced Mohammed Lamine as Defence Minister. Ghali had previously served as Defence Minister, but had left the government in 1991 after what RFI described as "serious political disagreements". According to analysts Ghali's reappointment was intended to strengthen the military capacity of the Polisario Front. RFI reported that Ghali was a "supporter of the hard line against Morocco".

■ Last article p. 39579; reference article p. R146.

## IN BRIEF

**ARAB LEAGUE:** The League Council agreed on Sept. 22 to admit Comoros, bringing membership of the organization to 22.

**IRAN:** The partial inspection of a Chinese cargo vessel suspected by the USA of carrying substances necessary for Iran's chemical weapons industry [see p. 39617], failed to uncover such materials, according to Chinese reports on Oct. 2

# INTERNATIONAL

## IMF - WORLD BANK

### Autumn meetings

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank held their autumn round of joint meetings on Sept. 28-30 in Washington. Preparatory meetings of the IMF's Interim Committee, the IMF-World Bank Development Committee, the Group of Seven industrialised countries (G-7), the Group of Ten industrialised countries (G-10) and the Group of 24 developing countries (G-24), were held on Sept. 25-27.

In his address to the opening session of the joint meetings on Sept. 28 the Managing Director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus, called on industrialized countries to "refocus boldly" their economic policies in order to strengthen growth and reduce unemployment. He also stressed the urgency of (i) concluding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay Round of trade talks [see

p. 39666]; (ii) introducing structural reform; (iii) lowering budget deficits by cutting subsidies and military spending; and (iv) reducing interest rates to boost economic growth and employment.

The President of the World Bank, Lewis Preston, focused on developing countries and highlighted the Bank's effectiveness in combating Third-World poverty. Among the measures adopted by the Bank were increased lending to the private sector and tripling over three years the Bank's support for "human resource development" such as education; taking steps to improve the quality of the Bank's loan portfolio; and creating an inspection panel to strengthen accountability. (The decision to establish an inspection panel to review complaints from Board members or people affected by Bank loans was reported on Sept. 27.)

#### G-7 meeting

G-7 ministers and central bank governors who met on Sept. 25 agreed on the need for far-reaching deregulation of their economies and extensive tax reforms, according to the US



Treasury Secretary, Lloyd Bentsen, who chaired the discussions.

The G-7 ministers held a separate meeting with the Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov the same day, and expressed in a communiqué "very strong hope" that recent political developments in Russia [see pp. 39648-50] "will help Russia achieve a decisive breakthrough on the path of market reform". G-7 ministers had reportedly agreed not to endorse any new financial support for Russia before further progress on its economic reform programme was achieved.

#### G-10 meeting

A meeting of G-10 ministers and central bank governors held on Sept. 26 reviewed items due for discussion by the Interim and Development committees [see below].

#### Interim Committee meeting

The meeting of the IMF's 24-member policy making Interim Committee held on Sept. 26 expressed concern about rising debt levels in many African countries and recognized "the special role ESAF (enhanced structural adjustment facility) has played in fostering effective reform in these countries". It directed the IMF's Executive Board "to implement rapidly the agreed framework so as to ensure continuity of ESAF operations after November 30, 1993 [the cutoff date for commitments of financial assistance under the current ESAF]".

The IMF's annual report published on Sept. 14 had recommended a new structural adjustment facility worth SDR 6,000 million to replace the existing ESAF. Reports said however that industrialized member countries, many of them facing severe budgetary constraints, had responded coolly to the proposal. Established in 1987 to replace the structural adjustment fund (SAF—founded in March 1986), the ESAF offered loans at 0.5 per cent interest rates to the poorest developing countries. Its success was recently underlined in an IMF study which found that annual growth rates in 19 recipient countries had risen from 2 per cent to 3 per cent after ESAF finance and reform programmes.

#### Development Committee meeting

The Development Committee of the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the World Bank meeting on Sept. 27 pledged to "do more to address the impact of macro-economic and adjustment measures" in borrowing countries, and welcomed the constructive part played by the IMF and the World Bank "in supporting social security system reforms and establishing and financing safety nets as part of their adjustment lending".

The UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Kenneth Clarke urged the committee to consider immediate debt relief for the poorest countries, chiefly in sub-Saharan Africa, under the Trinidad terms [see p. 37892].

#### World Economic Outlook

The IMF's *World Economic Outlook* released on Sept. 22 showed that growth in the developing world in 1993 would be maintained at 2.2 per cent in line with forecasts in May [see

p. 39490]. However, growth in the industrialized world would weaken in 1993 to 1.1 per cent from an already modest 1.7 per cent in 1992.

#### Suspension of Sudan's voting rights

Sudan was barred from exercising its voting rights at the meeting, its rights having been suspended on Aug. 6 [see p. 39587], following its persistent failure to fulfil its obligations. The action was taken under Article XXVI, section 2 (b), of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, and was the first such instance since the entry into force of the Third Amendment of the Articles of Agreement on Nov. 11, 1992. The amendment, adopted by the IMF's Board of Governors in June 1990, was aimed at strengthening strategy on overdue financial obligations to the IMF by authorizing the suspension of voting and other related rights of defaulting members. Sudan's overdue financial obligations to the IMF totalled SDR 1,150.9 million (about US\$1,600 million) as of Aug. 6, 1993.

■ Last article p. 39539; reference articles pp. R154-55; 159.

## GATT

### EC ministers' meeting

A major crisis endangering a final accord concluding the Uruguay round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was averted on Sept. 21 after agriculture, foreign and trade ministers from the European Communities (EC), meeting in Brussels, decided not to reopen negotiations on the US-EC accord on farm subsidies signed in November 1992 [see pp. 39176-77]. A communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, while avoiding any mention of a renegotiation of the pact (as demanded by France), underlined points of contention and restated "the importance of guaranteeing the EC's world role as an agricultural exporter". The EC trade commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, was delegated to resume immediate talks with the USA aimed at securing a more generous interpretation of the accord.

The outcome, hailed by ministers as a triumph and by observers as a compromise, followed weeks of dramatic brinkmanship during which a French threat to veto the deal on farm subsidies was met with warnings by UK Prime Minister John Major (on Sept. 19 while on a visit to Japan) and Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd expressing UK readiness to disrupt EC affairs if France caused the GATT talks to founder. The main French farm union, Co-Ordination Rurale, had staged a blockade of road and rail links around Paris on Sept. 15, in an attempt to force the French government to veto the US-EC farm agreement.

Efforts to iron out differences met with little success. On Sept. 20 a Franco-German initiative which fell short of calls for a formal renegotiation of the US-EC farm agreement identified five areas in need of concession. These included an extension of the so-called peace clause preventing unilateral

sanctions by either side; flexibility to make cuts in subsidized food exports at any point during the six-year life of the agreement; ensuring that EC food mountains were exempt from export curbs; strengthening existing provisions to prevent surges in cheap US cereal substitutes; and guarantees that the EC would get a full share of any growth in world food markets. The draft failed to win approval after it was argued that it would restrict room for manoeuvre in future negotiations with the USA.

On Sept. 21 the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé said upon returning to Paris that France reserved the right to exercise its veto if the EC failed to win concessions from the USA. In a statement responding to the EC decision issued the same day the US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor said that the USA would not reopen talks on the US-EC farm agreement "directly or indirectly".

#### EC-US talks

Talks between Brittan and Kantor held in Washington on Sept. 27-28 ended without a resolution of outstanding issues relating to the farm agreement. Both sides, however, reiterated their determination to complete the Uruguay round by the Dec. 15 deadline, and agreed to meet again in October.

A joint declaration issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and GATT on Sept. 26 blamed the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized countries for the impasse in the GATT talks.

#### French opposition to cultural free trade

The French Culture Minister Jacques Toubon warned on Sept. 14 of an impending French campaign against any agreement involving free trade in cinema and television film distribution. The warning came in advance of an appeal published on Sept. 28 and signed by some 4,400 French actors, producers and authors, calling for Europe's "cultural identity" to be protected in the GATT negotiations.

■ Last article p. 39580; reference article pp. R151-52.

## OPEC

### Oil Ministers' meeting

The ministerial monitoring committee of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), meeting in Geneva on Sept. 27-29, agreed to restrict global OPEC oil production for the next six months to 24,500,000 barrels per day (bpd). The new ceiling was well above the 23,582,000 bpd which, although agreed in February, had been widely ignored [see pp. 39346; 39538], but it was below expected demand during the northern winter.

Final agreement on total output came after intense negotiations to reach a consensus on individual quotas.

On Sept. 26 a sub-committee of "wise men", including OPEC Secretary-General Subroto, met delegations from member states to iron out differ-



ences, especially between Iran and Kuwait, over Kuwait's demand that its quota be restored to parity with the United Arab Emirates (at 2,161,000 bpd) to make up for losses sustained during the Gulf war. In June Kuwait had pulled out of OPEC's production ceiling mechanism over this issue [see pp. 39346; 39538]. The final breakthrough came reportedly after a telephone conversation on Sept. 27 between King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and Iranian President Hashemi Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who apparently agreed to resolve their differences over individual quotas [see pp. 39120; 39218; 39346; 39580] in an effort to stabilize world oil prices.

Under the new pact Kuwait agreed to restrict production to 2,000,000 bpd; Iran agreed to restrict production in the fourth quarter of 1993 to 3,600,000 bpd (above its present allocation of 3,300,000 bpd, but below its preferred quota of 4,000,000 bpd); and Saudi Arabia accepted a freeze on its existing output of 8,000,000 bpd during the same period.

On Sept. 29 Kuwait's Oil Minister Ali Ahmad al-Baghli said that he was "happy" with the agreement although he had hoped for a higher quota. Iran described the meeting as a "success" and welcomed "the return of Kuwait to the OPEC quota system".

■ Last article p. 39580; reference article p. R155.

## UNITED NATIONS

### Opening of 48th General Assembly session

Representatives from 184 member states attended the opening session of the 48th UN General Assembly in New York on Sept. 21 under the presidency of Samuel R. Insanally, Permanent Representative of Guyana to the UN [for 47th General Assembly session see pp. 39120-21].

In his annual report to delegates UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed pessimism about the UN's long-awaited renaissance after the end of the Cold War. He criticized some members for pushing UN troops into areas of conflict "where major powers [were] not willing to venture themselves", and said that the UN was having difficulties in resolving the problems of poorer countries at a time when the rich states were no longer in competition for support in their ideological battles.

US President Bill Clinton, in his maiden speech to the General Assembly on Sept. 27, said that "the UN simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world's conflicts". On Sept. 23 the USA's permanent representative to the UN Madeleine Albright had called for a radical review of the UN's peacekeeping functions and suggested that no foreign troops be sent "in harm's way without a clear mission, competent commanders, sensible rules of engagement and the means required to get the job done".

Calls for more modest UN peacekeeping ambitions were endorsed on Sept. 28 by UK Foreign and

Commonwealth Secretary Douglas Hurd, who urged the rigorous control of future peacekeeping activities. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, who also addressed the General Assembly on Sept. 28, highlighted his country's self-imposed role in peacekeeping activities in the former Soviet Union. According to some reports Russia was seeking financial assistance from the UN to pay for such operations.

### Bids for Security Council membership

The debate on the possible enlargement of the UN Security Council gained momentum with Germany, believed by some observers to be a front-runner, publicly offering itself as a candidate for an additional permanent seat. Japan, another serious contender, chose to remain more circumspect, stressing merely its firm support for UN activities. On Sept. 29 China argued that any reform of the UN Security Council should include greater representation for developing countries. Earlier some reports had indicated that the 22-member Arab League intended to lobby for a permanent Arab seat on the Security Council.

■ Last article p. 39618; reference article p. R156.

## UNCTAD

### Trade and Development Report

The annual report of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), *Trade and Development Report 1993*, underlined the contrast between the remarkable economic performance of East and South-East Asia, averaging 6 per cent growth in 1992 and 1993, and the deepening recession in industrialized countries. Falling output levels and soaring unemployment in Eastern Europe were attributed primarily to the absence of appropriate mechanisms and institutions required to sustain a market economy.

Poor growth in Africa stemmed from worsening terms of trade and a high incidence of man-made and natural disasters. In Latin America the easing of the debt crisis of the 1980s had encouraged growth rates of around 5 per cent in 1991 and 1992, under tighter monetary and fiscal policies combined with increased trade liberalization and privatization.

■ Last article p. 39394; reference article p. R157.

## WAR CRIMES

### Release of Demjanjuk

John Demjanjuk, having been acquitted in Israel on war crimes charges [see p. 39581], arrived in Medina in his home state of Ohio, USA, aboard a private flight from New York, on Sept. 22 having flown overnight after his release from prison in Israel the previous day.

Reports said that he would remain in seclusion for several weeks before returning to his home in Cleveland.

Demjanjuk's release, delayed by a series of petitions from Jewish Holocaust survivors who launched legal proceedings to pursue fresh criminal charges against him [see p. 39619], had finally been made possible on Sept. 19 when Israel's Supreme Court ruled against a re-trial. The US Justice Department, which had earlier sought to prevent his re-entry into the United States, on Sept. 1 announced that it had withdrawn its appeal to the US Supreme Court.

Demjanjuk was extradited to Israel in 1986 [see p. 34839] after being stripped of his US citizenship in 1981 following legal proceedings in which he was accused of concealing his wartime activities. He was expected to face a fresh round of legal proceedings in order to clear his name and regain his US citizenship.

■ Last article p. 39619; reference article pp. R158-59.

## ICRC

### International Conference on the Protection of War Victims

Representatives from 159 countries attended the International Conference on the Protection of War Victims, jointly sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Swiss government, which was held in Geneva on Aug. 30-Sept. 1.

A final declaration condemned the targeting of civilians during armed conflict and supported moves for a permanent war crimes tribunal. In April the ICRC had appealed against the use of inhumane conventional weapons, especially landmines, which caused civilian suffering [see p. 39443].

■ Last article p. 39443.

## IN BRIEF

**AVIATION:** Three Iranians describing themselves as "Iranian Muslim fundamentalists", who hijacked a Russian Tupolev-134 jet aircraft en route from the Azerbaijani capital, Baku, to Perm in Siberia on Sept. 15, surrendered the following day after forcing the pilot to land in Oslo, Norway; the hijackers were said to have acted in protest against alleged human rights violations in Iran.

**IMO:** The accessions of Turkmenistan and Eritrea, on Aug. 26 and Aug. 31 respectively, brought the total membership of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to 146.

**OLYMPIC GAMES:** The International Olympic Committee (IOC) voted in Monte Carlo, Monaco, on Sept. 23 to select Sydney, Australia, as the venue of the Olympic Games in the year 2000. Sydney won the vote against Beijing and the less well-supported candidacies of Manchester, Berlin and Istanbul.



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